Skip to main content
Log in

Contestation and participation: Operationalizing and mapping democratic models for 80 electoral democracies, 1990–2009

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Acta Politica Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

In recent decades, some attempts have been made to empirically assess different models of democracy in action by identifying and measuring various indicators. Lijphart’s seminal work, Patterns of Democracy, is one of the most comprehensive attempts to categorize models of democracy systematically. However, it has mainly focused on established democracies. There is no extensive operationalization of models of democracy which evaluates a broader range of countries, including new democracies in a systematic way. This article aims to fill the gap by operationalizing two persistent dimensions of democracy – contestation and participation – for 80 electoral democracies around the world between 1990 and 2009. Extracting empirical scores, we present a two-dimensional global map of democracy over two decades. We finally examine the associations between democratic models and indices of level and performance of democracy.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3
Figure 4

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Vanhanen (2000) and Altman and Pérez-Liñán (2002) partially utilized the empirical ‘rate’ of contestation and participation for measuring level (or quality) of democracy. Their measures are highly correlated with the well-known indexes of level of democracy namely Freedom House and Polity IV. Their efforts are not focused on measuring models of democracy.

  2. Lijphart’s second dimension, federal versus unitary, is related to the issue of concentration and centralization of power. It is argued that this dimension is provisionally connected to the size of countries (Taagepera, 2003).

  3. We should also mention a herculean, in-progress project named Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) that aims to operationalize seven different conceptions of democracy for a large number of countries over two centuries, through measuring hundreds of indicators (Coppedge et al, 2012). The comparison of our operationalization with the aggregated results of V-Dem project, which presumably will be available by 2015, could be beneficial and supplementary to both studies.

  4. In our study, we consider a country an electoral democracy:if a country is recognized under concepts seven (restricted election) or eight (competitive election) of Polity IV if a country’s score of Freedom House’s ‘political rights’ is lower or equal to four if a country’s score of EIU’s ‘electoral process’ is higher than fiveIn the occasional cases that Polity IV has no final assessment for a country or there is a lack of full consensus between different studies, we assess the case based on the highest consensus between the criteria.

  5. There are some more electoral democracies in the world but because of the lack of data required (that is, election results, non-electoral participation) for many small countries, we could not include them in this study

  6. It is important for our study because in calculation of some indicators, namely electoral disproportionality and voter turnout, the type of political regime determines whether or not the results of the presidential elections should be involved. That is, if a country has a presidential or semi-presidential regime then the disproportionality and turnout of the presidential election must be included otherwise only parliamentary elections are taken into consideration.

  7. Importantly and indirectly, NPG integrates the influence of presidentialism. In a full presidential system, the cabinet is often led by a party that the president belongs to. However, there are some countries with presidential system and a multi-party parliament (for example, Brazil). In such countries and also in semi-presidential systems in which the cabinet must have parliamentary support, multi-party cabinets are more common.

  8. Lijphart (1999) plausibly asserted that the majoritarian electoral system leads to a smaller number of parliamentary parties. Nevertheless, some exceptions can be mentioned like India which has more than five effective parliamentary parties in spite of its plurality voting system. On the other hand, a PR system does not necessarily result in a large effective number of parliamentary parties. Indeed, we can point to many democratic countries having PR voting system but a low effective number of parties (for example, Albania, Greece, Portugal, Spain and South Africa).

  9. We calculated the correlation between the IDD scores for the years 1990–2009 and the scores for Lijphart’s first dimension for the years 1981–2010 (Lijphart, 2012).

  10. The turnout is usually measured using two different formulas: one is the percentage of total number of votes cast divided by the registered electors (voting eligible population), and the other one is called VAP turnout which has the Voting Age Population as the denominator. The VAP includes all citizens above the legal voting age. The database of International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (IDEA, 2012a) provides both voter and VAP turnouts for virtually all countries. In the case of missing data for some countries we use other sources namely IPU (2012), African Elections Database (2012), Keesing (1998) and Nohlen and Stover (2010).

