Skip to main content
Log in

A matter of habit? The sociological foundations of empowering the European Parliament

  • Original Article
  • Published:
Comparative European Politics Aims and scope

Abstract

In this article we study the ‘institutionalization’ of the European Parliament (EP), analysing those processes whereby the EP and its role in the EU's institutional setting acquire legitimacy and are increasingly taken for granted by political actors. In order to both explain the process of institutionalization and to understand why granting the EP more powers has become the EU's standard response to eliminate the (alleged) democratic deficit, we argue that a sociological perspective is necessary. In particular, only when we relate the evolution of the EP to its perceived legitimacy among EU member states, can we begin to better grasp the process of its empowerment. To that effect, we discuss the concept of legitimacy and conceive of it as an inter-subjective property that, nevertheless, operates through individuals via cognitive scripts. We then empirically demonstrate that the legitimacy of the EP did change over the course of its existence. Whereas until the early 1990s, categorical opposition to extend the powers of the EP was commonplace and several governments drew symbolic boundaries between the EP and national legislatures, the value of these indicators of legitimacy had fundamentally changed by the mid-late 1990s. We therefore suggest to perceive of the more recent episodes of empowering the EP as common habitual responses triggered by a recurring challenge rather than explicit calculations based on instrumental rationality.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. See also Deephouse and Suchman (2008), Johnson et al (2006), and Colyvas and Powell (2006) for similar definitions.

  2. In the context of this article, when talking about cultural beliefs, we refer only to a sub-set of beliefs within a cultural realm: political beliefs, that is beliefs about the appropriate goals, means and resources of political institutions. Members of the EU constitute the community to which these beliefs refer.

  3. An everyday example shall suffice to illustrate the concept of ‘script’: behaviour associated with eating in a restaurant. Having entered a restaurant with table service, the typical activities – seating, selecting food, eating food, paying the bill – correspond to nodes of the restaurant script and one's actions after in the restaurant will be guided by these nodes. (example taken from Nooteboom, 2007, p. 167).

  4. The earlier example of the restaurant script (see note 3) will also help to illustrate the indeterminate nature of scripts. Within constraints imposed by connections between nodes, a node allows for different forms of action. When paying the bill in a restaurant, for example, the script allows for different strategies to accomplish this goal. So, both the use of cash or credit cards would be principally permissible means of action. For a more detailed discussion of the characteristics of scripts and for references to the relevant literature in psychology, see Nooteboom (2007, pp. 167–169) and DiMaggio (1997).

  5. The attention paid by sociologists to cognitive biases in decision-making parallels, of course, some of the issues motivating the research programme of behavioural economics (see Kahneman, 2003).

  6. Our attempt to operationalize legitimacy of the EP has been substantially inspired from Colyvas and Powell's work on the legitimacy of the commercial applications of science and the associated transformation of US universities over time (see Colyvas and Powell, 2006, 2007).

  7. Regarding the carriers of discourse, our main focus is on national governments and government delegations to IGCs. Previous research has demonstrated that demands for empowering the EP by ‘interested’ actors, most notably Members of the European Parliament (MEP) themselves, has been inconsequential: Demands for increases in the EP's powers have been recurrent, yet in the decisions made by governments during IGCs and the justifications of these decisions, no systematic evidence has been provided that MEPs or other actors have neither been successful ‘norm entrepreneurs’ (see Finnemore and Sikkink, 1998, p. 897) nor have they successfully framed the debate on enhancing the prerogatives of the EP (Rittberger, 2005). Moreover, we can find that in the early decades of the EP's existence, demands by MEPs even proved counterproductive (see Rittberger, 2006).

  8. The lack of fundamental opposition, however, does not mean the end of politics with regard to the EP. But as predicted by the concept of legitimacy, the political fights now centred around the scope of the EP's influence within the legislative process or on the exact scope to which QMV should be extended to new policy areas.

  9. But this was not because individual governments had ceased to perceive democratic legitimacy as resting in national parliaments. Rather, as John Major writes in his memoirs, governments did not dare to publicly voice criticism against the expansion of the EP's powers (Major, 2000, p. 270).

References

  • AAPD – Institut für Zeitgeschichte. (1949/1950) Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. München: Oldenbourg.

  • Assemblée Nationale. (1986) Journal Officiel De La République Francaise, Débats Parlementaires, 11 June 1986.

  • Bartolini, S. (2005) Restructuring Europe. Centre Formation, System Building, and Political Structuring between the Nation State and the European Union. New York: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Bräuninger, T., Cornelius, T., König, T. and Schuster, T. (2001) The dynamics of European integration. A constitutional analysis of the Amsterdam treaty. In: G. Schneider and M. Aspinwall (eds.) The Rules of Integration. Institutionalist Approaches to the Study of Europe. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, pp. 46–68.

