Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Which type of democracy performs best?

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Acta Politica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Which type of democracy performs best? While some scholars argue that an electoral system with proportional representation combined with a decentralized system works best, and that the type of electoral system is crucial (Lijphart, 1999), others state that a proportional electoral system with a centralized (and hence not decentralized) system lead to better performance (Gerring et al, 2005; Gerring and Thacker, 2008). Still other scholars claim that decentralization is crucial, particularly in countries with deeply divided societies (Norris, 2008). In this article, we argue that Lijphart's earlier 1960s work needs to be combined with his more recent 1990s work, which results in an eightfold classification. This cube with eight different types of democracy not only enables us to compare the three rival claims in a systematic way, but is also a helpful tool for future studies focusing on types of democratic systems, and their origins and consequences. Our findings show that the type of electoral system is always crucial; the other two dimensions are crucial as well, though under different circumstances. In order to achieve the highest level of good governance, the best choice for the type of political system (centralization or decentralization) depends on the structure of the society (homogeneous or not). Centralization is best in homogeneous societies, while decentralization is best in heterogeneous societies. We recommend that future studies take into account all eight different types of democracy that can be distinguished based on Lijphart's theoretical arguments in earlier and later work.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See for example the following studies: Crozier et al (1975), Huntington (1981), Norris (1999a, pp. 3–4).

  2. See, for example, Fuchs and Klingemann (1998), Norris (1999a, 1999b).

  3. See for overviews of these studies Doorenspleet (2005), Aarts and Thomassen (2008).

  4. See, for example, Lijphart (1968, 1969, 1984, 1985, 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2001, 2002). See also work by Norris, and by Gerring and his co-authors.

  5. A final example is the May 2011 referendum in the United Kingdom, in which voters were asked if they wanted to adopt the ‘alternative vote’ system instead of the current ‘first past the post system’ for electing their MPs.

  6. Please note that we use different terms for the same dependent variable in this article, including ‘kinder and gentler policies’, ‘better government’, ‘better quality of democracy’, ‘economic and political performance’, and ‘performance and quality of the democratic institutions’. It is important to realize that the confusing multiplicity of different formulations of the dependent variable is Lijphart's choice, and not our choice. The intention of this article is not to review the way Lijphart defines and measures the dependent variable, and to develop new –and possibly improved – measurements. Rather, we would like to replicate his own research thoroughly by carefully following his choices, including his bundle of performance indicators (see Section ‘The Cube’ and tables). In this way, we may become aware of other ‘internal’ weaknesses of Lijphart's ideas, and show that the dimension of federalism has been neglected.

  7. Andeweg (2001, p. 119) introduced the distinction between ‘the younger Lijphart and the older Lijphart’.

  8. The figure shows that the structural setting of the electoral competition defines the dominant behavior of the political elite among each other. The contest in a system with majority rule is about being in office or not, and this rule has an effect on the electoral competition among political parties or candidates. The zero-sum setting of the election leads to adversarial elite behavior. Proportional representation, on the other hand, postpones the decision of who will be in office or not. Only after the election during the process of coalition formation is the decision made as to which of the parties will form a government. The need to form a majority with others requires the coalescent behavior of the elite. The composition of the societal, segmental cleavages determines the role of the elite on the mass level. A heterogeneous society with clear-cut cleavages will lead to the articulation, organizing and mobilization of segmental interests. In a homogeneous society with crosscutting cleavages, and overlapping memberships, articulation and mobilization must be on a higher aggregate level than purely along the lines of cleavages.

  9. Please notice that Lijphart has recently published a second edition of Patterns of Democracy; while the first 1999 edition covered the period from 1945 to 1996, the new edition extends this to 2010. In this new 2012 edition, the empirical evidence is even clearer than in the first edition with regard to the performance of different types of democracy. With regard to both government performance and democratic quality, the first edition showed that the better results for consensus democracy were mainly the results of the executives-parties dimension of consensus democracy; the federal-unitary dimensions had only slight effects, according to Lijphart. This difference is even more striking in the evidence of the 2012 edition: the effect of the executives-parties dimension is very strong, whereas the federal-unitary dimension has basically no effect, according to Lijphart.

  10. It would have been better to label such systems ‘unitary systems’. What is problematic is that Gerring et al (2005) and Gerring and Thacker (2008) use the terminology of the younger Lijphart (although –remarkably – they do not quote Lijphart's 1968 work), while the empirical part relies on the work of the older Lijphart (1999). This is confusing, as the concepts are now mixed up. Centripetal democracies have majoritarian electoral systems and homogeneous societies (Lijphart, 1968), while unitary democracies have PR electoral systems with centralization (Lijphart, 1999). Confusingly, Gerring et al (2005) and Gerring and Thacker (2008) give these ‘unitary democracies’ the label of ‘centripetal democracies’.