  11. In theory, the VAP turnout must be lower than the registered-based voter turnout (because the voting age population is always more than the registered voters). However, since the voting age population is calculated based on the most recent and available census, in some cases the VAP is not updated and consequently the reported VAP turnout is higher than the registered-based voter turnout. In such cases we will consider the lower turnout as the more realistic indictor in our calculations.

  12. We apply the reduction factor to 17 countries having compulsory voting. We are aware that this decision may be debated, however, it does not have a major impact on the general pattern of PDD.

  13. According to the WVS, in the survey of 2007–2008, 36 per cent of Spanish and 23 per cent of Greek respondents mentioned that they ‘have attended in lawful demonstrations’ while 23 per cent of Spanish and 19 per cent of Greek respondents declared that they ‘have signed petition’.

  14. This aggregation rule is acceptable and reliable if the three measures display a minimum level of internal relatedness. The result of Cronbach’s α reliability test is 0.61(N=72), which represents a meaningful level of internal consistency. For those African and Latin American countries that all three items of political action have not been surveyed, we used only available data to find the NEP score.

  15. Peterlevitz (2011) revised the Vanhanen’s formula without changing the main logic of it. He considered the same way of aggregation in which the score of referendums is an additive to the turnout. In his formula, the highest score would be 100, which can be achieved by either turnout or number of referendums in a substitutable manner.

  16. All sorts of electoral participation need the formal process to be fulfilled and hence take plenty of time and resources. In an occasion that people are not satisfied with adopted policies or the way of governance, the non-electoral participation is the main means of political activism. The political action or protest participation is an important ‘control force’ to regulate the function of power holders. That is, if the power holders know that the public participation and people’s surveillance are not only there in election times but also realized in different forms of non-electoral participation, then their accountability would be different. Therefore, lack of non-electoral participation cannot be fully compensated by having high electoral participation.

  17. The statistical correlations between PDD and two indices by Vanhanen (2002) and Peterlevitz (2011) were calculated for the years 1990–2000.

  18. Our data for the 1990–2009 period cannot tell whether patterns of political participation have fundamentally changed following the outbreak of the recent financial crisis.

References

  • African Elections Database. (2012) A database of election results in Sub-Saharan Africa, http://africanelections.tripod.com/, accessed September 2012.

  • Afrobarometer. (2012) Afrobarometer online data analysis, http://www.afrobarometer-online-analysis.com/aj/AJBrowserAB.jsp, accessed October 2012.

  • Alcantara, M. (2012) Elections in Latin America 2009–2011: A comparative analysis. E. Kellogg Institute for International Studies. Working Paper No.386.

  • Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. (1963) The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations. New York: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Almond, G.A. and Verba, S. (1980) The Civic Culture Revisited. Boston, MA: Little Brown.

    Google Scholar 

  • Altman, D. (2011) Direct Democracy Worldwide. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Altman, D. and Pérez-Liñán, A. (2002) Assessing the quality of democracy: Freedom, competitiveness and participation in eighteen Latin American countries. Democratization 9 (2): 85–100.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Altman, D. (2013) Bringing direct democracy back in: Toward a three-dimensional measure of democracy. Democratization 20 (4): 615–641.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Araúz, H.B., Freidenberg, F., Sonnleitner, W., Valladares, R.G.R., Jones, M.P. and Reynoso, D. (2010) Las reformas electorales en Panamá: claves de desarrollo humano para la toma de decisiones. Panamá: Programa de las Naciones Unidas Para el Desarrollo.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armingeon, K. and Careja, R. (2007) Comparative data set for 28 post-communist countries, 1989–2007. Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_eng.html.

  • Armingeon, K., Careja, R., Weisstanner, D., Engler, S., Potolidis, P. and Gerber, M. (2012) Comparative political data set III 1990–2010. Bern: Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_eng.html, accessed September 2012.

