Abstract
This article analyzes patent and innovation policies in Mexico. Unlike many developing countries, Mexico has enthusiastically embraced external pressures for stronger patent protection. Yet, also unlike other countries, Mexico has not complemented changes to its patent regime with measures to buttress science, technology and innovative (STI) capabilities. To explain this atypical trajectory, I focus on the shape of political coalitions in the areas of patents and STI policies. The early adoption of a strong patent regime, combined with liberalization and internationalization of the economy, consolidated a coalition based on a low-technological form of integration into the global economy, and the same processes withered away the coalition that might have pushed for an alternative project. Understanding the political underpinnings of Mexico's behavior sheds light on the conditions under which middle-income developing countries may engage in issue leadership and join with other developing countries to shape the international economic architecture.
Abstract
Cet article analyse les politiques de brevets et d′innovation au Mexique. Contrairement à de nombreux pays en développement, le Mexique a accueilli avec enthousiasme les pressions extérieures visant à renforcer la protection par brevets. Pourtant, au Mexique, contrairement à d′autres pays, la transformation du système de brevets n′a pas été accompagnée de mesures pour renforcer ses capacités scientifiques, technologiques et innovantes. Pour rendre compte de cette trajectoire atypique, j′examine l’évolution des coalitions politiques dans les domaines des brevets et des politiques STI. L′adoption précoce d′un solide dispositif de brevets, associée à une libéralisation et internationalisation de l′économie, a renforcé une coalition s′appuyant sur une intégration dans l′économie mondiale au moyen d′innovations de basse technologie, alors que les mêmes processus ont affaibli la coalition qui aurait pu soutenir un projet différent. Comprendre les fondations politiques du comportement mexicain aide à expliquer les conditions sous lesquelles les pays en développement à revenu moyen peuvent s′engager dans le leadership thématique et s′associer à d′autres pays en développement pour façonner l′architecture économique internationale.
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Notes
Of course, one can also claim, rightly, that from the perspective of the demandeurs of stronger IP protection, for example, the United States and the rest of the OECD countries, Mexico has been strongly conformist.
Shadlen (forthcoming) provides comparative analysis of the politics of patents and innovation in these three countries, focusing on the patent regimes adopted in the 1990s and the reactions in the 2000s to the subsequent mismatches between patent systems and national STI capabilities.
The emphasis on pharmaceuticals in this section is because of this being the area where patents are, arguably, most important from the perspective of knowledge-owners and knowledge-users.
NAFTA does require pipeline patents, although given the fact that by the time NAFTA was completed Mexico already had adopted a pipeline mechanism, its inclusion in NAFTA was redundant. Critics of pipeline patents note that they are retroactive, and thus contradict the requirement of ‘novelty’, a fundamental pillar of patent law. In addition, the applications are not examined, but simply revalidated.
Indeed, as other developing countries began altering their patent regimes in the 1990s to conform with TRIPS, the US government and the transnational pharmaceutical sector regularly touted Mexico's 1991 LFPPI as the model and exemplar that other countries should emulate. See, for example, ‘A Modern Patent Law for Mexico’, Pharma Marketletter, 29 July 1991, p. 27, and ‘Mexican Patent Law ‘Commended’ to India’, Pharma Marketletter, 21 October 1991, p. 15. This latter article reports on the USTR's brandishing of Mexico's law as a model on a visit to Delhi in October 1991.
Compare TRIPS Article 31 (http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/t_agm3c_e.htm#5) and NAFTA Article 1709.10 (http://www.sice.oas.org/Trade/nafta/chap-171.asp).
In contrast, in some faster-moving technological areas, for example electronics, many technologies become obsolete well before the completion of 20-year patent terms.
See Shadlen (forthcoming) for elaboration and extension of the framework.
Previously, CONACYT was part of the Secretary of Education.
This observation is based on cross-national data on patent nullification proceedings. I consider annual numbers of nullification proceedings relative to the total number of patent applications filed by residents and non-residents over the course of the preceding 6 years. The full data set is available from the author.
The data come from national innovation surveys in Argentina (2001), Brazil (2003) and Mexico (2001). Firms with 50 employees or above.
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Acknowledgements
Funding was provided by the British Academy, the Nuffield Foundation and STICERD. This article benefited from the comments and insights of Matilde Luna, Alejandra Salas-Porras and Ricardo Tirado. I also wish to thank the editors of this special issue, along with the journal's three anonymous reviewers, for their constructive and helpful suggestions.
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Shadlen, K. The Mexican Exception: Patents and Innovation Policy in a Non-conformist and Reluctant Middle Income Country. Eur J Dev Res 24, 300–318 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2012.9
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2012.9