Since the 1970s Anthony Giddens has become one of the most cited social scientists by works on class structure, social theory — receiving most attention for his anti-reductionist theory of structuration — the fundamentals of sociology, state formation and related topics. More recently he came to the fore with his view on modernity and, widely noticed in politics, on 'New Labour' and the 'Third Way'. His current work on Europe — preceding Europe in the Global Age he (co-) edited two volumes on 'Social Europe' in 2006 — directly emanated out of these studies and continues part of its themes. Social Europe — 'the European social model' — alongside social-structural changes is again prominent in the book under consideration. Other topics addressed in this work are global competition and the importance of learning for the maintenance of a competitiveness of European societies. The book also discusses environmental questions, migration processes and related problems, questions of lifestyle and the institutional structure of the EU. On the whole, it has the character of a critical overview of a number of subjects rather than of a focused treatise making its case. And since Giddens does barely discuss rival theories or even ones similar to his own position it is difficult to detect the novelties of his book. Because of its somewhat fragmented structure a review has to be selective. My choice is to touch upon Giddens' ideas on the structure of the European Union and then to concentrate on social Europe and the knowledge economy in the context of global competition.
Joining authors like Andy Moravscik and Vivien Schmidt and against Euro-skeptics, Giddens classifies the European Union as a democracy (pp. 211ff), though rather of the deliberative than representative type. Its structure of checks and balances and the anticipation of vetos from member states require permanent negotiation. In brief, it is a 'democratic association of semi-sovereign nations' (p. 211). It is not a federation (p. 210). Analytically, it is not clear where this statement is based upon because there are many sorts of federations and perhaps semi-federations as one of which the EU could be considered. Normatively, the rejection of the idea of a European federation could be understandable as an aspect of Giddens' general attitude towards the EU, however. Reflecting the British position and the 'no's' in the Dutch and French referenda on the envisaged constitution, the EU has to remain a polity of limited scope in his view. It is an experiment 'in government without a state', and as such it does not need a constitution or quasi-constitution in the form of a comprehensive contract. A 'mission statement' would suffice (pp. 212ff).
In late 2007 it seems however, that the EU is moving into the direction of a constitution-like contract and some form of federation. However that may be, at the heart of the EU has to be the European social model, which is its 'sine qua non' (p. 207). The European social model does not exist, however. It is a contested notion (p. 1ff) reflecting different realities of work and welfare in the member states. The Portuguese welfare system is not the same as the Swedish one, which differs from its British counterpart and in the new member states in Eastern Europe the situation is different again. In the context of employment problems in particular the big continental member states of France, Germany and Italy, serious levels of poverty in a number of states, demographic changes and increasing global competition the European social model (ESM) has to be built yet. It is a constructive task. The ESM to be developed has to combine social security, employment and competitiveness with the latter aspects being more important than and constitutive for the first one. In this sense, the ESM should feature Finnish levels of ICT penetration, German industrial productivity, Swedish levels of equality, Danish levels of employment, Irish economic growth and Norwegian levels of education — apart from Cypriot weather and Italian cooking, washed down with Hungarian wine (pp. 28f).
Changing social stratification also pushes into the direction of radical reforms. Many scholars, like Giddens himself, have pointed out that simple dichotomies of rich and poor, capital and labour (the tensioned relation the existence of which Giddens does not deny), working class workers and middle class clerks have waned. More differentiation is not sufficient, however. The main reason is that we have entered post-industrial society where the old stratification has gradually been replaced by a new pattern, ranging from 'cosmopolitan elites, centred on government, business and the top echelons of the professions' at one end to farm workers and the industrial working class at the other (p. 62). In between these extremes we find the categories of professionals/managers, IT specialists, the owners of small businesses and the growing stratum of 'Big Mac workers' (employed in retail and restaurant services and the like), often with precarious jobs. On the whole, 50% of the jobs are stable, 40% rather insecure and the remaining 10% in this structure is reserved for the underclass of people, many of whom do not belong to the workforce such as the poor, the mentally disabled and drug users (p. 64). This social structure is highly scattered and individualized and risks (of job loss and income decline) are very unevenly distributed (p. 68).
