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A Liberal Defence of the Intrinsic Value of Cultures

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Abstract

Over the past 15 years, a great deal of efforts have been done by political philosophers to make liberal political theory more sensitive to the importance culture has for individuals, and to think about how to translate this importance into laws and policies, in particular those affecting cultural and national minorities. However, one of the outstanding issues is whether and how an appropriate account of the worth of culture can be provided from a liberal point of view. The most important and currently discussed liberal defence of the worth of culture is probably expressed in Will Kymlicka's theory of minority rights. Such a defence argues for the instrumental role culture plays in people's ability to make meaningful choices and lead a self-directed existence. This paper seeks to show that Kymlicka's instrumental account of the worth of cultures is non-viable, and that a liberal conception of culture viewed as intrinsically valuable is indispensable. While each of them recognizes individual autonomy as an intrinsically valuable good, it is demonstrated that both differ not only as to the role culture has to play in a self-directed existence, but also as to why cultures deserve to be protected and as to their policies towards non-liberal minority cultures.

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Notes

  1. Réaume (2000, 246–247). I examine her criticism more thoroughly in part III of my paper.

  2. The position upheld by Habermas in his last essay on cultural claims (2005) is, at least at first glance, uneasy to grasp correctly. On the one hand, and unlike many liberals, he contends that culture has an intrinsic, non-instrumental value for its members (Habermas, 2005, 17). On the other hand, however, cultural rights should, according to him, not be restricted to access cultures of origin but rather give access to a variety of cultural goods and traditions (Habermas, 2005, 18), otherwise it would be tantamount to committing the essentialist fallacy and treating particular cultures as ‘endangered species’. On this point, he explicitly endorses in a footnote Jeremy Waldron's view of culture. This is why I think the most coherent reading of Habermas's position is the one outlined in the present article, which I call the cosmopolitan reading.

  3. I say ‘probably’ because the choice/circumstance distinction on which Kymlicka's theory of minority rights relies, mainly inspired by the luck egalitarian trend in liberal egalitarianism, could also be called into question. For such a criticism, see Quong (2006).

  4. Kymlicka (1989, 176) makes no distinction between ‘enforced’ and ‘facilitating’ assimilation, which he combines. But in light of Réaume's convincing analysis, it is far from sure that such a distinction is really superfluous.

  5. Another, and more straightforward way to respond to the cost-of-transfer argument would be to say that, since liberals typically base their defence of cultural rights upon respect for individual autonomy, if individuals choose to perpetuate their culture, these choices deserve respect, whatever the value, intrinsic or instrumental, one ascribes to culture. But this response only begs the question. The question is: On what grounds can people legitimately demand protection of their culture? It is not enough that people want to preserve their cultural heritage for it to be protected. The necessity of resources allocation to a minority culture must also be publicly demonstrated by governments. What if the protection of an endangered linguistic or cultural heritage turns out to be, in a context of scarce resources, too costly for the whole society? Should not the transfer of its adherents to the dominant language or culture be an alternative to contemplate? What if the prospect of leading a decent life for children is far greater in the mainstream society than in the threatened culture? In such situations, the will of people is naturally to be considered but only as one element among others, given that the choices and preferences people have in a society cannot all be satisfied and taken at face value. And among the issues to be pondered, the question as to whether language and culture have an intrinsic or merely an instrumental value is surely likely to be central.

  6. This is the core of the criticism made by Margalit and Halbertal (1994).

  7. It is worth noting, however, that Réaume makes no distinction between Kymlicka's and Raz's respective account of culture, which she mistakenly confounds and interprets as one and the same intrinsic account.

  8. In effect, intelligence, sensitivity, extroversion and imagination might form the psychological profile of a perfect serial killer. These traits are valuable only insofar as they contribute to, or make possible an altruistic behaviour.

  9. Naturally, if it appears that people no longer have any attachment to their culture and let it decay, there is no longer reason to protect it since such a culture simply becomes unsuited as a context of choice. One cannot ‘oblige’ people to maintain their culture simply because it provides a valuable context of choice. Contrary to value-collectivism for which a culture is valuable independently of its contribution to the well-being of people, the value-individualism espoused in this paper contends that culture has intrinsic value only when and insofar as it contributes to people's well-being and autonomy. If an autonomous life has ultimate value, then people must be free, not only to make choices within the range of options provided by their culture, but also, at a second level, to revise this range of options, to transform their cultural heritage and even ultimately to abandon their culture if they find it no longer worthy of allegiance. For this reason, it would be self-defeating to paternalistically oblige people to maintain against their will their culture on the grounds that it is deemed intrinsically valuable. As Kymlicka and Ronald Dworkin have emphasized on many occasions, an autonomous life cannot be led from the outside, in accordance with values or principles people do not endorse.

  10. It could be objected that the intrinsic value of a culture does not constitute a ‘sufficient’ reason to protect it, any more than the importance of culture as a context of identity or the costs of integrating into another culture. As the example of the decaying culture shows, other issues (availibility of resources, social costs, common interest, viability, etc.) should also be pondered. This is undeniable. I nevertheless consider the intrinsic value of a culture as a sufficient reason to protect it from a moral point of view: it suffices that a culture provides its members with the enabling conditions for their personal flourishing, well-being and autonomy for it to deserve protection. By contrast, it is not sufficient, morally speaking, that a culture forms a lively context of identity and shared values, or that the transferral to another culture be too costly for its members, for such a culture to deserve protection. In effect, a culture could be oppressive, and the transferral costs for dissident members could be considerably alleviated. It remains, however, that even if one grants that the intrinsic value of a culture is a sufficient ‘moral’ reason to protect it, moral reasons are only one kind of reasons among many others (economical, political, etc.) that legislators should balance against one another when making a decision.

  11. I mean by ‘appropriate exit rights’ exit rights that satisfy minimal standards (freedom from physical abuse, a minimal education, a mainstream liberal society, etc.), which ensure that people have real right to exit. On this point, see Spinner-Halev (2005, 160).

  12. For a more explicit and thoroughgoing explanation of this policy, see Tan (2000, 32–34, 59–64).

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Courtois, S. A Liberal Defence of the Intrinsic Value of Cultures. Contemp Polit Theory 7, 31–52 (2008). https://doi.org/10.1057/palgrave.cpt.9300309

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