Abstract
Several misunderstandings have arisen about the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). Most widespread is the view that each and every country must achieve the same numerical targets. This is obviously incorrect because the global performance is the aggregate of MDG-plus and MDG-minus countries. Another misconception is that a universal strategy exists for achieving the MDGs. This view contradicts the historical fact that different countries have applied different means towards achieving the same end – namely, human development. A third misunderstanding is that the cost of achieving the MDGs can be determined with precision over a multi-year period. Jan Vandemoortele identifies growing disparities within countries as the main reason why the global targets will not be met by 2015. He outlines four practical steps for formulating homegrown and endogenous MDG-based national development strategies. He underscores the need for a new partnership between the rich and the poor, one that is based on ‘ideas changing minds’ rather than on ‘money changing hands’ because a partnership that is primarily based on money is inherently unequal.
This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.
Similar content being viewed by others
Notes
In 2001, the author co-chaired the UN inter-agency group that put together the MDGs. At the time of writing this article, he was UN Resident Coordinator in Pakistan. The views expressed are not necessarily those of the United Nations.
2005 saw the deadline pass for three global targets. The first one was to have gender parity in primary school enrolment. Although it was not achieved, the gender parity ratio increased from 0.87 in 1990 to 0.94 in 2005, which cannot be categorized as a failure. The second target was to eradicate polio by 2005, when some 2,000 cases were still reported worldwide but down from nearly 25,000 in 1990. The third target was to give three million HIV-infected people the access to life-saving drugs by the end of 2005. The ‘3 by 5’ initiative of the World Health Organization delivered for about a million people.
A recent misinterpretation is to refer to mid-2007 as the mid-point for the MDG period. This is incorrect as it would imply that the targets are to be achieved between 2000 and 2015.
In November 2007, four new targets and ten indicators were added to the MDG framework, including reproductive health. Such expansions are ill-advised, not only because several targets are ill-defined or overly ambitious, but mainly because they risk undermining the power of the MDGs as a clear and easy-to-understand framework for communicating with the public on human development.
For an insightful critique of the MDGs vis-à-vis Africa see Easterly (2007). Much of his critique applies beyond African countries. Most MDG targets are expressed in relative terms, and proportional changes tend to be inversely related to the initial level, simply because of a larger denominator. For example, reducing U5MR from 10 to 5 per 1,000 live births yields a 50 percent reduction; whereas lowering it from 250 to 200 gives a 20 percent reduction – albeit that the latter is 10 times larger in absolute terms. UNICEF data on U5MR in 190 countries confirm that the steepest reductions in relative terms have been observed in the countries with low initial U5MR. The ratio of U5MR in the worst 20 countries over U5MR in the best 20 countries increased to 46:1 in 2006; up from 27:1 in 1990. At the same time, the former group reduced its average U5MR by 40 points, against only four points for the latter group of countries. In other words, it is important to understand that performance can be interpreted in several ways – all valid but none complete.
Hence the oft-quoted remark attributed to Benjamin Disraeli, British Prime Minister in 1868 and 1874–1880, that‘there are three kinds of lies: lies, damned lies, and statistics’.
It is ironic that one of the most frequently used MDG indicators is among the most problematic ones – namely the proportion of people living on less than US$1/day. It is difficult to take the US$1/day statistics at face value (Reddy and Pogge, 2003). The indicator augments the danger of ‘misplaced concreteness’ whereby conclusions are drawn on the basis of deductions from abstractions rather than on the basis of direct observations.
The five indicators that are most problematic include (i) proportion of population below US$1/day, (ii) proportion of population below a minimum level of dietary energy consumption, (iii) primary completion rate, (iv) maternal mortality ratio, and (v) proportion of population with access to safe drinking water.
The quintile distribution is not based on income, which is notoriously difficult to measure. Instead, it is based on wealth, using household assets that can be directly observed such as the possession of a bicycle or a radio, the size of the dwelling and the type of construction materials.
For statistical updates on global and regional progress, see United Nations (2007) and UNICEF (2007).
All estimates are biased by implicit assumptions, methodological choices and data weaknesses. Global cost estimates are particularly unreliable – ranging from an extra US$30 billion per year to more than US$100 billion per annum (Vandemoortele and Roy, 2005,http://www.helsinkiprocess.fi/netcomm/ImgLib/24/89/hp_track2_vandemoortele_roy.pdf).
The original aid target of 0.7 percent of GDP is unrelated to the MDGs. It came about in the late 1960s during the preparation of the ‘Second Development Decade’. The Chairman of the UN Committee for Development Planning, the late Prof. Jan Tinbergen, used a simple Harrod-Domar model to estimate that for developing countries to achieve an average target growth rate of 6 percent per annum in the 1970s, their domestic savings needed to be supplemented by international transfers equivalent to 1 percent of the then combined national income of the developed countries. Prof. Tinbergen assumed that, at the time, private capital flows accounted for about 30 percent of total North-South flows. The remaining 70 percent, he argued, should come from official sources – hence the ODA target of 0.7 percent of gross national income.
Well articulated by Saith (2006).
IMF (2004). A similar evaluation by the World Bank concluded that the PRSP has ‘not yet fulfilled its full potential’. (World Bank, 2004).
Tailored targets are often seen as a watering down of the global MDG agenda. This view is incorrect because several countries will set national targets that are more ambitious than the global ones – the so-called ‘MDG-plus’ countries such as Thailand, Viet Nam and Chile. Others have set targets below the global level, including Bangladesh, Cambodia and Mozambique. Tailoring cannot, of course, become a euphemism for reneging on the political commitment to tackle human poverty in earnest.
References
Easterly, William (2007) ‘How the Millennium Development Goals are Unfair to Africa’, Global Economy & Development working paper 14. Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution.
IMF (2004) ‘Report on the Evaluation of Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF)’, Washington, DC: Independent Evaluation Office.
Minujin, Alberto and Enrique Delamonica (2003) ‘Mind the Gap! Widening Child Mortality Disparities’, Journal of Human Development 4 (3): 396–418.
Reddy, Sanjay G. and Thomas W. Pogge (2003) How Not to Count the Poor, New York: Columbia University.
Saith, Ashwani (2006) ‘From Universal Values to Millennium Development Goals: Lost in translation’, Development and Change 37 (6): 1167–1199.
UN Development Group (2005) Making the MDGs matter: The Country Response, New York: UN Development Group.
UNICEF (2007) ‘Progress for Children: A world fit for children’, Statistical Review No. 6, December, New York: Division of Policy and Planning.
United Nations (2000) Millennium Declaration, New York: United Nations.
United Nations (2007) The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007, New York: Department of Economic and Social Affairs.
Vandemoortele, Jan and Rathin Roy (2005) ‘Making Sense of MDG Costing’, Helsinki Process Publication Series 3/2005: 62–72. Helsinki: Foreign Ministry.
World Bank (2004) The Poverty Reduction Strategy Initiative. An Independent Evaluation of the World Bank's Support Through 2003, Washington, DC: Operations Evaluation Department.
Additional information
Aims to correct some misunderstandings around the MDGs
Rights and permissions
About this article
Cite this article
Vandemoortele, J. Making Sense of the MDGs. Development 51, 220–227 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1057/dev.2008.7
Published:
Issue Date:
DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/dev.2008.7