1. ^aDepartment of Economics, Amherst College, Amherst, MA 01002, USA. E-mail: jwreyes@amherst.edu
2. ^bNational Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02138, USA

Abstract

I analyze how the imperfectly competitive market for obstetricians and gynecologists (ob-gyns) clears in the face of an excess demand for female ob-gyns. This excess demand arises because all ob-gyn patients are women, many women prefer a female ob-gyn, and only a small portion of ob-gyns are female. I find that both money and non-money prices adjust: female ob-gyns charge higher fees and also have longer waiting times. Furthermore, institutional structure matters: waiting times adjust more when fees are inflexible. In the end, female ob-gyns capture some but not all of the value of the preferred service they provide.