  11. It is important to point out here that the claimed positive effects of consociationalism and consensus democracy have always been controversial. There have been constant debates in this field (Andeweg, 2000) with scholars questioning the predicted positive effects of consociationalism and consensus democracy (Horowitz, 1985; Reynolds, 2002; Roeder and Rothchild, 2005), and demonstrating that the normative typology is incongruent with the empirical typology of democratic systems (Bogaards, 2000). Some scholars criticized the inclusion of particular indicators in Lijphart's measurements, for example the incorporation of the role of the Central Bank (Anderson, 2001) or corporatism (Roller, 2005). Others rejected the classification of certain cases, like Ware (2000) who contends that the United States should have been labeled differently. Some scholars pointed out that Lijphart's typology is based on an analysis of established democracies, but that his findings cannot be generalized to other cases at the national level (for example, in Africa, see Van Cranenburgh and Kopecky, 2004) or subnational level (for example, in Switzerland, see Vatter, 2007; and in the 16 federal states of Germany, see Freitag and Vatter, 2009). Finally, several scholars showed that incorporating additional independent variables in the empirical analyses leads to different results as well (Armingeon, 2002; Doorenspleet, 2005). These previous critical reviews of Lijphart's claims are mainly ‘external‘. It is important to keep in mind though that the three rival claims are basically ‘internal’ critique; they do not highlight Lijphart's choice of the used indicators, case selection, choice and measurements of the dependent variables, such as economic and political performance, or concepts or measurements of performance. As our analyses focus on testing the three rival claims, it is not our aim to improve the analyses on the basis of the ‘external’ critical comments. Instead, we will explore which of the three claims finds the most support by replicating the findings in a different way and by using the ‘cube’ with three dimensions.

  12. Please note that the difference between the highest and the second highest score is very small compared with the scores of the other types of democracy. Unitary-depoliticized democracy guarantees high political stability, maintenance of the rule of law, implementation of government regulation and low corruption. Consensus-consociational democracy ensures the liberties and rights of citizens to participate in the political process and it also sustains the independence of news media that holds government authority accountable, and provides high-quality public goods and services.

  13. See, for example, the following studies: Lijphart (1984, 1999, 2001, 2002), Bogaards (1998), Andeweg (2000, 2001), Powell (2000), Siaroff (2000), Anderson (2001), Armingeon (2002), Tavits (2004), Doorenspleet (2005), Roberts (2005), Roller (2005), Vatter (2007), Aarts and Thomassen (2008), Keman and Pennings (2008).

  14. Often scholars use the dimension of electoral system (or Executive-Parties Dimension) explicitly as a majoritarian/consensus democracy scale. Tavits, for example, uses this dimension as the basis for studying the relationship between types of democratic systems and their effects on the size of government (Tavits, 2004, p. 348). In Tavit's study, bivariate regression analyses are also used to show that consensus democracy ‘is more conducive to the growth of the public sector, whereas majoritarian democracy has more market-preserving characteristics built into its institutional structure’ (Tavits, 2004, p. 356). In fact, the dimensions of political system and societal structure are completely neglected in such analyses (cf. Aarts and Thomassen, 2008; see also Anderson, 2001).

