Introduction

In December 1962, Dean Acheson, former United States Secretary of State and President Kennedy's special adviser on NATO affairs, asserted that Britain's role as an independent power was 'about played out.' At the time he told a conference on American affairs at West Point Military Academy that Britain had lost an empire and had not found a role. He added: Britain's attempt to play a separate power role — that is, a role apart from Europe, a role based on a 'special relationship' with the United States, a role based on being the head of a Commonwealth which has no political structure or unity or strength and enjoys a fragile and precarious economic relationship — this role is about played out...Great Britain, attempting to work alone and to be a broker between the United States and Russia, has seemed to conduct a policy as weak as its military power (in Brinkley, 1992, 176).

Acheson's suggestion was that after 1945 the United Kingdom purposefully downplayed its reduced status within the international community, and it is likely unionists will suggest Scotland would experience a similar, if not steeper, reduction of global standing in the event of independence. Moreover, Acheson's comments imply that an independent strategic nuclear deterrent did not disguise the intrinsic limitations of Britain's conventional armed forces, and central government's unfavourable view of Scotland's autonomous military potential is not so dissimilar. To sustain credibility, it is generally accepted that an independent state must have the ability to defend its citizens, territory and national interests, and while the Scottish National Party (SNP) has entertained the concept of a Scottish Defence Service (SDS) it also rejects full integration into a nuclear-capable NATO. Yet it should be noted that James Baker, former Secretary of State to President George Bush I, has argued that a decision by Scotland to pull out of the world's most powerful security alliance would 'go down poorly' in the United States (The Scotsman, 23/9/03). In the event of separation, a Scottish government will be encouraged to appreciate the weight of this particular viewpoint. Nevertheless, in light of the SNP's current success this article explores some of Scotland's more recent experiences with the British military establishment, the national nuclear deterrent and the devolution settlement as it affects British defence issues. It also touches upon the subjects of terrorism and NATO membership, and presumes that arguments against British military disentanglement are based as much on the United Kingdom's inconvenience as they are with the autonomous state's available security options. All these issues will have a significant degree of influence over the formation of an SDS, although it is a myriad of factors that will dictate the final outcome.

Scotland has a long military tradition and its history with the British military establishment is impressive, but with random polls suggesting independence is more popular than the current devolution settlement (BBC News, 10/9/06), and with the SNP considering a referendum by 2010, one must question whether it is time to devote greater attention to Scotland's military future. Under the current constitutional arrangements, professional researchers investigating the plausibility or composition of the SDS have a responsibility to avoid partiality or being drawn into an intractable academic and political minefield. Furthermore, the subject is politically loaded on both sides of the Border, and has the potential to encourage greater interest from regional (i.e. more devolved) government. This may provide some explanation for the absence of quality research on this subject. An informed discussion on matters such as an independent Scotland's international security obligations and the formulation of the SDS are remarkably ill developed in Scotland, despite independence being one of the country's leading political issues. With the existing 'federal' defence arrangements ceasing to persist in the event of a greater transfer of powers, a sovereign Scottish government will encounter notable challenges when planning and establishing an independent military establishment. This article was written in the belief that the subject deserves substantial scholarly attention, and if the SNP is able to achieve its objectives it is certain this issue will demand extensive input from a number of specialists with expertise in various fields.

This paper provides a suitable background to the current British military presence in Scotland, its recent civilian employment record, what jobs the Trident nuclear deterrent has provided and what its replacement might have to offer. These issues are of relevance to this work because there are questions as to whether the economic opportunities afforded by defence-related employment, or the threat of losing jobs in the event of independence, may serve to influence opinions regarding Scotland's place in the Union. This research also presumes that Scotland, and indeed the United Kingdom as a whole, is reliving the 1980 Polaris replacement decision and interprets the devolution settlement as it affects British defence issues. Arguably, divisive issues such as the Blair government's support for the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and the Trident replacement decision, provoked a sizeable proportion of the electorate to re-evaluate Scotland's present constitutional status. But if a referendum on independence is in the foreseeable future, there also is relevance in considering military disentanglement and appropriate security alliances. Will the British national deterrent and its shore establishments, or any of the Royal Air Force (RAF) stations in Scotland, be subjected to relocation? Taking from the experiences of others, one might refer to the breakup of the former Yugoslavia and the dissolution of Czechoslovakia, or consider how the Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan, which made the difficult decision not to retain nuclear weapons on their territory after the demise of the Soviet Union, could serve as a template for separation or disentanglement (Woolf, 2005). Finally, if Scotland is able to secure its share of North Sea oil it seems that it would be advisable for the SNP to modify its current anti-NATO policy given the security alliance's latest interest in energy security.

