Abstract
Social scientists have demonstrated how transparency and democratic accountability can help control political corruption. Whereas this research has had much to say about how an open media environment produces constraints on politicians, the problem of how a politically ignorant public can enforce accountability has received much less attention. In this article, I argue that effective citizen monitoring of government officials depends on accurate corruption perceptions, which depends on the degree to which citizens are politically informed. An analysis of 10 Latin American countries with varied levels of corruption shows that better informed individuals have more accurate perceptions, even if, like their less informed neighbors, they still tend to underestimate the amount of corruption in their societies. The importance of citizen political awareness in the analysis strongly suggests that policy recommendations targeting corruption control feature tools that increase civic engagement along with those that increase government transparency and press freedoms.
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Notes
Perhaps more disturbing are cases where demonstrably corrupt politicians still enjoy political power (for example, former President Menem as a Senator in Argentina). See, for example, Agence France Presse (2008).
Luskin (1990) introduced this typology in a study examining variation in citizen ‘political sophistication’.
For good reviews, see Converse (2000) and Bennett (2006).
Many of the conceptual and empirical problems one finds when dealing with something like ‘corruption’ are systematically examined in Bailey (2006); Johnston (2005); Philp (2002); and Warren (2004).
Samper was nominated to be Ambassador to France by President Álvaro Uribe in 2006. After elite and popular criticism, Samper declined the offer. The latter scandal is known in Colombia as the parapolítica scandal.
The PELA project periodically conducts anonymous surveys of congressional deputies in Latin America.
See pages 6-7 for an analysis of the methodology used to construct this index.
Turnout for legislative and presidential elections in Latin America is comparatively high, hitting the 60–90 per cent range repeatedly in Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru and Uruguay (IFES Election Guide). Compulsory voting laws, where they are enforced, are part of the reason for this, but many factors are responsible for Latin America's turnout rates (see, for example, Fornos et al, 2004). On variation in ‘compulsoriness’ within Brazil, see Power (2009).
For more on the CPI's usefulness as an estimate of the amount of corruption in a society, see also Lancaster and Montinola (2001), as well as Montinola and Jackman (2002).
The AmericasBarometer, run by the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) at Vanderbilt University, is one of the two regular surveys in the region (the other is the Latinobarómetro), and has distinguished itself by adhering to strict procedures concerning survey sampling and cross-national reliability.
For example, political interest mattered less in countries where corruption was more pervasive. That is, citizens in very corrupt societies were more likely to perceive corruption levels accurately, regardless of their self-reported interest in politics. On the other hand, Canache and Allison found that politically disinterested citizens tended to overestimate corruption in places with relatively lower levels.
See note 3.
The following politicians served as presidents under the 1995 law: Hugo Banzer Suárez (1997–2001), Jorge Quiroga Ramírez (2001–2002), Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada (2002–2003), Carlos D. Mesa Gisbert (2003–2005), Eduardo Rodríguez Veltzé (2005–2006) and Evo Morales Ayma (2006–present).
Parties and agrupaciones ciudadanas are given equal attention on Bolivia's electoral commission website: www.cne.org.bo/org_politica/partidos.aspx.
The original measure, variable exc7, was coded in the opposite direction.
Table 3 examines bivariate correlations between corruption perceptions and political knowledge.
Costa Rica's Polity score in 1875 changed to six, and has remained in the six to ten range since. The civil war in the 1940s fortunately did not destroy Costa Rica's resilient democracy.
This was variable exc6.
These survey items asked respondents if they respected the institutions in their country; whether the system protects basic rights; whether they felt pride in their political system; whether they felt pride in being a citizen; and whether people should support the system.
We might imagine many reasons why ideology would matter. For example, conservatives and others on the political right might exaggerate levels of corruption owing to their pessimistic view about human nature or government action. Then again, others on the right might minimize or dismiss corruption owing to their tendency to support the justness of the existing order. Leftists, more skeptical about authority, might overestimate levels of corruption, assuming base motives of those in power. Other possibilities abound. The point is that individuals’ ideologies might condition their corruption perceptions.
The first category for each dummy series was treated as the base category.
Additionally, fused power systems like parliamentarism and unitary states appear beneficial, despite the potential information benefits of separation of powers competition (see Arnold (2008); cf. Samuels and Shugart (2003)). Also see Lupia (2004) for a more general analysis of institutions and ‘citizen competence’.
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Acknowledgements
For their helpful comments on earlier versions, I am grateful to Katie Dura, Cary Funk, Paul Goren, David Samuels, Phil Shively, Eric Weitz, Jessica Zielonis and the participants to the panel ‘Accountability and Checks and Balances I’ at the annual meeting of the Latin American Studies Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 11–14 June 2009. I also thank the Latin American Public Opinion Project (LAPOP) and its major supporters (the United Stated Agency for International Development, the United Nations Development Program, the Inter-American Development Bank and Vanderbilt University) for making the data available.
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Arnold, J. Political awareness, corruption perceptions and democratic accountability in Latin America. Acta Polit 47, 67–90 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2011.21
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2011.21