References

  • Aarts, C.W.A.M. and Thomassen, J.J.A. (2008) Satisfaction with democracy: Do institutions matter? Electoral Studies 27 (1): 5–18.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Adcock, R. and Collier, D. (2001) Measurement validity: A shared standard for qualitative and quantitative research. American Political Science Review 95 (3): 529–546.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Almond, G.A. (1956) Comparative political systems. The Journal of Politics 18 (3): 391–409.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, C.D. (2009) Institutional change, economic conditions and confidence in government: Evidence from Belgium. Acta Politica 44 (4): 28–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Anderson, L. (2001) The implications of institutional design for macroeconomic performance. Reassessing the claims of consensus democracy. Comparative Political Studies 34 (1): 429–452.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andeweg, R.B. (2000) Consociational democracy. Annual Review of Political Science 3 (3): 509–536.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andeweg, R.B. (2001) Lijphart versus Lijphart: The cons of consensus democracy in homogeneous societies. Acta Politica 36 (2): 117–128.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armingeon, K. (2002) The effects of negotiation democracy: A comparative analysis. European Journal of Political Research 41 (1): 81–105.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blais, A. and Carty, R.K. (1996) Does proportional representation foster voter turnout? European Journal of Political Research 18 (2): 167–181.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bogaards, M. (1998) The favourable factors of consociational democracy: A review. European Journal of Political Research 33 (4): 475–496.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bogaards, M. (2000) The uneasy relationship between empirical and normative types in consociational theory. Journal of Theoretical Politics 12 (4): 395–423.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Budge, I. and Newton, K. (eds) (1997) The Politics of the New Europe: From the Atlantic to the Urals. London: Longmans.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bulsara, H. and Kissane, B. (2009) Arend Lijphart and the transformation of Irish democracy. West European Politics 32 (1): 172–195.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Burnell, P. and Youngs, R. (eds.) (2009) New Challenges to Democratization. London: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Castles, F.G. (1994) The political consequences of proportional representation: A sceptical commentary. Political Science 46 (2): 161–171.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Cox, G.W. (1997) Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Crepaz, M.L. (1996a) Constitutional structures and regime performance in 18 industrialized democracies: A test of Olson's hypotheses. European Journal of Political Research 29 (2): 87–104.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crepaz, M.L. (1996b) Consensus versus majoritarian democracy: Political institutions and their impact on macroeconomic performance and industrial disputes. Comparative Political Studies 29 (1): 4–26.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Crozier, M.J., Huntington, S.P. and Watanuki, J. (1975) The Crisis in Democracy. New York: New York University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Doorenspleet, R. (2000) Reassessing the three waves of democratization. World Politics 52 (3): 384–406.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Doorenspleet, R. (2005) Electoral systems and good governance in divided countries. Ethnopolitics 4 (4): 365–380.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duverger, M. (1964) Political Parties, their Organization and Activity in the Modern State. London: Science Editions.

    Google Scholar 

  • Flinders, M. (2010) Democratic Drift – Majoritarian Modification and Democratic Anomie in the United Kingdom. Oxford, UK: Oxford University.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fortin, J. (2008) Patterns of democracy? Counterevidence from nineteen post-communist countries. Zeitschrift Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 2 (2): 198–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Freitag, M. and Vatter, A. (2009) Patterns of democracy: A sub-national analysis of the German Lander. Acta Politica 44 (4): 410–438.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fuchs, D. and Klingemann, H.D. (eds.) (1998) Citizens and the state: A relationship transformed. In: Citizens and the State. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 419–444.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Ganghof, S. (2005) Normative Modelle, institutionelle Typen und beobachtbare Verhaltensmuster: Ein Vorschlag zum Vergleich parlamentarischer Demokratien. Politische Vierteljahresschrift 46 (3): 406–431.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gerring, J. and Thacker, S.C. (2008) A Centripetal Theory of Democratic Governance. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gerring, J., Thacker, S.C. and Moreno, C. (2005) Centripetal democratic governance: A theory and global inquiry. American Political Science Review 99 (4): 567–581.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goertz, G. (2005) Social Science Concepts: A Users Guide. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Golder, M. (2005) Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946–2000. Electoral Studies 24 (1): 103–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Horowitz, D.L. (1985) Ethnic Groups in Conflict. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huntington, S.P. (1981) American Politics: The Promise of Disharmony. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Huntington, S.P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Katz, R.S. (1980) A Theory of Parties and Electoral Systems. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Katz, R.S. and Koole, R. (2002) Political data in 2001. European Journal of Political Research, Political data yearbook 2011, 41: 885–896.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2004) Governance matters III: Governance indicators for 1996–2002. The World Bank Economic Review 18 (2): 253–287.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Keman, H. and Pennings, P. (2008) The changing landscape of Dutch politics since the 1970s: A comparative exploration. Acta Politica 43 (2–3): 154–179.

    Google Scholar 

  • Knutsen, C.H. (2010) Which democracies prosper? Electoral rules, form of government and economic growth. Electoral Studies 30 (1): 83–90.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lewin, L. (2000) Introduction. Special issue: The future of democracy. Scandinavian Political Studies 23 (3): 245.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (1968) Typologies of democratic systems. Comparative Political Studies 1 (1): 3–44.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (1969) Consociational democracy. World Politics 21 (2): 207–225.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (1977) Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (1984) Democracies: Patterns of Majoritarian and Consensus Government in Twenty-One Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (1985) Non-majoritarian democracy: A comparison of federal and consociational theories. Publius: The Journal of Federalism 15 (2): 3–15.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (2000a) The future of democracy: Reasons for pessimism, but also some optimism. Scandinavian Political Studies 23 (3): 265–273.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (2000b) Definitions, evidence, and policy. Journal of Theoretical Politics 12 (4): 425–431.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (2001) The pros and cons – But mainly pros – Of consensus democracy. Acta Politica 36 (2): 129–139.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (2002) Negotiation democracy versus consensus democracy: Parallel conclusions and recommendations. European Journal of Political Research 41 (1): 107–113.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (2008) Thinking About Democracy. Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (2012) Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries, 2nd edn. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Linz, J. (2000) Democratic political parties: Recognizing contradictory principles and perception. Scandinavian Political Studies 23 (3): 252–265.