When coming to grips with this multifaceted subject it is necessary not only to brush aside unionist threats of Scotland's vulnerability or nationalist visions of non-nuclear self-determination, but to disregard the economics of independence and its ability to sustain a military establishment. Obviously, military expenditure is an important component of the national economy, but due to the intensity of conflicting opinions that surround this inflammatory subject matter this article shall present no speculation as to what the composition of the SDS will be. At this point, it cannot be determined as to whether the SDS would resemble Óglaigh na hÉireann (the Irish Defence Force), Forsvarskommandoen (Defence Command Denmark) or any other military framework until a referendum has passed, Anglo-Scottish separation arrangements have been finalised and a Scottish defence budget has been produced. Furthermore, it is without question that various international security obligations will influence the military and political behaviour of the sovereign state. Thus, it appears that issues relating to an independent Scotland's military composition, purpose or procurement will remain largely unresolved until the Union has officially dissolved and formal negotiations have taken place.

The British Military Establishment in Scotland

According to Dr John R. Walker of the Arms Control and Disarmament Research Unit, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Ministry of Defence (MoD) operates roughly 400 sites of varying significance and size in Scotland, including HM Naval Base Clyde (interview, 23/10/06). The Scottish Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (SCND) also suggests that approximately 10,000 civilians are employed directly by the MoD north of the Border, with another 15,000 Scots serving either in the Army, Navy or RAF (SCND, 2004). Currently, the west of Scotland harbours the British national deterrent at both Faslane submarine base and Royal Navy Armaments Depot (RNAD) Coulport, while Scotland's Highlands and Islands hosts defence research facilities, training areas for low-altitude military aircraft and bombing ranges at Cape Wrath and Tain. The north-east also accommodates the RAF bases of Kinloss and Lossiemouth while the south-east of Scotland contains a number of important military locations for each branch of the armed forces, not least at Rosyth Royal Dockyard and RAF Leuchars. Yet it should be noted that while the Labour government insists that major job losses at Trident's shore establishments would be devastating for the local economies of the Helensburgh and surrounding areas, roughly one in three facilities in Scotland have been closed since 1980, although certain operational establishments have undergone considerable investment.

There have been significant developments for all three services in Scotland since 1989, and the military presence north of the Border has changed considerably since that time. Perhaps the most striking of these developments is the termination of the long-standing Scottish regiments. In December 2004, all of Scotland's regiments were reallocated and placed into one 'super-regiment'. The Royal Scots and the King's Own Scottish Borderers were to be dissolved and merged into an entirely new battalion; while the remainder would lose their regimental status and be downgraded to battalions of the new Royal Regiment of Scotland.¹ Furthermore, the Royal Navy still retains its Scottish headquarters at Faslane, home to Trident ballistic missile nuclear-powered submarines (SSBNs), although all Resolution class Polaris boats have been decommissioned and a replacement for the current system is under consideration.² While HM Naval Base Clyde provides for the largest number of people employed on a single site in Scotland, the RAF also operates several important centres across the country. In addition to the establishments at Kinloss, Leuchars and Lossiemouth, these include radar stations at Benbecula, Buchan and Saxa Vord; a bombing range at Tain; and a military air-traffic control centre at Prestwick. Approximately 50 aircraft are based at RAF Leuchars, with three squadrons of Tornado F3 aircraft, an RAF mountain rescue unit and an air transportable surgical unit. With roughly 80 aircraft based at RAF Lossiemouth in Moray, it has three Tornado bomber squadrons and has been described as the RAF's busiest fast jet base (interview with John R. Walker, 23/10/06). These aircraft are part of the D Flight 202 Squadron, which was relocated to RAF Kinloss in May 2005. Kinloss is also home to the recently grounded Nimrod fleet of maritime reconnaissance, search and rescue and anti-submarine warfare planes, with approximately 20 aircraft in the four Nimrod Squadrons.³ According to the SCND (2004), the RAF employs roughly 6,300 service personnel and 1,300 civilians across Scotland, yet the financial impact of Britain's armed forces to the Scottish economy continues to be a controversial subject. One might assume that a fading British military presence in Scotland has, to some extent, initiated greater support for Scottish independence.

