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Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy: Aid, Security and Civil Society after 9/11 in Afghanistan

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Abstract

This article traces the effects of the increasing securitisation of aid and development in Afghanistan after 9/11 on aid policy and civil society. It argues that although aid has not been wholly subordinated to security objectives, security interests have been sufficient to shape the objectives, policies and practices of aid policy in Afghanistan in significant ways. Furthermore, it is argued that the securitisation of aid has not only nurtured a ‘rentier’ civil society, comprised of an assortment of donor-funded NGOs, but also promoted a particular model of state–civil relations that prioritises service delivery over the deliberative role of civil society. The article begins by outlining the key changes in aid policy in Afghanistan since 2001. It then explores the effects on existing civil society of external donors’ attempts to manufacture a liberal civil society. Finally, the article examines the short-term impact of security policies and objectives on civil society in Afghanistan.

Cet article s’intéresse aux effets de la « sécuritisation » de l’aide et du développement en Afghanistan sur la politique d’aide et la société civile, suite aux évènements du 11 septembre 2001. Bien que l’aide au développement n’ait pas été entièrement subordonnée à des objectifs sécuritaires, l’auteur défend l’idée que ces derniers ont été suffisamment importants pour influencer de manière significative les objectifs, les politiques et les pratiques de l’aide en Afghanistan. En particulier, il est soutenu que la « sécuritisation » de l’aide a non seulement entretenu une société civile rentière, composée d’ONG financées par les agences d’aide au développement externes, mais a aussi promu un certain modèle de relations entre l’Etat et la société civile qui tend à privilégier la fourniture de services par cette dernière au détriment de son rôle consultatif plus traditionnel. L’article commence par exposer les principaux changements dans la politique de l’aide au développement en Afghanistan depuis 2001. Il s’intéresse ensuite aux effets des tentatives des agences d’aide internationales de promouvoir un modèle de société civile libéral. Enfin, pour terminer, l’article se penche sur les impacts des objectifs et politiques sécuritaires sur la société civile afghane à court terme.

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Notes

  1. We are very grateful for the comments received from the two anonymous reviewers.

  2. For a detailed treatment of variations in donor policies in the War on Terror see Howell and Lind, 2009a.

  3. For further exploration of the concept see, for example, Taylor, 1990, Cohen and Arato, 1995, Hann and Dunn, 1996, Keane, 1998, Howell and Pearce, 2001.

  4. Because of the deteriorating security at the time of interviewing, it was not possible to conduct any research in rural areas. A field visit to a community development council (CDC) was possible in a rural district near Herat. The empirical study is thus limited to two urban areas, although the interviews, grey literature and secondary sources provided insights and information about the situation in rural areas. Initial fieldwork findings were discussed at a round table in Kabul in September 2006 with researchers and aid agency staff. The research is part of a larger project on civil society, security and aid after 9/11. We are grateful to the Economic Social Research Council (ESRC) Non-Governmental Public Action Programme for funding this research.

  5. Rubin (2002, pp. 65, 311) notes that a rentier or allocation state is one where the states derives more than 40 per cent of its revenue from oil or foreign sources. In the case of Afghanistan, the significant sources are foreign aid and the sale of natural gas (at least up to 1989).

  6. The UK government committed £500 million to Afghanistan from 2002–2007, though additional funds are also channelled through other mechanisms such as the Global Conflict Prevention Pool (see Cosgrave and Andersen, 2004). Establishing precise promised and actual aid flow figures for donors is hampered by the lack of available data for the early years, the different categories and reporting mechanisms used by donors and the flows of funds to support the UN and other international institutions.

  7. Donors, such as DFID, transfer 80 per cent of their funds to the Afghan government. In contrast, USAID spends most of its funds outside of Afghanistan's core budget (Waldman, 2008, p. 16).

  8. According to the OECD (2006, pp. 1–4), only 52 per cent of total official development assistance (ODA) was disbursed ‘in agreement with the government’.

  9. For a summary version of this see www.kabul-reconstructions.net/images/ndf.pdf. It can also be accessed at www.cmi.no/afghanistan/?id=5&Government-of-Afghanistan.

  10. For the full report see www.cmi.no/pdf/?file:/afghanistan/doc/SecuringAfghanistansFuture/-18-03-04.pdf.

  11. This can be accessed at www.afghanistanembassy.no/Doc/About%20Afghanistan-ANDS%20summary.pdf.

  12. For detailed information see http://www.ands.gov.af/ands/final_ands/src/final/Afg%20National%20Development%20Strategy_eng.pdf.

  13. For an interesting account of the background of the NSP and other national programmes see Ghani and Lockhart, 2008, Chapter 9. For a different perspective on the NSP see Barakat, 2006.

  14. For a critique of NSP finances see ActionAid Afghanistan and ELBAG (2007).

  15. Participant observation at NGO–Civil Military Working Group, 28 September 2006, and authors’ interview, DFID Development Advisor to ISAF, 7 September 2006

  16. For an in-depth discussion of this shift towards stabilisation see Gordon (forthcoming).

  17. For example, both Rubin (2002, p. 52) and Johnson and Leslie (2004, p. 41) point out how rulers like Abdul Rehman Khan (1889–1901), Daud in 1977 or Najibullah in 1987 used grand loya jirgas to legitimate decisions of their own rather than to initiate debate.

