Abstract
Since the late 1970s, but especially since Unification in 1990, the German federal system has come under considerable stress. On the one hand, party competition is increasingly played out through the Bundesrat, the body representing the Länder governments at the federal level, making intergovernmental coordination more difficult and leading to accusations of ‘Reformstau’ (reform log jam). On the other hand, Unification not only added five new Länder to the system, but also led to economic disparities between the Länder at a hitherto unknown level, and deepened territorial conflicts over Länder competencies and the allocation of finances. Both developments have led to demands for a reform of the federal structure aimed at disentangling joint policymaking structures to ensure greater autonomy for both the federal level and the Länder. However, as the article will argue, the developments have resulted in a triangular constellation of interests between the federal level, the richer and the poorer Länder that makes reforming the system almost impossible.
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Notes
On the 2006 and 2009 federal reforms see below.
Electoral Alternative for Employment and Social Justice (Wahlalternative für Arbeit und soziale Gerechtigkeit).
So far, the SPD has not embraced the Left List as a viable coalition partner due to the unease in the West regarding the historical baggage of the PDS, but also due to inter-party animosities since a number of Left List party members in the West are former SPD members including former Left List co-chairman Oscar Lafontaine.
If the new and first Green Minister President, Winfried Kretschmann of Baden-Württemberg, does not remain a ‘one hit wonder’, MPK and Bundesrat may have to organise ‘G’ meetings as well.
Decisions in the Bundesrat are always based on ‘positive’ questions, that is, ‘who votes for the bill’ for consent laws and ‘who objects to the bill?’ for all other laws.
This number does not, of course, take into account consent bills that are never introduced because the government fears that they might be watered down too much or not pass the Bundesrat at all.
The only really important amendments concerned the distribution of the Länder votes in the Bundesrat, the involvement of the Länder in EU policymaking and the amendment to Article 72 granting the Bund concurrent powers on the basis of a ‘necessity’ rather than a mere ‘need’ for the establishment of equivalent living conditions. In addition, the Court was given explicit jurisdiction in disputes over the new ‘clause of necessity’ (Article 93 (1) GG), thus forcing it to abandon its ‘political question theory’.
For a critical discussion of this view see Auel 2010.
For the reform process as well as the outcome see Moore and Wade, 2008.
Hunting, nature conservation and landscape management, land distribution, spatial planning, management of water resources and higher education (both admission and degrees).
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Auel, K. Intergovernmental relations in German federalism: Cooperative federalism, party politics and territorial conflicts. Comp Eur Polit 12, 422–443 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2014.13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2014.13