Defence-related Employment in Scotland

The historical record reveals that defence contracts have a limited economic impact in Scotland when compared to the United Kingdom in its entirety, while terms like 'efficiency improvements' or 'privatisation' tend to raise concerns north of the Border. In 2004, for example, the House of Commons Defence Committee found that the MoD's 'smart acquisition' strategy had failed 'on almost all counts' to deliver promised efficiency improvements (The Scotsman, 28/7/04; also see Jamison, 2006). Yet during a visit to Faslane in October 2000, the-then Secretary of State for Scotland, John Reid, emphasised the contribution that the armed forces made to the Scottish economy in terms of employment, expenditure, and research and development. According to Reid, when taking into account the employment that was derived from defence contracts in Scotland, the total of defence-related jobs was 'in the region of 55,000' (Scotland Office press release, 25/10/00). Furthermore, in the first Scottish opinion poll of 2007 the SNP increased their lead against Labour as Adam Ingram, the armed forces minister, declared that Scotland could lose up to 26,000 jobs and have its military capacity 'reduced to the status of a gendarmerie if it became independent' (The Guardian, 18/01/07). These suggested estimates will be revisited as there are others who find defence-related employment in Scotland to be far less beneficial. Ian Goudie, central government's appointed representative on the European Cooperation in the Field of Scientific and Technical Research Action 10 programme on Defence Restructuring and Conversion, has argued that British industrial employment dependent on defence expenditure dramatically decreased from 740,000 in 1980 to 345,000 in 1999. In Scotland, the north and the south-east were particularly hard hit with the loss of thousands of jobs and hundreds of millions of pounds of MoD income to local economies. Goudie also argued that roughly 10,000 defence jobs had been extinguished in Fife since 1990, Strathclyde experienced a reduction of 25% in defence-related employment since that time, and Lothian lost more than 40% of its defence-related workforce during the same period (Goudie, 2001). Thus, Ingram, Reid and Goudie's differing perspectives on Scotland's defence-based economy tend to provoke further thought.

It is certain that the collapse of the Soviet Union, reductions in overall defence spending and British military restructuring heavily impacted upon the Scottish economy. However, when attempting to verify figures for defence-related employment in Scotland official sources do little to establish greater accuracy. While MoD figures are available for the deployment of British regular forces by region (see e.g. Morgan, 1999), there are no comprehensive regional figures available for defence-related employment. According to Ingram, the exact number of defence-related jobs in each constituency in Scotland, including those related to defence expenditure by the MoD on goods and services and defence export contracts in Scotland, is not held centrally and could only be provided at disproportionate cost (Defence Personnel (Scotland) 19/11/03, Col.961W). Thus, one must ask where Ingram (the loss of 26,000 jobs) and Reid (the reinforcement of 55,000 jobs) obtained their estimates, how these conflicting figures were established and what Ingram's estimate indicates when compared to Reid's initial suggestion. While official documentation provides for only limited information, the SCND has recently estimated that over 40,000 Scottish defence-related jobs have lapsed since 1990 without significant government intervention to ensure the provision of alternative employment (SCND, 2004). Finally, according to Angus Robertson, the SNP's spokesman on Defence and Europe, 1,826 service jobs were terminated (with another 200 transferred) and 1,382 civilian jobs lost since the Labour party returned to power (Discussion with Angus Robertson, February 2007. Also see Scottish Daily Record & Sunday Mail, 18/3/00, 17/03/05; Aberdeen Press and Journal, 11/3/05, Evening Times (Glasgow), 29/11/00, 21/1/03). Given Scotland's ongoing resentment towards the submarine platform, its disappointing employment record, the steady withdrawal of the British military's conventional establishments and the devolved parliament's restrictive degree of manoeuvrability, disgruntled unionists might argue that the Scottish electorate is being escorted to full autonomy.

The Devolution Settlement to Scotland as it Affects British Defence Issues

While arguments supporting the 1980 Polaris replacement decision and the 2007 Trident replacement debate are almost identical, important similarities also arise in debates about Scotland's constitutional affairs within the context of the defence of the United Kingdom.⁴ The pre-devolutionary efforts that were implemented to ensure that Holyrood would have no influence over HM Naval Base Clyde or any other military establishment in Scotland are clear to see. The concordat on defence between the Scottish executive and central government runs for almost 13 pages, whereas the concordat on international relations requires just one. Devolution is a process internal to Scotland and a procedure that involves the entire United Kingdom, and while the Scotland Act 1998 determines the authority of the Scottish Parliament and the executive it founded, the Act serves to maintain the fundamental supremacy of the British Parliament. The Scottish Parliament is entitled to generate its own laws, but only on those matters conferred within the Act. Furthermore, nothing within the Scotland Act prevents Westminster from making laws for Scotland on any subject and it retains sole powers to modify both the 1998 Act and the 1707 Act of Union. Under these circumstances, matters of defence are unequivocally reserved to London. On defence policy, the reserved matters identified in the Scotland Act, Schedule 5, Part I, Paragraph 9 (1) include:

1. the defence of the realm
2. the naval, military or air forces of the Crown, including reserve forces
3. visiting forces
4. international headquarters and defence organisations.

