Skip to main content
Log in

Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments

  • Original Article
  • Published:
The European Journal of Development Research Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Reliable microdata on corrupt behavior are hard to obtain in the field, and available field data are hard to interpret. Laboratory corruption experiments have therefore recently gained in popularity, and those that shed light on gender effects are surveyed in this article. The tentative main result is this: if women are involved in a potentially corrupt transaction, it is more likely to fail. The reason is not that women are intrinsically more honest, but that they are more opportunistic when they have the chance to break an implicitly corrupt contract and less engaged in retaliating nonperformance. The survey closes with tentative implications for development policy.

Les micro-données fiables sur les comportements de corruption sont difficiles à recueillir sur le terrain, et les données de terrain disponibles sont difficilement interprétables. Les expériences en laboratoire sur la corruption gagnent donc, depuis quelques temps, en popularité. Celles qui mettent en lumière les effets de genre sont examinées dans cet article. Un premier constat provisoire est celui ci: Si des femmes sont impliquées dans une transaction potentiellement frauduleuse, la probabilité d’échec de cette dernière est plus élevée. La raison n’en n’est pas que les femmes sont intrinsèquement plus honnêtes, mais plutôt qu’elles sont plus opportunistes lorsqu’il s’agit de rompre un contrat teinté de corruption et moins enclines à réagir face à des performances insatisfaisantes. L’étude conclut en décrivant des implications possibles pour les politiques de développement.’

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. There is a range of general surveys on corruption experiments available, see Abbink (2006) and Dušek et al (2005) for the longer ones, Andvig (2005) for a short one, and Renner (2004) for one in German. None of these touches on the gender issue.

  2. See Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) for a comprehensive survey of differences between economists’ and psychologists’ experimental practice.

  3. A special case are field experiments, where subjects are not aware that they are taking part in an experiment, which can be considered as an advantage, leading to more external validity.

  4. The only exception we are aware of is Alatas et al (2009b), who find that public officials are less inclined to pay and accept bribes; unfortunately, it is not reported (and possibly not tested) whether this effect is stables across sexes.

  5. Following Abbink et al (2002), Rivas (2007) used a very small detection probability of no more than 0.003. Detection did not occur in her experiments, and its possibility probably did not have a large impact on subjects’ decisions.

  6. Remarkably, Abbink et al (2002) found that the presence of this negative externality does not seem to have a notable effect on the extent of corruption.

  7. Unfortunately, it is not clear to what extent this is to be ascribed to the distribution of nonzero bribe offers between male and female public officials in the final round.

  8. Using the same notation as above, which is slightly different from Alatas et al (2009a).

  9. For Indonesia, also see the replication in Alatas et al (2009b).

  10. A similar effect was not found by Rivas (2007), most probably owing to the low detection probability of 0.003.

  11. And like in a laboratory experiment performed by Armantier and Boly (2008) in Canada with rules similar to the field experiment in Burkina Faso.

  12. The results with respect to this element of the experiment are interesting (Lambsdorff and Frank, 2007), but rather uniform across the sexes, hence they are disregarded below.

  13. In addition, Jackson (2009) points out that additional insights from experiments could be gained through post-experimental interviews exploring the underlying motivation that lead to certain behavior observed in a given game. It would also enable researchers to learn more about the circumstances and contexts of a given experiment and, for instance, to detect gendered framing effects and their potential impact on findings. We believe that on the one hand such additional information could add value to the research on gender differences in corrupt behavior, and on the other findings from such interviews could be an interesting avenue for designing future experiments and testing new fine-tuned hypotheses.

  14. See also Azfar and Nelson (2007) for a related result, which we do not discuss here because, its title notwithstanding, their paper is on a political principal-agent constellation without bribes being paid.

References

  • Abbink, K. (2006) Laboratory experiments on corruption. In: S. Rose-Ackerman (ed.) International Handbook on the Economics of Corruption. Cheltenham, UK: Elgar, pp. 418–437.

    Google Scholar 

  • Abbink, K., Irlenbusch, B. and Renner, E. (2002) An experimental bribery game. Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization 18 (2): 428–454.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Aguiar, F., Brañas-Garza, P., Cobo-Reyes, R., Jimenez, N. and Miller, L. (2009) Are women expected to be more generous? Experimental Economics 12 (1): 93–98.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alatas, V., Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N. and Gangadharan, L. (2009a) Gender and corruption: Insights from an experimental analysis. Southern Economic Journal 75 (3): 663–680.

    Google Scholar 

  • Alatas, V., Cameron, L., Chaudhuri, A., Erkal, N. and Gangadharan, L. (2009b) Subject pool effects in a corruption experiment: A comparison of Indonesian public servants and Indonesian students. Experimental Economics 12 (1): 113–132.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Alhassan-Alolo, N. (2007) Gender and corruption: Testing the new consensus. Public Administration and Development 27 (3): 227–237.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andersen, S., Bulte, E., Gneezy, U. and List, J. (2008) Do women supply more public goods than men? Preliminary experimental evidence from matrilineal and patriarchal societies. American Economic Review: Papers & Proceedings 98 (2): 376–381.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Andvig, J. (2005) Experimental economics and corruption: A survey of budding research. In: Transparency International (ed.) Global Corruption Report. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 265–267.

    Google Scholar 

  • Armantier, O. and Boly, A. (2008) Can corruption be studied in the lab? Comparing a field and a lab experiment. Mimeo: http://www.cirano.qc.ca/pdf/publication/2008s-26.pdf.