  • Beck, T., Clarke, G., Groff, A., Keefer, P. and Walsh, P. (2001) New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions. World Bank Economic Review 15 (1): 165–176.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benito Sánchez, A.B. (2010) La Política Del Poder: Alianzas E Interacciones Partidistas Estratégicas En República Dominicana. Revista de Ciencia Política 30: 751–772.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blais, A. (2006) What affects voter turnout? Annual Review of Political Science 9: 111–125.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bormann, N.C. and Golder, M. (2012) Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946–2011, https://files.nyu.edu/mrg217/public/es3.pdf, accessed November 2012.

  • Bose, S. (2005) The bosnian state a decade after dayton. International Peacekeeping 12 (3): 322–335.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowman, K., Lehoucq, F. and Mahoney, J. (2005) Measuring political democracy case expertise, data adequacy, and central America. Comparative Political Studies 38 (8): 939–970.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bunker, K. (2007) Explicando La Desproporcionalidad En América Latina: Magnitud De Distrito, Malapportionment Y Fragmentación Partidaria. Master Thesis, Universidad Diego Portales.

  • C2D (2012) Direct democracy databases, http://c2d.ch/inner.php?table=dd_db&link_id=61&parent_id=61, accessed September 2012.

  • Carey, J. and Hix, S. (2010) Electoral system design project, http://sites.dartmouth.edu/jcarey/data-archive/electoral-system-design-project/, accessed October 2012.

  • Carr, A. (2012) Adam Carr’s election archive, http://psephos.adam-carr.net/, accessed October 2012.

  • Cheibub, J.A. (2007) Presidentialism, Parliamentarism, and Democracy. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cheibub, J.A., Gandhi, J. and Vreeland, J.R. (2010) Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice 143 (1–2): 67–101.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coppedge, M. (2002) Democracy and dimensions: Comments on Munck and Verkuilen. Comparative Political Studies 35 (1): 35–39.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coppedge, M. (2007) Continuity and change in Latin American party systems. Taiwan Journal of Democracy 3 (2): 119–149.

    Google Scholar 

  • Coppedge, M., Alvarez, A. and Maldonado, C. (2008) Two persistent dimensions of democracy: Contestation and inclusiveness. Journal of Politics 70 (3): 632–647.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Coppedge, M., Gerring, J. and Lindberg, S.I. (2012) Varieties of democracy project description. New Orleans: APSA 2012 Meeting Paper. Available at SSRN, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2132586.

  • Coppedge, M. and Reinicke, W.H. (1990) Measuring polyarchy. Studies in Comparative International Development 25 (1): 51–72.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Croissant, A. and Martin, B. (2006) Between Consolidation and Crisis: Elections and Democracy in Five Nations in Southeast Asia. Münster, Germany: Lit.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dahl, R.A. (1971) Polyarchy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dahl, R.A. (2000) On Democracy. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Democracy Barometer (2010) Democracy barometer databank, http://www.democracybarometer.org/dataset_en.html, accessed October 2012.

  • Diamond, L.J. (1996) Is the third wave over? Journal of Democracy 7 (3): 20–37.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Direct Democracy Navigator (2012) The navigator to direct democracy. Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe, http://direct-democracy-navigator.org/countries, accessed October 2012.

  • Doorenspleet, R. (2005) Electoral systems and democratic quality: Do mixed systems combine the best or the worst of both worlds? An explorative quantitative cross-national study. Acta Politica 40: 28–49.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duverger, M. (1980) A new political-system model: Semi-presidential government. European Journal of Political Research 8 (2): 165–187.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • EIU (2010) Democracy Index 2010: Democracy in retreat. Economist Intelligence Unit, http://www.eiu.com/public/democracy_index.aspx, accessed May 2012.

  • Elgie, R. (2005) A fresh look at semi-presidentialism: Varieties on a theme. Journal of Democracy 16 (3): 98–112.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Elgie, R. and McMenamin, I. (2008) Semi-presidentialism and democratic performance. Japanese Journal of Political Science 9 (3): 323–340.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • EVS (2012) European values study: Data and downloads, http://www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/data-and-downloads/, accessed October 2012.

  • Fiorino, N. and Ricciuti, R. (2007) Determinants of Direct Democracy. Munich: CESifo Working Papers No. 2035.

