Abstract
While being generally appreciative of Sen's theory of capabilities, the point of this paper is to raise some conceptual challenges that arise in addressing entrenched conditions of power and domination from the capability paradigm. The enhancement of people's capability prospects with regard to education, employment, decent living standards and political participation can empower them to challenge various dominating conditions in society. It can also bestow a sense of self-confidence in people to stand up against discriminating practices. Yet, the objectives of the capability theory remain less secure as long as citizens’ capability prospects are dependent on and subjected to arbitrary power and domination. I argue that Sen's theory of capabilities can be strengthened and developed as an effective antidote to the liberal hegemony in political theory by drawing on resources from Pettit's republicanism particularly by accommodating the robustness condition of freedom and by envisioning individual freedom as intimately tied to the common good of the polity.
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Notes
An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Human Development and Capability Association conference Ideas Changing History, 17 – 20 September 2007, The New School for Social Research, New York. I thank the referees and the editorial board members of this journal for their valuable comments and suggestions.
Skinner (1998) outlines the historical background of republicanism, particularly, in relation to the political thought in which freedom was associated not with absence of physical and legal coercion or intrusion, but rather with the classical ideal of the free state (civitas libera). Skinner calls this the ‘neo-roman theory’ of freedom because the elements embodied in this view could be traced back to ancient Roman legal and moral thought. But they were at a later period revived and advocated by the defenders of ‘republican liberta’ in the Italian Renaissance, particularly by Machiavelli. They were also prominent in the writings of J. Harrington, A. Sydney and others in and after the period of the English Civil War and Commonwealth. I do not go into the historical details of the republican thought, but restrict myself to the essential characteristics of freedom supporting such a thought. I do not also discuss the strand of republicanism that emphasises active political participation associated with the early Greek tradition and revived by the writings of Hannah Arendt.
Although the focus of this paper is to show how Sen's theory of capabilities can be enriched and strengthened by Pettit's republicanism, it should be noted that the republican political theory can also benefit from Sen's perspective particularly from its sensitivity to issues of poverty, global justice and human development. The dialogue between these two theories, therefore, is mutually beneficial and enriching.
In Republicanism (1997: 55, 290–92), Pettit notes that interference, particularly governmental interference, should be considered non-arbitrary if it tracks the interests and ideas of the citizens, by which he means the interests and ideas they share in common or what he calls ‘common recognizable interests’. However, in A Theory of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp. 156–158), he speaks of ‘common avowable interests’. I come back to this idea later in the third section in the context of the republican idea of the common good.
I understand Sen's ‘entitlement approach’ that emerged in the context of the political economy of famines to be the forerunner for his later ‘capability approach’ to well-being or the quality of life. As far as I am aware, neither Sen nor any other capability theorist justifies the switch over of terminology from ‘entitlements’ to ‘capabilities’. The most plausible reason could be that the term ‘capabilities’ seems to indicate more clearly the agency and active participation of the person than ‘entitlements’. When we say that someone is ‘entitled to’ something, it can give the impression that the person himself or herself does not have to do anything. For more details, see, Alexander (2008, pp. 55–58).
Sen (1992; 1993) sometimes also refers to capabilities as notions of ‘positive freedom’. Given Berlin's distinction between ‘negative’ and ‘positive’ freedom in the classic essay ‘Two Concepts of Liberty’ and the consequent association of negative freedom with absence of interference and positive freedom with various possible degenerations of authoritarianism, Sen's proposed linkage between capabilities and positive freedom can be misunderstood. For reasons as to why it is more cogent to understand Sen's capability theory in the direction of real freedom, see, Alexander (2008, pp. 149–152).
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Alexander, J. Ending the liberal hegemony: Republican freedom and Amartya Sen's theory of capabilities. Contemp Polit Theory 9, 5–24 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2009.13
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/cpt.2009.13