It should also be noted that the Scotland Act places no conscientiousness on central government to engage or consult with Scottish Ministers when decisions are being taken on reserved matters that might affect Scottish interests. Under these circumstances, Whitehall has made a deliberate and well-orchestrated attempt to inhibit Scottish intervention in nuclear policy. As Malcolm Chalmers and William Walker have noted, central government's monopoly on nuclear weapons is reinforced in the Scotland Act, which grants it 'sole control of nuclear, biological and chemical weapons of mass destruction', the only weapons to be emphasised in the Act. Furthermore, the Secretary of State for Defence also has the right to prohibit a Bill from the Scottish Parliament being submitted for Royal Ascent if it is reasonable to suspect it would be incompatible with any international obligations, including NATO, or the interests of defence or national security. Chalmers and Walker have acknowledged there is room for flexibility in the nuclear field, but in this instance Westminster has retained control of the issue though the SNP continues to explore its options (Chalmers and Walker, 2001). The implications of the SNP's January 2007 Trident tax proposal (for imposing a £1 million toll on every warhead transported in nuclear convoys) have yet to reach a conclusion. But regardless of whether this political strategy proves successful or not, now that the party has been given the opportunity to govern it might attempt to bolster its domestic and international qualifications, being careful to uphold legal commitments under the Act and respecting international commitments. The SNP might recall the days when an unelectable Labour Party imploded beneath the Thatcher government for its stance on unilateral disarmament (for more on Labour's previous position on nuclear weapons see Foot, 1999). Nevertheless, for the purposes of this article it is best to avoid further exploration of the legislative process, which may be employed to modify both the 1998 Act and the 1707 Act of Union, and turn to a future where the sovereign state must consider those issues relative to national security.

National Defence, Security Alliances and Anglo-Scottish Military Negotiations

There will be a myriad of issues the nationalists will need to address while given the opportunity to manage a devolved government, and if they are to lead Scotland to full autonomy it must consider the general subjects of national defence, international security commitments, military reconstruction and its overall compatibility with the Scottish economy. Public expectations in Scotland of what an SDS should encompass have not yet been determined, and there has been limited academic research invested in the subject. It is nonsensical to ask the electorate if it gains from collective security as a member of the United Kingdom (the answer is obvious), but it is logical to ask if Scots can live with an indigenous military capability. In the event of independence one might enquire as to whether a majority of Scots are prepared to support a costly force projection capability similar to that of British armed forces, a relatively modest military capacity similar to that of the Republic of Ireland, or something in between. One can assume that most Scots would want their military establishment to be led by professional and trusted leaders, and reinforced by troops that are physically and mentally prepared to meet the rigours of military operations. Most would probably argue that Scotland's military personnel should also be reinforced by the most technologically advanced, battle-tested and alliance-compatible equipment money can buy. Thus, economy, effectiveness and state-of-the-art technology would all be influential in matters of procurement. However, long before an equipment inventory can be finalised, it is important for an autonomous Scottish Parliament to develop a comprehensive knowledge of the politico-military dimension of security.

It is uncertain as to what might occur in the aftermath of a referendum. It is obvious that the SNP has not yet taken the time to refine party defence policy, but since the collapse of the Soviet Union and the general relaxation of East–West tensions there has been a positive transformation in Britain's external security environment in common with its neighbours in Western Europe. Arguably, Scotland faces virtually no risk of external military attack on its territory from another state and there is at present virtually no risk of externally instigated conflict in its immediate region. Any change in these conditions is liable to be preceded by a significant warning period of some months or years. But sovereign states have a duty to predict and manage potential risks or threats to the greatest extent possible. This is when geographic, policy and threat analysis come together to formulate threat/risk assessments, high-priority analysis of either geographic areas or particular policy/military developments of interest. Understanding the hazards before investing economic and human resources would permit an independent Scotland the ability to implement Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs) that greatly reduce the risks (Barakat and Wardell, 2005). SOPs would serve to influence the composition and structure of any future SDS, but regardless of the absence of state-sponsored threats to Scotland there are other highly significant security issues that deserve undivided attention.