  • Fortin, J. (2008) Patterns of democracy? Counterevidence from nineteen post-communist countries. Zeitschrift für Vergleichende Politikwissenschaft 2 (2): 198–220.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Foweraker, J. (1999) Database of liberal democratic performance, 1970–1998. Colchester, Essex: UK Data Archive, http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-4046-1, accessed October 2012.

  • Freedom House (2012) Freedom in the World: Aggregate and Subcategory Scores, http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world-aggregate-and-subcategory-scores, accessed October 2012.

  • Gallagher, M. (1991) Proportionality, disproportionality and electoral systems. Electoral Studies 10 (1): 33–51.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gallagher, M. (2012) Election indices, http://www.tcd.ie/Political_Science/staff/michael_gallagher/ElSystems/Docts/ElectionIndices.pdf, accessed July.

  • Gallagher, M. and Mitchell, P. (2005) The Politics of Electoral Systems. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Gallie, W.B. (1955) Essentially Contested Concepts. In Proceedings of the Aristotelian society, vol. 56. London: The Aristotelian Society, Blackwell Publishing, pp. 167–198.

  • Ganghof, S. (2010) Review article: Democratic inclusiveness: A reinterpretation of lijpharts patterns of democracy. British Journal of Political Science 40 (3): 679–692.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Globalbarometer (2012) Globalbarometer online data analysis, http://www.jdsurvey.net/gbs/Analize.jsp, accessed October 2012.

  • Golder, M. (2005) Democratic electoral systems around the world, 1946–2000. Electoral Studies 24: 103–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gross, A. and Kaufmann, B. (2002) IRI Europe Country Index on Citizenlawmaking. Amsterdam, The Netherlands and Berlin, Germany: IRI Europe.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gupta, V., Hanges, P.J. and Dorfman, P. (2002) Cultural clusters: Methodology and findings. Journal of World Business 37 (1): 11–15.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Held, D. (2006) Models of Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hendriks, F. (2010) Vital Democracy: A Theory Of Democracy In Action. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • IDEA (2008) Direct Democracy, The International IDEA Handbook. Stockholm, Sweden: IDEA.

  • IDEA (2012a) Voter Turnout Database, http://www.idea.int/vt/viewdata.cfm#, accessed October 2012.

  • IDEA (2012b) Table of electoral systems worldwide, http://www.idea.int/esd/world.cfm, accessed October 2012.

  • IPU (2012) Inter-parliamentary union: PARLINE database on national parliaments, http://www.ipu.org/parline-e/parlinesearch.asp, accessed August 2012.

  • Kaufmann, B., Buchi, R. and Braun, N. (2010) Guidebook to Direct Democracy in Switzerland and Beyond. Initiative & Referendum Institute Europe, Koniz: Ast & Jakob.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kaufmann, D., Kraay, A. and Mastruzzi, M. (2009) Governance matters VIII: Aggregate and individual governance indicators 1996–2008. Policy Research Working Paper 4978, Washington: World Bank.

  • Keesing (1998) Colombia. Keesing’s record of world events. 44: 42263.

  • Koliopoulos, G. and Veremis, T.M. (2002) Greece: The Modern Sequel: From 1831 to the Pesent. London: Hurst & Company.

    Google Scholar 

  • Kriesi, H. and Bochsler, D. (2012) Varieties of Democracy, http://www.democracybarometer.org/Papers/Bochsler_Kriesi_2012.pdf, accessed July 2012.

  • Kriesi, H. and Trechsel, A.H. (2008) The Politics of Switzerland: Continuity and Change in a Consensus Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Kucera, O. (2006) Is Taiwan a presidential system? China Perspectives, http://chinaperspectives.revues.org/, accessed October 2012.

  • Laakso, M. and Taagepera, R. (1979) Effective number of parties: A measure with application to west europe. Comparative Political Studies 12 (1): 3–27.

    Google Scholar 

  • Latinobarometro (2012) Latinobarometro online data analysis, http://www.latinobarometro.org/latino/LATAnalize.jsp, accessed October 2012.

