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Sharecropping in Non-traditional Agro-export Production: The Abougnon Contract for Pineapple Cultivation in Côte d’Ivoire

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Abstract

This article highlights the role of sharecropping in small-scale, non-traditional export production, through the case of pineapple production in Côte d’Ivoire. The study reveals the diversity of contractual configurations with respect to the same crop, under the same local term of abougnon. Beyond a description of contractual practices, the article explores the rationale for share contracts in a context of imperfect tenancy, labour and credit markets. The analysis of actors’ rationales in entering abougnon contracts points out the role of financing constraints and disequilibrium in the tenancy market. It highlights the secondary role played by transaction costs induced by moral hazard, incentives or – up to the crisis that struck down the sector – production and market risks. This in-depth, localised longitudinal case study relies on first-hand data collected through intensive fieldwork conducted in the village of Djimini-Koffikro in 1983–1984 and 2002–2003, updated in 2010.

Cet article met en exergue le rôle du métayage dans la production d’exportation non traditionnelle à petite échelle, en s’appuyant sur le cas de la production d’ananas en Côte d’Ivoire. L’étude révèle la diversité des configurations contractuelles pour une même culture et sous un même terme local (abougnon). Au delà d’une description des pratiques contractuelles, cet article examine la logique sous-tendant les contrats de métayage dans un contexte où les marchés de location de terre, du travail et du crédit sont imparfaits. L’analyse des raisons pour lesquelles les acteurs passent des contrats d’abougnon met en évidence le rôle des contraintes de financement et du déséquilibre du marché locatif. Elle souligne le rôle secondaire des coûts de transactions induits par l’aléa moral, des incitations ou – jusqu’à la crise qui s’est abattue sur ce secteur – des risques de production et de marché. Cette étude de cas longitudinale, approfondie et localisée, s’appuie sur des données de première main recueillies grâce à un travail intensif de terrain effectué dans le village de Djimini-Koffikro en 1983–1984 et 2002–2003, puis actualisées en 2010.

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Notes

  1. See Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984), Otsuka et al (1992), Hayami and Otsuka (1993), Dasgupta et al (1999).

  2. ‘Landless’ refers specifically to the land ownership status of migrants in the area under study.

  3. As landowners’ relatives also lease land out, ‘assignors’ might be a better term; I nevertheless use the usual term ‘landlords’.

  4. For the reasons explaining the major role foreigners played in pineapple production, see Colin (2010).

  5. During some years the export cooperatives also extended some credit to some of their members, but this support had vanished by the early 2000s in Djimini.

  6. 1000 FCFA=€1.52.

  7. This latter cost must be considered as an investment to be amortised over several agricultural campaigns: shoots appear at the basis of the plant, once the fruit has been harvested.

  8. One will find in Colin et al (2007) an analysis of why this conflict did not spread to our research area, in Adiaké sub-prefecture.

  9. See Sharma and Drèze (1996) for a similar interpretation of the rigidity in the land rent level in an Indian context.

  10. From 47 tons/ha in 1983 (Colin, 1990) to 21 tons/ha in 2003.

  11. The average yield for plots considered as ‘tired’ was 16.7 tons/ha, whereas the yield of plots considered to be ‘good’ was 23.4 tons/ha (significantly different at 1 per cent, data on 147 plots).

  12. As a matter of fact, the average abougnon-tenant plot yield (26.4 tons/ha) was substantially higher than owner-operated plot yield (18.6 tons/ha, 1 per cent level) and even fixed-rental plot yields (20.8 tons/ha, 5 per cent level). It is not possible to investigate this issue further, due to a lack of adequate data.

  13. For capital rationing models of contractual choice, see Jaynes (1982), Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984), Shetty (1988), Laffont and Matoussi (1995).

  14. For transaction costs on the lease market, see Binswanger and Rosenzweig (1984) and Skoufias (1995).

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Céline Bignebat, Marc Bellemare, my colleagues from MOISA in Montpellier and participants to the Toronto ISNIE Conference (June 2008), as well as two referees who provided valuable comments on preliminary versions of this text. Usual caveat applies.

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  1. IRD, UMR 201 Développement et Sociétés, F-34000, Montpellier, France

    Jean-Philippe Colin

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Colin, JP. Sharecropping in Non-traditional Agro-export Production: The Abougnon Contract for Pineapple Cultivation in Côte d’Ivoire. Eur J Dev Res 24, 627–643 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2011.56

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