Early into an SNP administration, on 30 June 2007, Alex Salmond found himself working closely with Gordon Brown's Labour government after Muslim extremists drove a burning jeep laden with gas canisters and petrol into Glasgow airport's terminal 1 building, causing structural damage but no loss of civilian life (BBC News, 7/8/07). Salmond's fledgling government faced a demanding test as it called for calm in the wake of the failed plot. Immediately after the attack, Salmond sought to unify the country and build bridges with the Muslim community, visiting mosques and meeting community leaders. However, while this political response was considered appropriate, at this juncture in time only the organs of the British state can effectively deal with terrorism. The SNP, dedicated to Scottish independence, has not yet provided a detailed and structured policy that explains how it intends to thwart terrorist activity. Furthermore, the party has not presented plans for the organisation that will confront this issue, the training its personnel will receive, the tools it will have at its disposal, the level of cooperation and information sharing it will employ with other states, or how this particular organisation will be funded. Whereas most of the wars and armed conflicts over the last 15 years were civil or regional, terrorists and organised criminals have been able to operate globally. Although international and domestic terrorism is currently of the highest priority, the SNP have not completed threat assessments that include an examination of law enforcement and intelligence problems and issues, queries about homeland security and an understanding of terrorist activity. September 2001 also triggered a prompt response in the field of internal security, and the military reaction has been either channeled through NATO and the United Nations (UN) or managed individually (and bilaterally with the United States — in 'coalitions of the willing') by both member and NATO's applicant states. More indirectly, the events of 9/11 have increased the pressure towards NATO enlargement by pushing a faster and broader accession of the current candidates. In both respects, non-state actors have been the major players with terrorist strikes against New York, Washington, London, Madrid and elsewhere highlighting the complexity of the new security environment (see Rupp, 2006). This being the situation, it appears that the SNP have not yet recognised that state policy regarding a security alliance should be based, at least in part, on the most credible option for dealing with current and long-term terrorist threats or state-sponsored aggression.

The contours of an indigenous European security capability remain vague, but within the contents of the SNP administration's August 2007 White Paper, Choosing Scotland's Future: A National Conversation — Independence and Responsibility in the Modern World, it is stated that Scotland could decide to 'continue with NATO, or could opt for a defence posture within other co-operation bodies' such as 'the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Western European Union (WEU) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme' (Section 3.23, Scottish Executive, 2007). If the SNP leadership, and those who are advising Salmond, seek an influential security architecture during periods of regional or global crisis, the party must realise that these 'other co-operation bodies' are incapable of providing a robust military response to state-sponsored military action or terrorist activity. The OSCE is an international organisation that serves as a forum for political dialogue. Many effective counter-terrorism measures fall into areas in which the OSCE is already active, such as police training and border monitoring, but it will never provide 'boots on the ground' (British Helsinki Human Rights Group; http://www.bhhrg.org). Furthermore, NATO still dominates European security planning, and the WEU, a dormant European defence and security organisation whose parliamentary assembly was urged to dissolve itself, only has a limited Operational Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) capable of commanding operations up to a Light Division commitment. The RRF in theory is capable of a wide variety of policing, humanitarian or intervention scenarios as laid down by the WEU in the Petersberg Tasks of 1992; however, a gulf exists between facilities, military hardware, transport and logistics, available personnel and the perceived role of the RRF. Finally, the Partnership for Peace Programme was a NATO project generally aimed at creating trust between NATO and states in the former Soviet Union. It allowed partner countries to build up an individual relationship with NATO, choosing their own priorities for cooperation. If we are to assume that the SNP is concerned with providing the most credible option for dealing with terrorist or state-sponsored hostilities, the party is apparently experiencing a worrying degree of confusion about what exactly a credible security alliance embodies.

There are a number of political and military implications of the SNP's current stance on NATO that go to the centre of debates over sovereignty. The nationalists currently reject NATO membership due largely to the security alliance's nuclear capability, but it is important to note that in the modern era states cannot simply announce their arrival on the international stage and decide for themselves how or with whom they will engage in the international community. Furthermore, it is not completely certain what challenges European Union (EU) or UN membership will hold for an independent Scotland, and there are numerous domestic and international legal issues that would have to be addressed if Scotland sought independent statehood (Chalmers and Walker, 2001). What is clear is that NATO would have to be made to encourage convergence and full membership for Scotland, thereby providing an initial and basic form of integration to Scotland's security needs while awaiting admission. This approach would serve to facilitate the linkage of established security pillars, and perhaps the most pressing need would be to establish interlocking economic and political criteria in order to provide Scotland with a clearly delineated chart by which to measure qualifications for full membership. Furthermore, to draw the various levels together in a viable whole, the designated security alliance and Scotland's own authorities would probably have to create a temporary position/office to oversee external coordination with the independent state's activities (for more on this see Simon, 1997). However, there is little possibility for any of this to occur unless the SNP seriously reconsiders its options.

