1. ¹Max-Planck-Institute for the Study of Societies, London, UK
2. ²King's College London, London, UK

Correspondence: Gregory Jackson, King's College London, 150 Stamford Street, London SE1 9NH, UK. Tel: +44 20 7848 4466; E-mail: gregory.2.jackson@kcl.ac.uk

Abstract

Degrees of shareholder orientation among companies differ across countries as well as over time. Markets for corporate control are important elements of corporate governance regimes that affect such orientations. German corporate governance has often been described as a bank-oriented, blockholder, or stakeholder model where markets for corporate control play no significant role. This case study of the hostile takeover of Mannesmann AG by Vodafone in 2000 demonstrates how systemic changes during the 1990s have eroded past institutional barriers to takeovers. The emergence of a market for corporate control cannot be understood by looking at takeover regulation in isolation. Rather, takeover markets rely on a whole set of complementary institutions, social practices, and predominant interpretations, such as banking strategies, codetermination practices, company regulation, and business ideologies. A limited, but significant segment of German corporations are now subjected to a market for corporate control.