Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

Using a Difference-in-Differences Approach to Estimate the Effects of Teacher Merit Pay on Student Performance

  • Article
  • Published:
Eastern Economic Journal Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

The present study uses a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effects of teacher merit pay on student graduation rates and dropout rates. Using district-level data from the Schools and Staffing Survey for the years 1999–2000, 2004–2005, and 2007–2008, results of the present study suggest that merit pay for excellence in teaching has statistically significant and positive effects on the district-level graduation rate, but no significant effect on dropout rates. Merit pay for national teacher certification, however, had no effects on either dropout rates or graduation rates.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. In preliminary regressions that excluded the year 2005, neither type of merit pay had significant effects on academic performance. In the 2-year regressions, the most consistently significant covariates were teacher pay and percentage of students that obtained free or reduced-fee lunches. Given the gap between the first [1999–2007] and second year [2007–2008] in these 2-year regressions, however, it was felt that adding a third year would do much to improve the statistical significance of the estimated equations.

References

  • Davis, Ben 2004. Examining Teacher Performance Incentives, House Research Organization, Texas House of Representatives, Number 78–17.

  • Eberts, R., K. Hollenbeck, and J. Stone . 2002. Teacher Performance Incentives and Student Outcomes. The Journal of Human Resources, 37 (4): 913–927.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Figlio, D., and L. Kenny . 2007. Individual Teacher Incentives and Student Performance. Journal of Public Economics, 91 (5–6): 901–914.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Fryer, R. 2011. Teacher Incentives and Student Achievement: Evidence From New York City Public Schools, NBER Working Paper Series, Number 16850.

  • Glazerman, S., and A. Seifullah . 2010. An Evaluation of the Teacher Advancement Program [TAP] in Chicago: Year Two Impact Report, Mathematica Policy Research, Reference Number: 6319–520.

  • Glewwe, P., N. Ilias, and M. Kremer . 2010. Teacher Incentives. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2 (3): 205–227.

    Google Scholar 

  • Goldhaber, D., and E. Anthony . 2007. Can Teacher Quality be Effectively Assessed? National Board Certification as a Signal of Effective Teaching. Review of Economics and Statistics, 89 (1): 134–150.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goodman, S., and L. Turner . 2009. Group Incentives for Teachers: The Impact of the NYC School-wide Bonus Program on Educational Outcomes, Department of Economics Discussion Paper no. 0910–05, Columbia University.

  • Ladd, H. 1999. The Dallas School Accountability and Incentive Program: An Evaluation of Its Impact on Student Outcomes. Economics of Education Review, 18 (1): 1–16.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lavy, V. 2002. Evaulating the Effect of Teachers’ Group Performance Incentives on Pupil Achievement. The Journal of Political Economy, 110 (6): 1286–1317.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lavy, V. . 2009. Performance Pay and Teachers’ Effort, Productivity, and Grading Ethics. American Economic Review, 99 (5): 1979–2011.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lincove, Jane Arnold 2012. Can Teacher Incentive Pay Improve Student Performance on Standardized Tests, Working Paper, The University of Texas.

  • Muralidharan, K., and V. Sundararaman . 2011. Teacher Performance Pay: Experimental Evidence from India. Journal of Political Economy, 119 (1): 39–77.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Murname, R., and D. Cohen . 1986. Merit Pay and the Evaluation Problem: Why Most Merit Pay Plans Fail and Few Survive. Harvard Education Review, 56 (1): 1–17.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Podgursky, M. 2008. Teams versus Bureaucracies: Personnel Policy, Wage-setting, and Teacher Quality in Traditional Public, Charter, and Private Schools. In Mark Berends, Matthew Spring, and Herbert Walberg (eds.) Charter School Outcomes. New York: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, pp. 61–84.

    Google Scholar 

  • Podgursky, M., and M. Springer . 2007. Teacher Performance Pay: A Review. Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 26 (4): 909–949.

    Article  Google Scholar 

Download references

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Quinnipiac University, Hamden, 06518, CT, USA

    Mark Gius

Authors
  1. Mark Gius
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Gius, M. Using a Difference-in-Differences Approach to Estimate the Effects of Teacher Merit Pay on Student Performance. Eastern Econ J 39, 111–120 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1057/eej.2012.22

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/eej.2012.22

Keywords

JEL Classifications

Search

Navigation