Skip to main content
Log in

Political parties’ welfare image, electoral punishment and welfare state retrenchment

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Comparative European Politics Aims and scope

Abstract

Will voters punish the government for cutting back welfare state entitlements? The comparative literature on the welfare state suggests that the answer is yes. Unless governments are effectively employing strategies of blame avoidance, retrenchment leads to vote loss. Because a large majority of voters supports the welfare state, the usual assumption is that retrenchment backfires equally on all political parties. This study contributes to an emerging body of research that demonstrates that this assumption is incorrect. On the basis of a regression analysis of the electoral fate of the governing parties of 14 OECD countries between 1970 and 2002, we show that most parties with a positive welfare image lose after they implemented cutbacks, whereas most parties with a negative welfare image do not. In addition, we show that positive welfare image parties in opposition gain votes, at the expense of those positive welfare image parties in government that implemented welfare state retrenchment.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. These two implications suggest that voters base their voting decision on a party's past performance, that is to say, voters vote retrospectively. However, this line of argument does not rule out the possibility that at least some voters, some of the time, vote prospectively, that is to say, based on what they expect that a party will do. Even in the latter situation, however, voters will always draw on a party's past performance too, as they need information from the past to assess to what extent promises made in, for example, a party's manifesto are credible. If, say, a conservative party promises in its manifesto to increase the generosity of unemployment benefits by 20 per cent, voters will know, based on the party's past performance, that the party is unlikely to keep its promise.

  2. Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden and the United Kingdom. We exclude the United States because it is a presidential democracy. We exclude Switzerland because – due to the so-called magic formula that divides the seven executive positions between the four main parties – there is no traditional party competition. Consequently, these two countries are not well suited for testing our hypotheses.

  3. The web appendix will be posted on the authors’ web site: www.gijsschumacher.nl.

  4. The attention of parties for welfare issues is a candidate for a time-varying measure. We chose not to do this, because voter images of parties do not directly change when parties change their policy intent. Also, parties hardly discuss retrenchment in their manifestos. For example, the mean of the ‘per505 welfare state retrenchment’ category in the Comparative Manifesto project indicates that on average parties spend only 0.05 per cent of their manifesto on welfare state retrenchment. In comparison, parties spend on average about 8 per cent of their manifesto to the item ‘welfare state expansion’.

  5. Our sample of governments ends in 2002, but because our dependent variable is the electoral result of governing parties at the next elections the observations can be from after 2002.

References

  • Allan, J.P. and Scruggs, L.A. (2004) Political partisanship and welfare state reform in advanced industrial democracies. American Journal of Political Science 48 (3): 496–512.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Armingeon, K. and Giger, N. (2008) Conditional punishment: A comparative analysis of the electoral consequences of welfare state retrenchment in OECD nations, 1980–2003. West European Politics 31 (3): 558–580.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Becker, J. (2005) ‘De Steun voor de Verzorgingsstaat in de Publieke Opinie, 1970–2002: Een Analyse van Trends in Meningen’ (SCP-Publicatie No. 2005/3). Den Haag, the Netherlands: Sociaal en Cultureel Planbureau.

    Google Scholar 

  • Bélanger, E. and Meguid, B. (2008) Issue salience, issue ownership, and issue-based vote choice. Electoral Studies 27 (3): 477–491.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Boeri, T., Börsch-Supan, A. and Tabellini, G. (2001) Would you like to shrink the welfare state? A survey of European citizens. Economic Policy 16 (32): 9–50.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brambor, T., Clark, W.R. and Golder, M. (2006) Understanding interaction models: Improving empirical analysis. Political Analysis 14 (1): 63–82.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Brooks, C. and Manza, J. (2006) Why do welfare states persist? Journal of Politics 68 (4): 816–827.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Budge, I., Klingemann, H.D., Volkens, A., Bara, J. and Tanenbaum, E. (2001) Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and Governments 1945–1998. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Burstein, P. (2010) Public opinion, public policy, and democracy: Old expectations and new. In: K.T. Leicht and J.C. Jenkins (eds.) Handbook of Politics. New York: Springer, pp. 63–80.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Duch, R.M. and Stevenson, R.T. (2008) The Economic Vote. How Political and Economic Institutions Condition Election Results. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Erikson, R.S., Mackuen, M.B. and Stimson, J.A. (2002) The Macro Polity. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fallend, F. (2003) Political data yearbook 2002: Austria. European Journal of Political Research 42 (7–8): 887–899.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Giger, N. (2010) Do voters punish the government for welfare state retrenchment? A comparative study of electoral costs associated with social policy. Comparative European Politics 8 (4): 415–443.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Giger, N. and Nelson, M. (2011) The electoral consequences of welfare state retrenchment: Blame avoidance or credit claiming in the era of permanent austerity? European Journal of Political Research 50 (1): 1–23.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Green-Pedersen, C. (2002) The Politics of Justification: Party Competition and Welfare-State Retrenchment in Denmark and the Netherlands from 1982 to 1998. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: Amsterdam University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Green-Pedersen, C. (2007) The growing importance of issue competition: The changing nature of party competition in Western Europe. Political Studies 35 (3): 607–629.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Huber, E. and Stephens, J.D. (2001) Development and Crisis of the Welfare State: Parties and Policies in Global Markets. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). (1985) Role of government. ZA No.1490, http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/issp/modules-study-overview/role-of-government/1985/, accessed 28 January 2010.

