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Networks and Anti-poverty Programs: Experience of India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme

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Abstract

Governments struggle with the reality that the beneficiaries of anti-poverty programs are powerless to influence policies and prevent the possibility of capture of benefits by the non-poor. Networks – social and political – are supposed to increase the ability of the less-powerful to access their entitlements. This article assesses whether socially and politically networked households do in fact have better awareness of the components of the program and of the processes of decision making, and whether such networking makes them more likely to vocalise their dissatisfaction when their entitlements are threatened. India's national rural employment guarantee scheme's institutional design (mandating village assemblies to authorise decisions on the projects) makes it a good test case. Our results show that links to social and political networks significantly increase the beneficiary's awareness of the program's components and enhances the ability to seek redress.

Les gouvernements doivent faire face au fait que les bénéficiaires de programmes anti-pauvreté n’ont aucune influence sur leurs politiques sous-jacentes, et peinent à empêcher les non-pauvres de s’approprier ces aides. Appartenir à des réseaux – sociaux et politiques – est censé aider ceux qui ont peu de pouvoir à accéder aux aides auxquels ils ont droit. Cet article cherche à déterminer si les ménages faisant partie de réseaux politiques et sociaux sont réellement plus au fait des composantes des programmes et des processus de décision qui les déterminent, et si leur appartenance à de tels réseaux augmente leur probabilité d’exprimer leur mécontentement lorsque leurs droits sont menacés. Le plan national de garantie d’emploi rural mis en œuvre en Inde, et son organisation institutionnelle – le pouvoir de décision concernant les projets est donné aux assemblées de village – constituent un bon cas d’étude. Nos résultats montrent que l’appartenance des bénéficiaires à des réseaux sociaux et politiques améliore sensiblement leur connaissance des composantes des programmes ainsi que leur capacité à demander réparation.

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Notes

  1. Elections to village councils are held every 5 years, with quotas for women and SC/ST. Village, along with block and district level panchayats who are also elected, comprises the three tiers.

  2. About 42 per cent of Indians lived below the poverty line of US$1.25 a day in 2005 prices, as compared to 16 per cent in China and 8 per cent in Brazil. At the lower cutoff point of $1 at 2005 prices, the proportion of poor was 24 per cent.

  3. SC are the former untouchables, and ST are India's aborigines, and are eligible for affirmative action. Other backward castes (OBC) are also eligible for certain types of affirmative action in a sub-national state.

  4. For a critique of the social audit process in AP, Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, see Shankar (2011).

  5. The interviewees included village political, caste and economic elites, political and social activists, worksite supervisor and NREG beneficiaries, school teacher and health worker, village and district government functionaries, and local elected representatives.

  6. Also see Chattopadhyay et al (2010).

  7. For a detailed explanation, see Greene (2007).

  8. As the coefficient estimates could be misleading, it is appropriate to confine our comments to marginal effects. The results of the mlogits are available with the authors.

  9. The GS, which is expected to meet four times a year, is the general body of villagers (quorum is 10 per cent of villagers of voting age) who meet to discuss issues relating to the development of a village. The village secretary is supposed to maintain a register in which he/she records the agenda, the signatures of the attendees and the minutes of the meeting.

  10. Characteristics such as possession of less or no land are associated with those who are more likely participate in NREGS. The comparison is only among participants in the second part of the equation. Therefore those who were less likely to participate in the NREG among the participants have lower probability of complaining.

  11. Results available with the authors.

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Acknowledgements

We gratefully acknowledge financial support from Australian Research Council – AusAID Linkage grant LP0775444. We are grateful to the two anonymous reviewers for their comments and suggestions. We are also grateful to Raj Bhatia, Dr Srinivas, J. Aniruddha, Vikram Singh, Arun Jhadhav, Vibhu Tiwary and Manoj Pandey for assistance with the data. The usual caveat applies.

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Correspondence to Shylashri Shankar.

Appendix

Appendix

Table A1

Table A1 Distribution of households in sub-et (% in brackets)

Table A2

Table A2 Networks and awareness of who chooses NREG projects

Table A3

Table A3 Networking and awareness of facilities

Table A4

Table A4 Networking and complaints

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Shankar, S., Gaiha, R. Networks and Anti-poverty Programs: Experience of India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme. Eur J Dev Res 24, 550–569 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2011.57

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