  • Lijphart, A. (1996) The puzzle of Indian democracy: A consociational interpretation. The American Political Science Review 90: 258–268.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty Six Countries. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (2003) Measurement validity and institutional engineering – Reflections on Rein Taagepera’s meta-study. Political Studies 51 (1): 20–25.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (2007) Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice. New York: Routledge.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (2012) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty Six Countries, 2nd edn. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Mackie, T. and Rose, R. (1991) International Almanac of Electoral History. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Marshall, M.G., Jaggers, K. and Gurr, T.R. (2011) Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2010. The Polity IV Dataset, http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html, accessed September 2012.

  • Munck, G.L. (2009) Measuring Democracy: A Bridge between Scholarship and Politics. Baltimore, MA: John Hopkins University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Munck, G.L. and Verkuilen, J. (2002) Conceptualizing and measuring democracy: Evaluating alternative indices. Comparative Political Studies 35: 5–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Nohlen, D. (2005) Elections in the Americas: A Data Handbook, Vol. 2 South America. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nohlen, D. and Stover, P. (2010) Elections In Europe: A Data Handbook. BadenBaden, Germany: Nomos.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Norris, P. (2002) Democratic Phoenix: Reinventing Political Activism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Norris, P. (2008) Driving Democracy: Do Power-Sharing Institutions Work? New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Norris, P. (2009) Democracy time-series dataset. Release 3.0, http://www.hks.harvard.edu/fs/pnorris/Data/Data.htm, accessed July 2012.

  • Norris, P. (2011) Cultural explanations of electoral reform: A policy cycle model. West European Politics 34 (3): 531–550.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Parry, G., Moyser, G. and Day, N. (1992) Political Participation and Democracy in Britain. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Patrick, J.J. and Hamot, G.E. (2005) Constitutional Democracy in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Bloomington, IN: Social Studies Development Center.

    Google Scholar 

  • Peterlevitz, T. (2011) Adding Direct Democracy Processes To An Assessment Of Political Participation. Zurich: C2D Working Paper Series 39.

  • Przeworski, A., Alvarez, M.E., Cheibub, J.A. and Limongi, F. (2000) Democracy and Development; Political Institutions and Well-Being in the World, 1950–1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Qi, L. (2010) Power-sharing and democratic development: Nested analysis of political institutions in third-wave democracies. Columbia: PhD Dissertation, University of Missouri.

  • Reid, M. (2007) Forgotten Continent: the Battle for Latin America's Soul. London: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Reilly, B. (2007) Electoral systems and party systems in east Asia. Journal of East Asian Studies 7: 185–202.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ronen, S. and Shenkar, O. (1985) Clustering countries on attitudinal dimensions: A review and synthesis. Academy of Management Review 10 (3): 435–454.

    Google Scholar 

  • Saward, M. (2003) Democracy. Cambridge: Polity Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Setala, M. (2006) On the problems of responsibility and accountability in referendums. European Journal of Political Research 45 (4): 699–721.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Siaroff, A. (2003) Comparative presidencies: The inadequacy of the presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary distinction. European Journal of Political Research 42 (3): 287–312.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Statistics Norway (2012) Local referendums 1970–2011. Number of local referendums, https://www.ssb.no/a/english/kortnavn/folkavs_kostra_en/tab-2012-03-27-04-en.html, accessed October 2012.

  • Stockton, H. (2012) Manufacturing majoritarian democracy through electoral reform in East Asia. American Association for Chinese Studies Annual Conference, Atlanta.

  • Taagepera, R. (2003) Arend Lijphart’s dimensions of democracy: Logical connections and institutional design. Political Studies 51: 1–19.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • UNDP (2012) Human Development Index (HDI). Human Development Reports, http://hdr.undp.org/en/statistics/hdi/, accessed October 2012.

  • Van der Krieken, K. (2011) Een Toekomst Voor Referenda? Tilburg: Master Thesis, Tilburg School of Politics and Public Administration.

  • Van Eerd, J. (2009) A Comparison of Measurements for the Identication of Party Systems in Sub-Saharan Africa. APSA Annual Meeting and Exhibition, Toronto.