  18. Rubin (2002, p. 62) uses the term ‘encapsulation’ to describe the strategy of rulers to balance out potential opponents, such as khans or ulema, by giving them symbolic roles without real power and granting them autonomy over local issues.

  19. Some such as CARE International non-governmental organisations had previously been based in Afghanistan. Authors’ interview, CARE International, Kabul, 24 August 2006.

  20. For example, the Afghan Women's Education Centre was established by Afghan refugees in Pakistan in 1991 and began its work in Afghanistan in 2001. Similarly, the Sanayee Development Foundation was founded in 1990 in Peshawar and entered Afghanistan in 2002.

  21. The only other related law was the Law on Social Organisations, issued in line with the 1964 Constitution. Social organisations referred to ‘communities and associations’ engaged in cultural, educational, legal, artistic and vocational activities.

  22. In September 2001, Al-Rashid Trust was added to the US list of terrorist organisations. It was allegedly close to Al-Qaeda and coordinated with Wafa Khairia, an Arab NGO formed by Osama bin Laden. It set up networks of Deobandi madrassas across Afghanistan and took over the bakeries that the UN WFP abandoned after the 9/11 attacks (Escobar, 2001). Its funds were mainly from the Middle East and Pakistan. Bin Laden was reportedly a recipient of the trust's funds. Its activities were carried forward by the Al-Akhtar Trust, which in turn the United States designated a terrorist organisation. In April 2007, Al-Rashid Welfare Trust was allowed to resume its activities (Latif, 2007).

  23. As the private sector was discouraged during the Taliban period, existing businesses sought legal shelter under the nomenclature of NGOs, contributing to the layers of confusion around the terms NGO and later civil society.

  24. Authors’ interview, Wassa, Herat, 3 September 2006.

  25. Authors’ interview, Care International, Kabul, 21 August 2006. Participant's comment during London School of Economics and Political Science LSE/ACBAR round table, Kabul, September 2006.

  26. Authors’ interview, Christian Aid, Kabul, 21 August 2006.

  27. Participants’ comments, LSE/ACBAR round table, Kabul, 11 September 2006.

  28. For example, while Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, founder of Hezb-e-Islami and a notorious warlord has been put on a US terrorist list, others like General Abdul Rashid Dostum, currently Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces and Ismail Khan, currently Minister of Energy, were also prominent and ruthless commanders, whose acts of violence could also be designated as war crimes.

  29. Authors’ interview, Counterpart International, Kabul, 29 August 2006.

  30. Authors’ interview, international development agency, Kabul, 29 August 2006. For further reading on the PRT debates see McHugh and Gostelow, 2004, Hendrickson et al, 2005, Perito, 2005, 2007, McNerney, 2006 and Uesugi, 2006.

  31. The United States established the first PRTs in 2002. By 2007, there were 25 PRTs under NATO-led ISAF forces, varying considerably in their size, balance of military and civilian staff, their activities and their effectiveness (Perito, 2005 and 2007).

  32. Authors’ interview, international NGO, Kabul, 23 August 2006. One interviewee gave the example of the Afghan NGO Coordination of Humanitarian Assistance. Authors’ interview, Afghan Civil Society Forum, Kabul, 23 August 2006.

  33. According to the Afghan NGO Security Office (ANSO), 12 aid workers, including Afghan and international staff working for NGOs, the UN and development contractors, were killed in 2003; 24 in 2004; 31 in 2005; and 29 up to August 2006. Authors’ interview, Kabul, 30 August 2006. To access 2008 and later figures see www.afgnso.org.

  34. Interviews, INGO worker and local head of international foundation, Herat, September 2006.

  35. Press release, December 2006, full statement is available at www.baag.org.uk. This statement pointed out, ‘There have been instances of military actors in Afghanistan behaving in ways that are confusing to local populations and compounding the security risks facing aid actors. Examples include: dressing in civilian clothing, driving white vehicles that resemble aid agency transport, and using NGO resources, such as vehicles, office equipment and premises without permission’.

  36. ‘Civilians under threat’, ACBAR press statement, 3 August 2008. Available at http://www.afgana.org/showart.php?id=351&rubrica=218. Accessed 16 February 2009.

  37. See Perkins 2006 for an in-depth exploration of the political dilemmas facing NGOs in Afghanistan.

  38. Interview, Head of the Local Cultural Association, August 2006.

  39. Interview, international NGO worker, August 2006.

  40. Interview, international UN worker, September 2006. For a robust critique of the Bonn Agreement and aid conditionality see Goodhand and Sedra, 2007.

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    Jude Howell & Jeremy Lind

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Howell, J., Lind, J. Manufacturing Civil Society and the Limits of Legitimacy: Aid, Security and Civil Society after 9/11 in Afghanistan. Eur J Dev Res 21, 718–736 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2009.40

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