If the SNP is capable of scrapping its current anti-NATO policy, the independent state will have to satisfy very specific capability requirements that must be met before full membership would be granted. NATO enlargement has provided an exact groundwork for such an occasion, with its established guidelines serving to assist in our understanding of any future obstacles for the independent state (see Taylor, 2005). Given the experiences of previous NATO applicant states, the SDS would have to be capable of defending the country in the event of possible aggression as well as being able to effectively act with alliance forces in fulfilling its obligations (see Smith, 2000). Among a number of issues, the SDS would have to demonstrate the capacity to ensure a unified and effective command and control system, provide the physical security of premises for storing and handling classified information, and establish an effective reserve training and mobilisation system. These requirements, and numerous others, would have to be carefully planned during the development and implementation of the Scottish military reconstruction programme. Interoperability is but one consideration, and within a coalition with mixed capabilities, it represents the sense of seamlessly integrated operations. The differing technology levels of various coalition/alliance members may require that a particular mission and/or battlespace be partitioned according to an individual member's capabilities. If the addition of partners without minimal assets is made for political reasons, these partners must be properly supported, using assets such as airlift and at least minimal command, control, communications, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance connectivity (commonly referred to as C3ISR) (Larson et al., 2003). In this instance, political and military representatives of an independent Scotland will have to decide what an autonomous Scotland can afford, in economic, human and technological terms, among a coalition. For the time being one must assume the SNP would seek membership within the EU and the UN as a non-nuclear weapon state in practice and law, but one cannot disregard a subtle, if not compulsory, shift in SNP policy regarding the United Kingdom's Trident programme, its replacement or a nuclear-armed NATO.

Some unionists and nationalists might assume that a newly independent Scotland would be eager to flex its sovereignty by expelling Trident and its replacement as quickly as possible, but this viewpoint fails to recognise that relocation of various military assets, including Faslane's shiplift, would involve sophisticated and hugely expensive operations. It might also be noted that, in the shadow of independence, the loss of Scotland's annual tax contribution to the United Kingdom, combined with Westminster's relocation and replacement of Trident, could be interpreted by some as a painful inconvenience for the remainder of the United Kingdom (rUK). For Scotland, the deterioration of national security is an issue for contemplation while the loss of civilian jobs and the need to revitalise a regional economy would be of highest priority. In the event of separation, it would be politically advantageous for both nationalists and unionists to consider greater flexibility with the national deterrent if it becomes necessary. One should avoid overestimating the technical difficulties or costs associated with relocating Trident and its jobs elsewhere, but Scotland and the rUK would have to seek advantages in working to reach an agreement. Furthermore, it is uncertain as to how Washington and NATO members would react to the dissolution of the Union, and how the withdrawal of rUK forces would impact on the security alliance. Though undetermined, Scottish cooperation and flexibility may support an appropriate division of natural resources (oil fields?) and bolster support from the rUK for Scotland's membership of the EU, NATO and the UN. In return, there also is the possibility that arrangements could be made where rUK forces would be permitted flexible on time schedules and greater economy while maintaining its commitment to NATO. Finally, the military disentanglement of British armed forces is an issue of vast complexity, but if Scottish independence is believed possible then when considering the United Kingdom's available security options it could be of some value for both parties to consider negotiations supporting a defence planning and management framework, which allows for temporary reintegration in times of global crisis or war. Kenny MacAskill, the SNP's deputy Holyrood leader, for instance, has argued that Scotland should retain RAF and Royal Navy establishments north of the Border in order to 'secure England's strategic needs' (The Scotsman, 30/6/05). These are merely examples of the complexity each side will face. However, before any formal Anglo-Scottish military agreement can be established a Scottish Parliament would require a comprehensive understanding of the United Kingdom's various governmental and military structures, its decision-making processes and Scotland's own domestic security needs. The outcome of military futures will hinge on these discussions.

Ultimately, the Scottish Parliament would have to produce a lengthy list of priorities after a referendum on independence has passed and before Anglo-Scottish military negotiations could take place. Before approaching the negotiation process, Scotland would need to define its own minimum security requirements and the methods and resources needed to support these requirements. Stating the obvious, a sovereign Scotland would have to take a number of steps designed to establish democratic civilian control of defence policy and policy-making, and the independent state would need to consider the formation of governmental structures (national security councils, defence committees and the like) tasked with overseeing the strategic course of both defence policy and the armed forces. Various mechanisms and procedures for the financial supervision and management of specific and general defence spending also would be required, and Holyrood would eventually have to support an alternative source of policy ideas and advice with the development of independent and semi-independent defence/security research institutes, think tanks and non-governmental organisations, fostering wider public debate on defence. In addition, while the United Kingdom does not have a solitary, unifying National Security Policy (NSP) document, Holyrood would need to establish a White Paper that explores current and future roles for the SDS, outlining the core interests of the nation and setting guidelines for addressing present and prospective threats (Barakat and Wardell, 2005). To compliment the independent state's NSP, an appropriate security alliance would serve to bolster Scotland's national defence, and when determining the independent state's security needs one must ask if the SNP would prefer the Irish military model or access to the best intelligence, the best countermeasures and best defence systems available through full NATO membership. If the SNP is able to achieve its political objectives, 'Scotland's Oil' and a healthy interest in energy security may one day influence party defence policy (Gallis, 2006).