  • Vanhanen, T. (2000) A new dataset for measuring democracy, 1810–1998. Journal of Peace Research 37 (2): 251–265.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vanhanen, T. (2002) Measures of Democratization 1999–2000. (Note on Updates and Additions to Polyarchy Dataset), http://www.prio.org/Global/upload/CSCW/Data/Governance/file42500_democracy_1999-2000.pdf, accessed October 2012.

  • Vatter, A. (2009) Lijphart expanded: Three dimensions of democracy in advanced OECD countries? European Political Science Review 1 (1): 125–154.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Verba, S., Nie, N.H. and Kim, J. (1978) Participation and Political Equality: A Seven-Nation Comparison. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • WVS (2012) World values survey: Online data analysis, http://www.wvsevsdb.com/wvs/WVSAnalize.jsp, accessed October 2012.

Download references

Acknowledgements

We wish to thank Ruud Luijkx for his kind assistance and constructive methodological advices. We are also grateful to Reza Khandan for his great help in preparing the graphs.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Appendices

Appendix A

Classification of democratic regimes

The classification of regime types by Cheibub (2007) is based on the formal constitutions and not necessarily on the real practice of democracy. Cheibub et al (2010, p. 82) argued that ‘in almost every instance where the formal rules do not seem to match practice at a first glance, we find examples of behavior that conform to the constitutional prerogatives of the president and/or the assembly’. We believe, however, that finding exceptional instances cannot overshadow the real and regular practices in many countries.

If not the constitution but the practice of democracy is the main focus of attention, as it is here, things will look somewhat differently. For instance, we are not convinced that the Austrian regime should be viewed as semi-presidential, rather than semi-parliamentary; it has a popularly-elected president, but this president has a ceremonial role only. Given this argumentation and considering the different definitions and classifications of semi-presidentialism in the literature (Duverger, 1980; Siaroff, 2003; Elgie, 2005), we reformulated and rearranged the criteria by Cheibub (2007, p. 35) and identified four types of political regime, as illustrated in Figure A1.

Figure A1
figure 5

The criteria for classifying the democratic regimes in practice.

Countries in which the head of state is not popularly elected (‘No’ to the first question) are categorized under the ‘parliamentary’ regime here. Countries having an elected president with a ceremonial role in practice (No to the second question) are classified as ‘semi-parliamentary’ regimes. For answering the second question and assessing whether or not a president has ‘considerable power’, we use the ‘Presidential Power’ score introduced by Siaroff (2003), which extended for some more countries by Elgie and McMenamin (2008) and Qi (2010). If the score is lower than 5, then the system is semi-parliamentary (for example, Lithuania, Portugal, Croatia after 2000); otherwise the regime is semi-presidential (for example, France, Romania, Croatia before 2000) or full presidential (for example, United States, Latin America, South Korea) depending on the answer to the third question in Figure A1, regarding whether or not an executive branch responsible to the legislative (based on Siaroff (2003)).

According to our classification, Switzerland that has no popular elected executive, and Austria that has a ceremonial elected president are respectively considered parliamentary and semi-parliamentary democracies, while according to Cheibub (2007) they are presidential and semi-presidential regimes respectively. In Table C1 in the Appendix C, the regime type of each country, based on our formulation, is specified. Except for Croatia, Finland, Moldova and Poland, all democratic countries had the same regime type for the whole range of 1990–2009.

Figure A1

Appendix B

Varieties of referendums and the weighting rationale

Two main categories of referendums can be distinguished: top-down and bottom-up.

  • Plebiscitary and mandatory (or compulsory) referendums are two types of top-down referendums. A plebiscite is defined here as a referendum called by the authorities, either the executive or legislative. A mandatory referendum is required ‘under circumstances defined in the constitution or in legislation’ (IDEA, 2008, p. 213).