This new social structure does not fit into the old 'negative' welfare system repairing market-induced damages and inequalities. A system is needed of 'positive' welfare, which combines traditional elements with investment in human capital and the creation of jobs as the bases for a 'new egalitarianism' as its main feature (pp. 91; 98ff) — in fact a system that Neil Gilbert (e.g. in his Transformation of the Welfare State, Oxford University Press, 2002) calls 'enabling' welfare system. Giddens is critical of the larger EU member states, which he describes as 'blocked societies' (p. 32), but particularly positive about the Scandinavian countries (pp. 10ff; 22ff and throughout the entire book) with their competitiveness, high levels of employment and equality and low levels of poverty. Is Scandinavia the example for the ESM? Giddens does not discuss this question. He does not even mention the high level of state employment in the Nordic countries and their quite traditional system of income distribution.
With the partial exception of Denmark with its combination of a flexible labour market and generous replacement rates in case of unemployment called 'flexicurity', the Scandinavian 'model' does not fit into Giddens' ideas on the new welfare state, which turns out to be one with clear liberal traits. His ESM is a social-liberal one. For him, a flexible labour market is 'essential' for success (p. 21) but in Sweden and Norway it is as 'rigid' as in France and Germany, with the Finnish situation being not much different. And the high level of Scandinavian unemployment-reducing and poverty-preventing level of public employment (above 30% — with the exception of Finland) has to bring about 'equality of condition', while Giddens' proposals rather point towards 'equality of opportunity'. In his view, jobs have to be created in the market sector and redistribution has to be altered for 'economic needs and job creation' (p. 91). Would this bring jobs to the unskilled unemployed and to the underclass? Would it be possible for them to have a good life? Could it be guaranteed by tax credits as is practiced in the US and as Giddens suggests (p. 93)? He does not discuss the problems related to subsidized work.
Unskilled people have to be educated and trained, of course. It is good for their self-esteem and their employability as well as for the competitiveness of the European countries. Giddens repeatedly points to this, just as do European governments. Nobody can seriously reject this idea, and without competitiveness no ambitious welfare system can be financed. It must be allowed, however, to ask whether everybody can be made fit for the labour market by education and training. Aren't the unemployable, at least partially, also those who are not trainable? In terms of competitiveness it might also be asked whether education and training is sufficient. All countries that have joined global competition try to do this and in this context it is difficult to expect this factor making the difference. Specialization and industrial clustering seem to be as important as upgrading skills. A mid-tech country like Denmark and comparable regions in Northern Italy demonstrate this. And as Giddens knows, even in a highly competitive economy many jobs with a low skill profile still exist.
A remaining question is who would have to realize the ESM. The EU is a somewhat unlikely candidate, since Giddens thinks it should have a restricted scope. Moreover, the only possible instrument would be the deliberative 'New Method of Coordination', which Giddens is critical of for its lack of effectivity (pp. 167f). The member states each separately? What about the conditions for realizing the ESM, in Britain, Poland and elsewhere? Giddens does not discuss these crucial questions, which is symptomatic. Europe in the Global Age is an interesting book with many ideas and many subjects touched upon. Its reading is a pleasure. Critically, it has to be said, however, that it is too fragmented, that it does not seriously discuss a number of questions it raises — not at all in the light of the existing literature — and that it does not really tell something new. Perhaps Giddens' map of a new social structure is a partial exception to this judgment, although it seems that he had North-Western member states in mind when drawing it, not Southern and Eastern ones. Moreover, it remains unclear how this new structure relates to remaining components of the old structure such as the conflict-ridden relation between capital and labour and traditional identities of, for example working, middle or upper middle class people. Finally, a more satisfying account on the ESM would have required more comparative elaboration.
