Germany's participation in the Kosovo war: Bringing agency back in

Abstract

In 1999, the Federal Republic of Germany participated in NATO's air campaign Operation Allied Force against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. It was the first offensive combat mission in the history of the country. Most of the theoretically informed literature discusses the decision from a structural perspective (for example, role theory, strategic culture). In contrast, the personalities and idiosyncrasies of the individual decision-makers that took the decision have received little attention. This article takes up this neglect in the literature by applying one cognitive and one psychological agency-based approach of foreign policy decision-making to the case, namely analogical reasoning and prospect theory. The discussion suggests that particularly prospect theory has strong explanatory leverage to account for Germany's decision to go to war. On a more general level, the article lends support to the claim that not only structure but also agency matters in foreign policy decision-making. Indeed, even in a country such as Germany, whose foreign and security policy is regarded as highly circumscribed by structural constraints, individual decision-makers can and do make a difference.