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A theoretical perspective on multi-level systems in Europe: Constitutional power and partisan conflict

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Comparative European Politics Aims and scope

Abstract

This article distinguishes three constitutionally defined categories of multi-level systems – confederations, federal arrangements and regionalized arrangements, which differ in whether their lower-level governments enjoy constitutional protection and whether we find a constitutional hierarchy between central and lower levels of government. We argue that the constitutional category a multi-level system belongs to systematically shapes first, the dominant mode of day-to-day intergovernmental coordination, second, the mode of formal competence (re)allocation; and third, the relative impact of party (in)congruence across central and lower-level governments on these coordination processes, respectively. The article then specifies the indicators used to test the hypotheses across the range of case studies. It finally shows how the multi-level systems covered in this special issue span the confederal – federal – regionalized spectrum and thus allow for an encompassing comparative assessment of multi-level dynamics and their long-term evolution.

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Notes

  1. To assure comparability across different constitutional arrangements, we chose the following terminology: the term ‘lower-level government’ or ‘subunit’ embraces regional or developed units in federal or regionalized states as well as the EU member states, thereby denoting the level directly below the central level of the respective polity looked at (further note that government refers to the government unit as a whole, not specifically the executive). For the same reason, we will refer to the ‘central level’, ‘central government’ or ‘centre’ rather than the ‘federal government’ or ‘federal level’. The case studies will refer to country-specific terminology for lower-level governments, respectively, for example, cantons, Länder, ACs and so on.

  2. For a recent cross-national study on multi-level policymaking that spans the unitary-federal divide, see Biela et al (2012).

  3. To give a prominent example, in the contemporary European Union, climate change policy requires the concerted action of many levels of government. The EU sets emission targets, which the member states, through domestic regulation are obliged to meet. The actual implementation of these policies often requires the intense cooperation or in highly decentralized states, co-regulation by regional and municipal authorities.

  4. Note that a shadow of hierarchy can also show in the superior level’s privileged access to constitutional or arbitration courts for settling intergovernmental conflict by judicial means.

  5. As we will see in the case of Finland’s relationship to the Åland Islands, this is not necessarily the case.

  6. For instance, in the European Union, the ‘member states’ remain the ‘masters of the Treaty’ and therefore changes to the constitutional make-up of the EU (Treaty reform) requires the unanimous consent of all EU member states.

  7. This is not usually the case for the local tier, which is why the case studies will not systematically consider it.

  8. Naturally, governments can opt for a policy of mutual non-interference maximizing spheres for autonomous actions or competition but depending on the level interdependence in the system (which can be linked to the mode of formal competence allocation or the particular cross-jurisdictional problems that confront governments) this can be costly.

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Acknowledgements

The research for this special issue was supported by an ESRC Seminar Series Grant (RES-451-26-0535) ‘Reforming Intergovernmental Relations in a Context of Party Political Incongruence’ jointly held by the editors. This support is gratefully acknowledged.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Politics, University of Exeter, Amory Building, Office 236E, Rennes Drive, Exeter, EX4 4RD, UK

    Nicole Bolleyer

  2. University of Edinburgh, School of Social and Political Science, 15a George Square, Edinburgh, EH8 9LD, UK

    Wilfried Swenden & Nicola McEwen

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  1. Nicole Bolleyer
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  2. Wilfried Swenden
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  3. Nicola McEwen
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Bolleyer, N., Swenden, W. & McEwen, N. A theoretical perspective on multi-level systems in Europe: Constitutional power and partisan conflict. Comp Eur Polit 12, 367–383 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2014.18

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