  • International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). (1990) Role of government II. ZA No. 1950, http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/issp/modules-study-overview/role-of-government/1990/, accessed 28 January 2010.

  • International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). (1996) Role of government III. ZA No. 2900, http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/issp/modules-study-overview/role-of-government1996/, accessed 28 January 2010.

  • International Social Survey Programme (ISSP). (2006) Role of government IV. ZA No. 4700, http://www.gesis.org/en/services/data/survey-data/issp/modules-study-overview/role-of-government/2006/, accessed 28 January 2010.

  • Jensen, C. (2010) Issue compensation and right-wing government social spending. European Journal of Political Research 49 (2): 282–299.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D. and Tversky, A. (1979) Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk. Econometrica 47 (2): 263–291.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kitschelt, H. (2001) Partisan competition and welfare state retrenchment: When do politicians choose unpopular policies? In: P. Pierson (ed.) The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 265–302.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Korpi, W. and Palme, J. (2003) New politics and class politics in the context of austerity and globalization: Welfare state regress in 18 countries, 1975–95. American Political Science Review 97 (3): 425–446.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Larsen, C.A. (2008) The institutional logic of welfare attitudes: How welfare regimes influence public support. Comparative Political Studies 41 (4): 145–168.

    Google Scholar 

  • Lewis-Beck, M.S. and Paldam, M. (2000) Economic voting: An introduction. Electoral Studies 19 (2): 113–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in Thirty-Six Countries. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • McDermott, R. (2004) Prospect theory in political science: Gains and losses from the first decade. Political Psychology 25 (2): 289–312.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • O'Connor, J.R. (1973) The Fiscal Crisis of the State. New York: St Martins.

    Google Scholar 

  • Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (1981) The Welfare State in Crisis. Paris, France: OECD.

  • Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2010) OECD Economic Outlook. Paris, France: OECD.

  • Petrocik, J.R. (1996) Issue Ownership in Presidential Elections, with a 1980 case study. American Journal of Political Science 40 (3): 825–850.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pierson, P. (1994) Dismantling the Welfare State? Reagan, Thatcher, and the Politics of Retrenchment. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Pierson, P. (ed.) (2001) The New Politics of the Welfare State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Powell, G.B. and Whitten, G.D. (1993) A cross-national analysis of economic voting: Taking account of the political context. American Journal of Political Science 37 (2): 391–414.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ross, F. (2000) ‘Beyond left and right’: The new Partisan Politics of welfare. Governance: An International Journal of Policy and Administration 13 (2): 155–183.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Scarbrough, E. (2000) West European welfare states: The old politics of retrenchment. West European Politics 38 (2): 225–259.

    Google Scholar 

  • Scruggs, L.A. (2004) Welfare state entitlement data set: A comparative institutional analysis of eighteen welfare states. version 1.1., http://sp.uconn.edu/~scruggs/wp.htm, accessed 25 June 2011.

  • Starke, P. (2006) The politics of welfare state retrenchment: A literature review. Social Policy & Administration 40 (1): 104–120.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Van der Brug, W., Van der Eijck, C. and Franklin, M. (2007) The Economy and the Vote: Economic Conditions and Elections in Fifteen Countries. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Van Kersbergen, K. and Manow, P. (eds.) (2009) Religion, Class Coalitions, and Welfare States. Cambridge, NY: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Van Oorschot, W. (2000) Who should get what, and why? On deservingness criteria and the conditionality of solidarity among the public. Policy & Politics 28 (1): 33–48.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Vis, B. and van Kersbergen, K. (2007) Why and how do political actors pursue risky reforms? Journal of Theoretical Politics 19 (2): 153–172.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Woldendorp, J., Keman, H. and Budge, I. (2000) Party Government in 48 Democracies (1945–1998), Composition, Duration, Personnel Dordrecht, the Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

    Book  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Gijs Schumacher.

Additional information

This article was presented at the NIG Work Conference 2009, the Research Seminar of the Department of Governance Studies, VU University Amsterdam and at the ECPR Joint Sessions 2010. Thanks to the participants of these workshops, especially to Mark Bovens and Duco Bannink, and to Carsten Jensen for their useful comments and suggestions. Barbara Vis's research is supported by a Veni grant from the Netherlands Organisation for Scientific Research (NWO, grant nr. 451-08-012).

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Schumacher, G., Vis, B. & van Kersbergen, K. Political parties’ welfare image, electoral punishment and welfare state retrenchment. Comp Eur Polit 11, 1–21 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2012.5

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2012.5

Keywords

Navigation