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A Consensus Unravels: NREGA and the Paradox of Rules-Based Welfare in India

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Abstract

The National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) was launched in India in 2006, and a widespread view is emerging that though flawed the NREGA has been successful in providing employment to the poorest. There was wide agreement among scholars before 2006 that India would not be able to promote such a regime of rules-based welfare and that schemes providing targeted patronage, open to political and bureaucratic manipulation and clientelism, would continue to be the norm. This article confirms that the NREGA was indeed a paradox and constructs a number of hypotheses using a political economy framework to explain it.

Abstract

La Loi nationale sur la garantie de l’emploi rural (NREGA en anglais) a été lancée en Inde en 2006 et l’avis général qui est en train d’émerger reconnait que bien qu’imparfaite, NREGA a réussi à fournir des emplois aux plus pauvres. Il y avait un large consensus parmi les chercheurs avant 2006 que l’Inde ne serait pas en mesure de promouvoir un tel régime basé sur des règles de protection sociale et que les initiatives prévoyant un patronage ciblé, ouvertes à la manipulation politique et bureaucratique et au clientélisme continueraient à être la norme. Ce document justifie le fait que la NREGA était en effet un paradoxe et construit un certain nombre d’hypothèses en utilisant un cadre d’économie politique de l’expliquer.

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Notes

  1. We would like to thank two anonymous reviewers and Professor Sanchez-Ancochea for invaluable comments on earlier drafts.

  2. NREGA is regularly audited by the Comptroller and Auditor General of India (hereafter Government of India).

  3. The first step in the research was to conduct a census survey of all households in the villages to gain basic socio-economic data. A subset of this population was sampled for more detailed survey on social protection programmes, including the NREGA. All members of the sample were selected at random to ensure a 99 per cent confidence level (Roy, 2015).

  4. Discussion, NREGA workers, April 9, 2010.

  5. Reference to the corruption and forgery experienced under NREGA.

  6. Mahajan, in rural West Bengal, is a term for employer. Not to be confused with the north Indian usage of moneylender.

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  1. Oxford University, Oxford, UK

    Matthew McCartney & Indrajit Roy

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  1. Matthew McCartney
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McCartney, M., Roy, I. A Consensus Unravels: NREGA and the Paradox of Rules-Based Welfare in India. Eur J Dev Res 28, 588–604 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1057/ejdr.2015.32

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