THE DIALECTIC OF CITIZENSHIP

As I have argued, all three aspects of the institution of citizenship have been subject to a constant change, to a dialectic, as I will call it in this essay. As there is not much to say on the change that has taken place in the domain of participation other than that there has been an apparent shift from an active to passive citizenship, I will focus upon the dialectic in the domains of membership and rights.

Let me note at the very outset that a dialectic between inclusion and exclusion, a separation between citizens and non-citizens has been essential to the institution of citizenship from the very beginning. Yet, the frontiers separating citizens from non-citizens have always been precarious. Although there have always been some persons excluded from citizenship, some of those who were formerly excluded, such as slaves, women, propertyless, natives or non-adolescents, have become citizens in time. Today, it may be argued that citizenship encounters another wave of inclusion. Immigrants, refugees and even living beings other than humans are now in the reach of the institution of citizenship. This new wave of inclusion points to a new pattern in the openness of citizenship to non-citizens. While citizenship was, in the past, open towards the 'inside' of, first, the city, and then the nation/country, today the openness of citizenship is towards the 'outside' of (i.e., beyond) the nation/country. It is due to this development that postnational citizenship, dual citizenship and European citizenship are now current.

Despite the fact that citizenship is now more open towards the outside, such questions as whom, what and which states of individuals are to be excluded from or included in citizenship are still on the top of the agenda of both citizenship politics and the debates on citizenship. Actually, there is nothing unusual in this, simply because the openness of citizenship towards 'the outside' is far from being a categorical one. Which, if any, of the 'outsiders' are to be included is still a disturbing question in the current debate on citizenship.

The answers given to the question 'to whom or to what is citizenship to be open' may be deployed on a continuum, at the two ends of which may be found two opposite positions. At one end would be found a position that argues for saving citizenship only for the present and future members of the nation, which is associated with a body with some well-defined cultural or geographical borders. A prominent follower of this position is David Miller, according to whom 'the practice of citizenship must [...] be confined within the boundaries of national political communities' (1999: 60).³

At the other end would be found the position that suggests that citizenship needs to be as inclusive as possible. Discussions around 'cosmopolitan citizenship' (Hutchings and Dannreuther, 1999; Linklater, 1998), 'world citizenship' (Rotblat, 1997), 'global citizenship' (Falk, 1994) and 'ecological citizenship' (van Steenbergen, 1994a) may be assessed in this respect. Between these two opposite positions are those that argue that citizenship should be inclusive towards the members of political communities the frontiers of which are defined in regional, political or 'social' terms.⁴ The proposals of 'regional citizenship' (Hettne, 2000), 'European citizenship' (Habermas, 1994), and 'transnational citizenship' (Bauböck, 1994a) may be considered in this respect.

As to the question 'to which traits of individuals is citizenship to be open', there again are two sets of opposite answers. On the one hand, there are those positions that argue that citizenship may be open only to those common traits of individuals that can be shared in the public sphere. Reducing citizenship to a formal equality in the public sphere, the orthodox version of liberal citizenship may be considered as the foremost precursor of this first position. Likewise, the classical interpretation of republican citizenship that stitches citizenship very tightly to the idea of an indivisible public should be construed as the other precursor of the same position. However, at the opposite side are those positions that suggest that citizenship may be organised so that it may take into consideration not only the public, general and/or rational facets of individuals but their private, emotional, cultural and particular facets too. As such, these positions suggest either moving citizenship beyond the borders of public sphere or reconciling the institution of citizenship with the idea of multiple publics. 'Multicultural citizenship' of Will Kymlicka (1995), 'differentiated citizenship' of Iris Marion Young (1994), 'radical democratic citizenship' of Chantal Mouffe (1992a) and 'feminist citizenship' of Ruth Lister (1998) may be construed as proposals suggesting to open up citizenship to the private, emotional, cultural and particular straits of human beings.

So far, I have discussed the dialectic in the sphere of membership. A similar dialectic may be observed in the sphere of the rights associated with citizenship. As argued above, Marshall illustrated that citizenship rights, while once being limited to civil ones, expanded towards first political rights in the nineteenth and then to social rights in the twentieth century. Today, the institution of citizenship seems to be expanding towards a new set of rights, namely cultural ones. Yet, it is important to note that the history of citizenship rights may not be reduced to a smooth and a unilinear process of development from civil to social rights. Rather, in addition to the fact that there has been more than one path in the process of the 'development' of citizenship rights, there have been some major drawbacks in the same process.