One must realise that the issues are much broader than Trident or MoD land ownership (the MoD being one of the largest landowners in Scotland), and all issues are subordinate to those separation arrangements that may be agreed. The Scottish Parliament will have to gauge its bargaining leverage, and examples are provided to highlight the increasing complexity of these negotiations. In the aftermath of the Cold War, it is reasonable to assume that RAF facilities are based in Scotland for political, rather than operational, purposes. Because the Soviet Northern Fleet operated from facilities in the Kola Peninsula, Scotland's role in NATO was closely linked to the perceived military functions of the north-east Atlantic and the Norwegian and Barents Seas — known collectively as 'Northern Waters'. The international situation has since changed and, arguably, RAF Kinloss could be closed or relocated upon the dissolution of the Union given that the primary reason maritime aircraft were based in Scotland was to provide intelligence and coverage for the Greenland–Iceland–UK gap, an area once considered an important 'choke-point' for Russian forces. In the contemporary setting, the same RAF facilities in Scotland could, in theory, be relocated to Northern Ireland or England (interview with Professor John Simpson, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 6/3/07).

If the rUK withdraws, how might Scotland cope with this scenario? If the SNP government considered leasing options for British military establishments (be they nuclear or conventional) it would be strongly encouraged to readjust its current policy on NATO, and financial arrangements would have to be made with the security alliance. Under those circumstances, the Scottish government would then have to see if the rUK would retain bases in Scotland or relocate elsewhere, and both would be forced to consider the financial implications. The division of military assets, and the determinations of defence industrialists represent another important dimension of Anglo-Scottish military negotiations, but the Devil will be in the details. Finally, some portion at the core of Anglo-Scottish military negotiations will presumably explore the issues of citizenship, since this will have clear implications for domestic and international agreements. If Scotland achieves full sovereignty then Article II of the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons dictates that a Scottish submariner would not be permitted, in any legal capacity, to assist in the process of launching a British Trident missile unless he/she were of British, rather than Scottish, nationality.⁵ This is merely a sample of various topics for discussion, and, based on the available evidence, it is doubtful as to whether the SNP is fully prepared for this challenge. Only after completion of negotiations will the SDS and Scottish national security policy attain any degree of significance.

Conclusions: Idealism vs Pragmatism

Scottish soldiers and sailors were instrumental in supporting the expansion of the British Empire and became involved in many international conflicts, including the American Wars of Independence, the two world wars and most recently the two Gulf wars. More to the point, two world wars had brought with it a reliance on arms production, as global conflict provided for full employment in Scottish factories re-designed for war work. However, during the cold war Scottish dependency on defence-related employment was generally characterised by support for both Polaris and Trident, but this transition implied little for heavy industry. Although some Oberon class conventional boats were assembled in Scotland, submarine production brought little relief to the country as heavy industries were gradually extinguished. One might ask whether the steady decline of Scotland's heavy industries, in collaboration with the passing of its contributions to the British military establishment, has, among a number of important factors, served to weaken the Union (see Harvie, 1994). It is also possible that events such as the closure of one in three military facilities in Scotland since 1980, the recent disbanding of Scotland's regiments and the constant threat of redundancy for civilian employees have somehow encouraged a growing number to take another look at Scotland's constitutional status. Finally, it should be noted that the continuing revolution in military affairs may be influencing the Anglo-Scottish relationship, and, if the British military presence in Scotland continues its downward spiral, there is the chance that an indigenous military capability may become more attractive.