    Google Scholar 

  • Colyvas, J.A. and Powell, W.W. (2006) Roads to institutionalization. The remaking of boundaries between public and private science. Research in Organizational Behavior 27: 305–353.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Colyvas, J.A. and Powell, W.W. (2007) From vulnerable to venerated. The institutionalization of academic entrepreneurship in the life sciences. Research in the Sociology of Organizations 25: 219–259.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Deephouse, D.L. and Suchman, M. (2008) Legitimacy in organizational institutionalism. In: R. Greenwood (ed.) The Sage Handbook of Organization Institutionalism. Los Angeles, CA: Sage, pp. 49–77.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Deutscher Bundestag. (1985) Bundestag debate. 27 June.

  • DiMaggio, P. (1997) Culture and cognition. Annual Review of Sociology 23: 263–287.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Douglas, M. (1987) How Institutions Think. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.

    Google Scholar 

  • European Parliament. (1996) White paper on the 1996 intergovernmental conference No. 2.

  • Finnemore, M. and Sikkink, K. (1998) International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization 52: 887–917.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Forster, A. (1999) Britain and the Maastricht Negotiations. Houndmills, UK: Macmillan Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • HAEC, AA/PA.SFSP. (Various years) Auswärtiges Amt, Sekretariat für Fragen des Schuman-Plans. Florence, Italy: Historical Archives of the European Communities.

  • HAEC, MAEF.DECE-05.02. (1964) Ministère des Affaires Etrangères Francais, Questions institutionelles, administratives, budgétaires. Florence, Italy: Historical Archives of the European Communities, 12 March.

  • HAEC, MAEF-Délégation francaise. (1951) PS (Plan Schuman) Exposé des motifs allemand. Florence, Italy: Historical Archives of the European Communities, 31 May.

  • Jepperson, R. (1991) Institutions, institutional effects, and institutionalism. In: W. Powell and P. DiMaggio (eds.) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, pp. 143–163.

    Google Scholar 

  • Johnson, C., Dowd, T.J. and Ridgeway, C.L. (2006) Legitimacy as social process. Annual Review of Sociology 32: 53–78.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kahneman, D. (2003) Maps of bounded rationality. Psychology for behavioral economics. American Economic Review 93 (5): 1449–1475.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • König, T. (2008) Why do member states empower the European Parliament? Journal of European Public Policy 15 (2): 167–188.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Major, J. (2000) John Major. The Autobiography. London: HarperCollins Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • March, J.G. and Olsen, J.P. (1989) Rediscovering Institutions. The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: Free Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Meyer, J.W. and Scott, W.R. (1983) Centralization and the legitimacy problems of local government. In: J.W. Meyer and W.R. Scott (eds.) Organizational Environments. Ritual and Rationality. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage Publications, pp. 199–215.

    Google Scholar 

  • Nooteboom, B. (2007) Elements of a cognitive theory of the firm. Advances in Austrian Economics 9: 145–175.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Norman, P. (2003) The Accidential Constitution. The Story of the European Convention. Brussels, Belgium: Eurocomment.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pierson, P. (2004) Politics in Time. History, Institutions, and Social Analysis. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rittberger, B. (2005) Building Europe's Parliament. Democratic Representation Beyond the Nation State. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Rittberger, B. (2006) ‘No integration without representation!’ European integration, parliamentary democracy, and two forgotten communities. Journal of European Public Policy 13 (8): 1211–1229.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rittberger, B. and Schimmelfennig, F. (2006) Explaining the constitutionalization of the European Union. Journal of European Public Policy 13 (8): 1148–1167.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Saurugger, S. (2009) The social construction of the participatory turn. The emergence of a norm in the European Union. European Journal of Political Research, doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2009.01905.x.

  • Schimmelfennig, F. (2001) The community trap. Liberal norms, rhetorical action, and the eastern enlargement of the European Union. International Organization 55: 47–80.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Schulz, H. and König, T. (2000) Institutional reform and decision-making efficiency in the European Union. American Journal of Political Science 44 (4): 653–666.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Suchman, M. (1995) Managing legitimacy. Strategic and institutional approaches. The Academy of Management Review 20 (3): 571–610.

    Google Scholar 

  • Thatcher, M. (1993) The Downing Street Years. London: HarperCollins Publishers.

    Google Scholar 

  • Welge, R. and Rittberger, B. (2009) European integration and the powers of the European Parliament. (Better) theory and (better) evidence. Unpublished manuscript.

  • Zerubavel, E. (1999) Social Mindscapes. An Invitation to Cognitive Sociology, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Berthold Rittberger.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Goetze, S., Rittberger, B. A matter of habit? The sociological foundations of empowering the European Parliament. Comp Eur Polit 8, 37–54 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2010.3

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/cep.2010.3

Keywords

Navigation