That the proliferation of citizenship rights has taken place through different paths has been stressed in many works. For instance, as Michael Mann (1987) shows, the 'development' of citizenship rights has followed quite different trajectories in different social settings. Taking the development of the institution of citizenship as a means of 'institutionalising class conflict in industrial society' (1987: 340), Mann argues that numerous paths have been pursued in the institutionalisation of class conflict in different European countries. Having conceptualised the ways of institutionalising class conflict as 'ruling class strategies', Mann argues that five such strategies have been pursued in advanced industrial countries: liberal, reformist, authoritarian monarchist, fascist and authoritarian socialist. As Mann elegantly shows, each of these strategies corresponds to a particular path in the development of citizenship rights. In the case of liberal strategy, which was pursued typically in the USA, political rights were handed over to all adult and white males as early as the 1840s, that is, fifty years before the emergence of the labour movement. This, according to Mann (p. 342), meant that the working class in the USA was 'inside the regime both civilly and politically' as early as the mid-1800s. Another 'particular' path was followed in Germany. While the absolutists of Wilhelmine Germany were 'willing to concede on civil citizenship' and 'favoured a minimal social citizenship', they were firmly resistant to recognising political rights (Mann, 1987: 344–5). As such political rights were recognised later than social rights in Germany.

Bryan S. Turner (1990) also argues that different trajectories may be observed in the development of citizenship rights in different countries. He suggests analysing these trajectories in terms of a quadruple typology that is developed along two dimensions. While the first dimension has to do with 'whether citizenship grew from above or below' the second dimension concerns 'the tension between a private realm of the individual and the family in relationship to the public arena of political action' (1990: 207). In other words, Turner develops his model in terms of two main axes: active versus passive citizenship and public versus private sphere. Four possible positions arising out of such a typology correspond to the following empirical cases: France, Britain, USA and Germany. In Turner's (pp. 209–10) words, 'in France, a revolutionary conception of active citizenship was combined with an attack on the private space of the family, religion and privacy'. In the case of Britain, 'citizenship is handed down from above and the citizen appears as a mere subject'. In the USA, there is active citizenship 'but this is often contained by a continuing emphasis on privacy and the sacredness of individual opinion'. Lastly, in the case of plebiscitary democracy of Germany, 'the individual citizen is submerged in the sacredness of the state which permits minimal participation (...), while again family life is given priority in the arena of personal ethical development'.

Another issue deserving some attention concerning the dialectic in the sphere of rights is that not only have citizenship rights proliferated in different ways but they have also, in some instances, been taken back. As the erosion in social rights in the era of neo-liberalism of the last few decades has shown, citizenship rights are, in fact, vulnerable. In other words, as Turner (1997: 14) accurately points out, citizenship rights are not inalienable. Consequently, both the 'fuzzy development' and the alienability of citizenship rights may be taken to mean that the sphere of citizenship rights, just like the domain of membership, is subject to a dialectic.

THE TRAGEDY OF CITIZENSHIP

Building equality among the members of a political community has been the founding principle and aim of modern citizenship. Historical analysis would attest to the fact that modern citizenship has fulfilled this self-proclaimed aim, albeit partially. Modern citizenship, while having built equality on the one hand, has concealed and reinforced the existing forms of inequality on the other. What I mean by the tragedy of citizenship concerns the ambivalence mentioned. My argument is that modern citizenship is tragic in character in that it has engendered two opposing results, equality and inequality, simultaneously. That the equality built by citizenship is erected at the expense of the homogenisation of the members of the community should also be included as a part of the same tragedy.

Modern citizenship, the self-proclaimed aim of which is to construct equality, has, in reality, concealed inequality mainly because it has taken equality as a formal matter. Understanding equality as something to be pursued in the sphere of formal rights has opened the way to conceal or to be indifferent to the substantial forms of inequality. Once equality is believed to be a formal issue to be implemented in the sphere of the public, the demands for the recognition of social, cultural and ethnic groups would only be seen as conflicting with the principle of equality. Perceiving equality as a matter of formal rights, the liberal understanding of citizenship, as Nira Yuval-Davis (1997: 8) suggests, 'constructs all citizens as basically the same and considers the differences of class, ethnicity, gender, etc., as irrelevant to their status as citizens'. However, it is important to see that the state of equality pursued by this formalist understanding is actually a state of inequality simply because the individual-citizen championed by this understanding has always been a historical–cultural being, and not a formal one devoid of any form of particular trait. As has been successfully shown in feminist critiques, the ideal individual-citizen of such formalist viewpoints has almost always been a masculine being. Also, as has been revealed in those critiques that defy the historical alliance between the discourses of citizenship and nationalism, this ideal citizen has always been an ethno-cultural being.

