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International Trade and Carbon Emissions

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Abstract

Using panel data, we find evidence for significant direct and indirect effects of trade on carbon emissions. Trade tends to increase the emissions burden, especially in those less industrialized countries. We also find evidence for a U-shaped relationship between income per capita and carbon emissions. We discuss the effectiveness of emission reduction policies in light of these results and advance some proposals to reconcile environmental and trade policymaking.

A partir de données de panel, nous constatons que le commerce a des effets directs et indirects significatifs sur les émissions de carbone. Le commerce tend à accroître la charge des émissions, particulièrement dans les pays moins industrialisés. Les données mettent également en évidence une relation en forme de U entre le revenu par habitant et les émissions de carbone. Au vu de ces résultats, nous évaluons l’efficacité des politiques de réduction des émissions et formulons des propositions pour concilier l’élaboration des politiques commerciales et celle des politiques environnementales

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Notes

  1. The UNFCCC negotiations’ current mandate coming from the Bali 2007 COP has a double track: (i) an LCA track to come up with ways to enhance the full implementation of the UNFCCC, and (ii) a Kyoto Protocol track in which a second commitment period, and with a new aggregate emission reduction target (for developed countries), should be negotiated. The G77 is currently insisting that this mandate must be kept, while developed countries would rather scrap the second track by merging negotiations of their emission reduction targets (coming from Copenhagen and now reflected in their Cancun pledges) with the negotiations on developing country climate change actions.

  2. In their seminal contribution, Grossman and Krueger (1993) estimate that SO2 pollution peaks at a per capita income level between $5000 and $6000. Other scholars find similar figures for carbon monoxide (see Selden and Song, 1994; Frankel, 2008).

  3. An important caveat applies to this mechanism: if politics matters in this process, popular demand for higher environmental quality will only materialize into effective regulation if and only if appropriate representative institutions are in place (Payne, 1995).

  4. See also Frankel (2008).

  5. In March 2009, testifying at a hearing in the US House of Representatives, John McMackin on behalf of the Energy-Intensive Manufacturers’ Working Group explicitly threatened delocalization of production overseas: ‘If the United States enacts tough global warming regulation but other key manufacturing nations do not, production of energy-intensive goods may well shift to the unregulated countries’.

  6. The political influence of the high-polluting industries is, of course, a key factor.

  7. Yang and Yang (2010) emphasize that those ‘who consume goods […] should also share the responsibility’ and pay for the relevant reductions, and they recommend China to ‘claim a consumption based accounting system’ in the global climate negotiations.

  8. There has been much warning of the threat of public investment crowding out private investment. Crowding out, strictly speaking, refers to the variety of channels whereby additional government spending may have little or even a negative effect on total output because of its adverse effects on interest-sensitive components of private expenditure. Neither theory nor empirical evidence provides a basis for clear-cut conclusions in these respects (Everhart and Sumlinski, 2001, Table 2.2).

  9. Table 4.3 of Rodrik (2007) shows how restrictions are defined under each institution or agreement and under what conditions they apply.

  10. Least developed countries and developing countries with less than $1000 per capita gross national product are exempted from rules on subsidies under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

  11. See Cervellati and Fortunato (2011).

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Kozul-Wright, R., Fortunato, P. International Trade and Carbon Emissions. Eur J Dev Res 24, 509–529 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2012.15

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