  • Optional (or abrogative or facultative or citizen-demanded) referendums and initiatives are two types of bottom-up referendums. The former is ‘initiated, or triggered, by a number of citizens referring to existing laws or political or legislative proposals’ (IDEA, 2008, p. 61). Initiatives are political proposals (for example, draft legislation) initiated by citizens. The proposal might be directly used for popular voting (direct initiative) or it could be revised by the legislative and then presented to the popular vote (indirect initiative which is also called counterproposal (Kaufmann et al, 2010)).

There is considerable inconsistency in the terminology of different types of referendums in the literature. For instance, in IDEA’s terminology, the ‘optional referendum’ is used in the meaning of plebiscite while in the terminology of Center for Research on Direct Democracy (C2D, 2012) it resembles the citizen-demanded referendum. In the terminology of IRI (Kaufmann et al, 2010), the term ‘optional referendum’ is not common and ‘citizen-initiated referendum’ is used instead. This could result in problematical operationalization

Some scholars distinguish and weigh referendums based on the main categories only (that is, top-down or bottom-up) (Peterlevitz, 2011). Some studies use only the number of referendums, no matter their types (Vanhanen, 2002; Altman, 2011; Kriesi and Bochsler, 2012). Another approach is to give a different weight to each type of referendum (Vatter, 2009; Altman, 2013). We follow this approach and weigh each type of referendum distinctively, based on its importance and contribution to direct democracy. It can be argued convincingly that bottom-up referendums with the citizens as initiators should have a higher weight than the top-down ones. Initiatives are seemed more participatory than optional (abrogative) referendums because in initiatives citizens themselves define, directly or indirectly, the issue and subject of the referendum. Plebiscites have more ‘governmental control’ than mandatory referendums (Setala, 2006; Vatter, 2009), which gives the latter higher participatory value than the former (see Table B1 for weights).

Table B1 Weight of different types, levels and effect of referendums

Normally only binding referendums are taken into account in the indices (Vatter, 2009; Peterlevitz, 2011). However, we believe that the non-binding referendum presents a form of participation that cannot be ignored. Setala (2006) asserted that in west-European democracies parliament binds itself to the result of advisory (non-binding) plebiscites. Therefore, we assign a weight for these referendums as well, albeit half the weight of a binding one. According to C2D (2012) database, all non-binding referendums have been plebiscites. However, we understood that there were also non-binding initiatives in some countries (for example, the Netherlands) (Van der Krieken, 2011).

Venhanen (2002), in his revised index of participation, includes the number of referendums as a supplement to voter turnout, assuming 5 points for each national referendum and 1 point for a local referendum. It seems an acceptable assumption, taking into account observation that in Switzerland – a country with a full-developed referendum culture – national referendums are five times as scarce as local ones. This ratio is reasonable if the practicalities (time, cost, facilities) in national and local referendums would also be taken into account. Moreover, the number of participants in a national referendum is also multifold than a local referendum. Thus a weighting factor of 0.20 for local referendums seems acceptable.

Table B1 summarizes the weighting coefficients for different type, level and effect of referendums.

As an example, Switzerland in 2000 had 1 mandatory referendum, 2 optional referendums and 13 initiatives at the national level, and 84 mandatory, 12 optional and 16 initiatives at the local level, all bindings. Thus the aggregated score of referendums for Switzerland in 2000 would be:

The aggregated score could be 0, when there is no referendum held in a country and it could be as high as in the above example for Switzerland. The REP score for Switzerland in 2000 is calculated as Log (28.4+1)=1.47, however, considering the highest score limit, its score would be 1.

We collected all binding and non-binding, national and local, and different types of referendums for all countries whose data are available in the extensive database of C2D (2012) in addition to other sources (Van der Krieken, 2011; Direct Democracy Navigator, 2012; Statistics Norway, 2012) for the range of 1990–2009.

Table B1

Appendix C

Table C1

Table C1 Countries’ information and scores for six indicators and final indices of integrative dimension of democracy (IDD) and participative dimension of democracy (PDD) for the range of 1990–2009

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

Maleki, A., Hendriks, F. Contestation and participation: Operationalizing and mapping democratic models for 80 electoral democracies, 1990–2009. Acta Polit 51, 237–272 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2015.10

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ap.2015.10

Keywords

Navigation