In recent years, technology has leapt forward and various weapons can be delivered with unprecedented precision. Surveillance and reconnaissance systems can provide remarkably detailed information about hostile force structures and locations; and a combination of data analysis and distribution systems now allows this information to be rapidly exploited. Most military analysts agree that advances in military technology require a fundamental reappraisal and revision of operational concepts to ensure that full advantage is taken of them. This combination of technological advances and revisions in operational concepts represents a revolution in military affairs (Galdi, 1995). Yet it should be realised that with this, the evolution of weapon projects is usually subject to unique certainties and difficulties, and while heavy investment in research and development provides for prototypes and eventually production weapons, improved military technology is geared towards a 'fire and forget' capability. It could be argued that military thinking has a disproportionate influence on science and technology in modern Britain and, ultimately, it is reasonable to suspect this will have implications for defence-related employment in Scotland. Thus, when considering the scientific investment that supports the development of British military systems, technological advancements, limited opportunities afforded to civilian employees and the 'brain drain' to England may also be contributing to the demise of the Anglo-Scottish relationship (The Scotsman, 29/10/06). But gone are Glasgow's days of munitions production and there is little, if any, chance that it will ever return.

If Scotland is to reach and sustain full autonomy there are certain military prerequisites that must be satisfied. It is this certainty that will most likely serve to reshape current nationalist policies regarding NATO, and perhaps modify the party's position on the British nuclear deterrent. Nevertheless, due to domestic political pressures the SNP are careful to address Trident, Iraq and the Scottish regiments, but it seems the most critical issue for the party is 'Scotland's negotiated share of UK defence resources' (http://www.snp.org). It is uncertain, however, as to how much thought the party has actually invested in this one topic. Disregarding renegotiations of the Act of Union 1707 and the Scotland Act 1998, military settlements are, without question, one of several key issues that face a future independent state. As with any negotiation, preparation is the most important prerequisite and neither experience, bargaining skill, nor persuasion on the part of the negotiator can compensate for the absence of solid groundwork. Both parties would require clear objectives and a thorough understanding of the politico-military dimension of security. With the situation as such, a Scottish government, previous to Anglo-Scottish negotiations, would have to perform a close examination of the current strategic environment and there would need to be a prognostication of the strategic environment at 5, 10, 15 and 20-year intervals (interview with Dr Kristan Stoddart, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, 16/3/07). In turn, this would assist in generating comprehensive threat and risk assessments based on the above-mentioned time scale, which might allow for greater clarity regarding the composition and function of the SDS. It is certain that findings derived from strategic studies and threat and risk assessments would hold influence over Scotland's position in Anglo-Scottish military negotiations, and with that there would be a need for considerations of present and future multilateral alliance commitments (Cohen, 2001).

Current United Kingdom defence policy, as it has been since 1949, employs the vehicle of NATO as a key focus. NATO assets are currently funded and operated by the United States, representing roughly two-thirds of NATO forces. Without access to these resources British foreign and defence policy would be severely hampered, and an autonomous Scottish government would be encouraged to appreciate the level of intrusiveness any dissolution of the Union represents. But establishing a military relationship with the United Kingdom is one issue, and building bridges with NATO is another. In concept and in practice, alliances unite the capabilities of nation-states not simply for the sake of constructing associations but essentially to preserve, enlarge or develop positions of strength for diplomacy or war. Yet this statement should not serve to conceal the historical dynamics of security relationships, a characteristic acknowledged in December 1962 when Acheson asserted: Of course a unique relation existed between Britain and America — our common language and history insured that. But unique did not mean affectionate. We had fought England as an enemy as often as we had fought by her side as an ally (Acheson, 1969, 387).

If ever a Scottish government is to enter into military negotiations with the United Kingdom or NATO, it seems best for it to keep this sentiment in mind. If a 2010 referendum is just around the corner, to this point it appears the SNP and its network of advisors has done very little to prepare party leadership for an issue of such sophistication and national importance.

Notes

¹ The infantry regiments that formed the 'super-regiment' are: the Royal Highland Fusiliers, the Royal Scots, the Kings Own Scottish Borderers, the Argyll and Sutherland Highlanders, the Highlanders, the Black Watch, the Scots Guards and the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards (BBC News, 17/12/04).

² Polaris was Britain's first nuclear submarine platform for deterrence. The current fleet contains four Vanguard class Trident boats and the shore establishment provides key support services to the Royal Navy (Jamison, 2006).

³ Checks were carried out on the RAF's Nimrod MR2 planes after concerns were raised over possible problems with fuel pipes (BBC News, 21/7/04).

⁴ The continuing risk from the proliferation of nuclear weapons, and the chance that a number of other countries will retain substantial nuclear arsenals, meant that Britain's minimum nuclear deterrent capability, currently represented by Trident, was always likely to remain a necessary element of UK security (Simpson, 1986).

⁵ Article II states that 'each non-nuclear-weapon State Party to the Treaty undertakes not to receive the transfer from any transferor whatsoever of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices or of control over such weapons or explosive devices directly, or indirectly; not to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices; and not to seek or receive any assistance in the manufacture of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices'. See the 1968 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, http://www.un.org/events/npt2005/npttreaty.html.

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