  • Azfar, O. and Nelson Jr, W.R. (2007) Transparency, wages, and the separation of powers: An experimental analysis of corruption. Public Choice 130 (3): 471–493.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowles, R., Babcock, L. and McGinn, K. (2005) Constraints and triggers: Situational mechanisms of gender in negotiations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 89 (6): 951–965.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Buccirossi, P. and Spagnolo, G. (2005) Leniency Policies in Illegal Transactions. GESY Discussion Paper No. 74, September.

  • Croson, R. and Gneezy, U. (2009) Gender differences in preferences. Journal of Economic Literature 47 (2): 448–474.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dollar, D., Fisman, R. and Gatti, R. (1999) Are Women Really the ‘Fairer’ Sex? Corruption and Women in Government. Policy Research Report on Gender and Development, Working Paper Series No. 4, World Bank.

  • Dollar, D., Fisman, R. and Gatti, R. (2001) Are women really the ‘fairer’ sex? Corruption and women in government. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 46 (4): 423–429.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dušek, L., Ortmann, A. and Lízal, L. (2005) Understanding corruption and corruptibility through experiments: A primer. Prague Economic Papers 14 (2): 147–163.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Echazu, L. (2010) Corruption and the balance of gender power. Review of Law and Economics 6 (1): 59–74.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eckel, C.C. (2007) People playing games: The human face of experimental economics. Southern Economic Journal 73 (4): 841–857.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eckel, C.C. and Grossman, P.J. (2008) Men, Women, and Risk Aversion: Experimental Evidence. In: C.R. Plott and V.L. Smith (eds.) Handbook of Experimental Economics Results, Vol. 1. Amsterdam, the Netherlands: North-Holland, pp. 1061–1073.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Fink, H. and Boehm, F. (forthcoming) Corrupción en la Policía de Tránsito – Una Primera Aproximación a través de Entrevistas con Taxistas Colombianos. Revista Relaciones. Estudios de Historia y Sociedad, in press.

  • Frank, B. and Schulze, G. (2000) Does economics make citizens corrupt? Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 43 (1): 101–113.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gneezy, U., Niederle, M. and Rustichini, A. (2003) Performance in competitive environments: Gender differences. Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (3): 1049–1073.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goetz, A.M. (2007) Political cleaners: Women as the new anti-corruption force? Development and Change 38 (1): 87–105.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • GTZ. (2004) Corruption and gender. Approaches and Recommendations for Technical Assistance. Focal Theme: Corruption and Trafficking in Women. Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Eschborn, Germany.

  • GTZ. (2009) Gender & corruption in development cooperation. Factsheet, Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ), Eschborn, Germany.

  • Hertwig, R. and Ortmann, A. (2001) Experimental practices in economics: A methodological challenge for psychologists? Behavioral and Brain Sciences 24 (3): 383–451.

    Google Scholar 

  • Jackson, C. (2009) Researching the researched: Gender, reflexivity and actor-orientation in an experimental game. European Journal of Development Research 21 (5): 772–791.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Krajčová, J. and Ortmann, A. (2008) Testing Leniency Programs Experimentally: The Impact of ‘Natural’ Framing. CERGE-EI Working Paper 372, November 2008.

  • Lambsdorff, J.G. (2007) The Institutional Economics of Corruption: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Lambsdorff, J.G. and Fink, H. (2006) Combating Corruption in Colombia: Perceptions and Achievements. Discussion Paper of the Economics Faculty of Passau University, No. V-44–06.

  • Lambsdorff, J.G. and Frank, B. (2007) Corrupt Reciprocity. Discussion Paper of the Economics Faculty of Passau University, No. 51–07, August.

  • Lambsdorff, J.G. and Frank, B. (2010) Bribing versus gift-giving – An experiment. Journal of Economic Psychology 31 (2): 347–357.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lambsdorff, J.G. and Nell, M. (2005) Let Them Take Gifts, and Cheat Those Who Seek Influence. Discussion Paper of the Economics Faculty of Passau University, No. 41-05, December.

  • Nyamu-Musembi, C. (2007) Gender and corruption in the administration of justice. In: Transparency International (ed.) Global Corruption Report. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 121–128.

    Google Scholar 

  • Renner, E. (2004) Wie lässt sich Korruption wirksam bekämpfen? Empirische Befunde aus der experimentellen Wirtschaftsforschung. Vierteljahreshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung 73 (2): 292–300.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Rivas, M.F. (2007) An experiment on corruption and gender. Revised version, October 2008, Mimeo.

  • Schulze, G. and Frank, B. (2003) Deterrence versus intrinsic motivation – Experimental evidence on the determinants of corruptibility. Economics of Governance 4 (2): 143–160.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sung, H.-E. (2003) Fairer sex or fairer system? Gender and corruption revisited. Social Forces 82 (2): 703–723.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Swamy, A., Knack, S., Lee, Y. and Azfar, O. (2001) Gender and corruption. Journal of Development Economics 64 (1): 25–55.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Transparency International. (2007) Gender and Corruption. Working Paper # 3.

  • Tullock, G. (1959) Publication decisions and tests of significance: A comment. Journal of the American Statistical Association 54 (3): 593, [repr. in Morrison, D.E. and Henkel, R.E. (eds.) (1970) The Significance Test Controversy – A Reader. London: Butterworths, pp. 301–302].

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

A first version of this article had been prepared for the GTZ and EADI workshop ‘Gender and Corruption in Development Cooperation’ in November 2008. The authors are indebted to two anonymous referees for helpful comments.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Björn Frank.

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Frank, B., Lambsdorff, J. & Boehm, F. Gender and Corruption: Lessons from Laboratory Corruption Experiments. Eur J Dev Res 23, 59–71 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2010.47

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2010.47

Keywords

Navigation