    Google Scholar 

  • Loewenstein, K. (1957) Political Power and the Governmental Process. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Müller-Rommel, F. (2008) Demokratiemuster und Leistungsbilanz von Regierungen: Kritische Anmerkungen zu Arend Lijphart's ‘Patterns of Democracy. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaften 2 (1): 78–94.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Norris, P. (ed.) (1999a) Introduction: The growth of critical citizens? In: Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 1–31.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Norris, P. (ed.) (1999b) Conclusions: The growth of critical citizens and its consequences. In: Critical Citizens. Global Support for Democratic Governance. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, pp. 257–273.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Norris, P. (2008) Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Powell Jr, G.B. (1982) Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Powell Jr, G.B. (2000) Elections as Instruments of Democracy: Majoritarian and Proportional Visions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Rae, D.W. (1967) The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Renwick, A. (2008) The politics of electoral reform in established democracies. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association; 28–31 August 2008, Boston.

  • Renwick, A. (2011) Electoral system choice in Europe since 1945. West European Politics 34 (3): 456–477.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Reynolds, A. (ed.) (2002) The Architecture of Democracy: Constitutional Design, Conflict Management and Democracy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Riker, W.H. (1975) Federalism. In: F. I. Greenstein and N.Q. Polsby (eds.) Handbook of Political Science, Reading, MA: Addision Wesley Vol. 5, pp. 93–172.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roberts, A. (2005) The quality of democracy. Comparative Politics 37 (3): 357–376.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Roeder, P.G. and Rothchild, D. (eds.) (2005) Sustainable Peace: Power and Democracy after Civil Wars. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Roller, E. (2005) The Performance of Democracies. Political Institutions and Public Policy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rose, R. (1992) What are the Political Consequences of PR? London: Electoral Reform Society.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sartori, G. (1970) Concept misformation in comparative politics. American Political Science Review 64 (4):1033–1053.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sartori, G. (1976) Parties and Party Systems. A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sartori, G. (1994) Comparative Constitutional Engineering. An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Google Scholar 

  • Schmidt, M.G. (2002) Political performance and types of democracy: Findings from comparative studies. European Journal of Political Research 41 (1): 147–163.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shugart, M. and Wattenberg, M. (2001) Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds? Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Siaroff, A. (2000) The fate of centrifugal democracies: Lessons from consociational theory and system performance. Comparative Politics 32 (3): 317–332.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Sinardet, D. (2010) From consociational consciousness to majoritarian myth: Consociational democracy, multi-level politics and the Belgian case of Brussels-halle-Vilvoorde. Acta Politica 45 (3): 346–369.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taagepera, R. (2003) Arend Lijphart's dimensions of democracy: Logical connections and institutional design. Political Studies 51 (1): 1–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Taagepera, R. and Shugart, M.S. (1989) The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Tavits, M. (2004) The size of government in majoritarian and consensus democracies. Comparative Political Studies 37 (3): 340–359.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van Cranenburgh, O. and Kopecky, P. (2004) Political institutions in new democracies: (Not so) hidden majoritarianism in post-apartheid South Africa. Acta Politica 39 (3): 279–296.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vatter, A. (2007) Lijphart goes regional: Different patterns of consensus in Swiss democracies. West European Politics 30 (1): 148–171.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vatter, A. (2009) Lijphart expanded: Three dimensions of democracy in advanced OECD countries? European Political Science Review 1 (1): 125–154.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vatter, A. and Bernauer, J. (2009) The missing dimension of democracy: Institutional patterns of 25 EU member states between 1997 and 2006. European Union Politics 10 (3): 335–360.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ware, A. (2000) All-embracing comparative analysis. Government and Opposition 35 (3): 412–414.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank Arend Lijphart for his very constructive and critical comments, his constant positive support and for providing the data of his study Patterns of Democracy. We also thank Rudy Andeweg, Shaun Breslin, Peter Burnell, Jan Erk, Tom Louwerse and all the participants of the CSD seminar series at Warwick University (UK) for their helpful suggestions and feedback on previous versions.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Warwick University, Gibbet Hill Road, Coventry, CV4 7AL, UK

    Renske Doorenspleet

  2. Leiden University, Wassenaarseweg 52, 2333 AK,, Leiden, The Netherlands

    Huib Pellikaan

Authors
  1. Renske Doorenspleet
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. Huib Pellikaan
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Doorenspleet, R., Pellikaan, H. Which type of democracy performs best?. Acta Polit 48, 237–267 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2012.35

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2012.35

Keywords

Search

Navigation