Likewise, it is evident that sticking to the principle of formal equality in a social context that is characterised by substantial inequality would necessarily reproduce the existing forms of inequality among the citizens. As Iris Marion Young (1994: 387) argues, 'where differences in capacities, culture, values and behavioural styles exist among groups, but some of these groups are privileged, strict adherence to a principle of equal treatment tends to perpetuate oppression or disadvantage'. Following Young, it looks probable to suggest the following: as modern citizenship has mostly been loyal to the principle of formal equality, it has made a considerable contribution to the reproduction and reinforcement of existing forms of inequalities in contemporary societies.

As to the homogenisation function of modern citizenship, here what is at stake is that national citizenship, which has long been the actual form of modern citizenship, has imposed the temporality of the nation-state over those sub-national communities that tend to live their own particular temporalities (Shapiro, 2000). It is no surprise that such an imposition has deprived such sub-national communities of their own voice and language for it required these communities to be alike, to assimilate into the cultural standards designed by the nation-state. As Michael J. Shapiro's (2000) study on citizenship in Israel shows, Israeli nationalism rendered 'Levantine temporalities ungrammatical'. To this study (2000: 94), in Israel, 'those who emerge from a Levantine past cannot be because their "having been" has been erased within the language of national cultural coherence'.

In brief, having been a perfect site for the implementation of modern citizenship, 'the nation state has homogenized ethnic, cultural, religious, regional and class-based differences' (Munch, 2001: 1). As such, modern (-national) citizenship has had an ambivalent character from the very beginning. While it built equality among the members of the political community on the one side, on the other side it helped the colonisation of different temporalities by the temporality of the nation-state (Shapiro, 2000). This, as Young (1994: 386) correctly argues, has derived its legitimacy mostly from the fact that 'equality is conceived as sameness'. To conclude, it could be argued that citizenship, achieving equality at the expense of homogenisation and concealing and reinforcing the existing forms of inequality have made it tragic in character.

COPING WITH THE TRAGEDY

The tragedy of citizenship has for some time been a key issue in citizenship studies. Many works are now engaged in finding the ways in which to cope with the tragedy of citizenship. This engagement is not fruitless. It is now argued that the tragedy of modern citizenship may be coped with by means of endowing citizens with group rights, (multi-) cultural rights, and/or special representation rights. To these views, the recognition of such rights would be of some use in easing such effects of modern citizenship as homogenisation and the reinforcement of inequality.

Young's (1994) proposal of 'differentiated citizenship' is a well-known example of such views. It is in the following context that Young proposes the idea of differentiated citizenship. In her (1994: 387–92) view, the openness of citizenship to all members of the political community, that is, the universalistic nature of modern citizenship, engenders ambivalent consequences. While it assumes and builds equality among the members of the community on the one hand (as individuals with dissimilar material and symbolic assets are made subject to the very same laws), it hides and reproduces inequality on the other. Besides, citizenship is inclusive in so far as the individual members of the community with different identities are prone to sacrifice their particular identities and surrender to the arguably general and abstract political–cultural identity designed by modern citizenship. In Young's (p. 391) view, 'in a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences to adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce that privilege'. Likewise, that the citizens are asked to give up their particular interests and traits and to follow the abstract codes of citizenship imposes homogenisation. This, according to Young, generates another instance of inequality because homogenisation always takes place as a homogenisation around a particular cultural identity. Besides, the requirement of sacrificing one's own particular traits or viewpoints may actually be difficult especially for those who are incapable of following such general codes. In brief, being subject to the same formal status, that is, the universal nature of modern citizenship, Young contends, generates two major outcomes: homogenisation and reinforcement of inequality.

Under such conditions, what is necessary for a more equal and a more just society, Young (1994: 395) argues, is to replace universal citizenship with differentiated citizenship. This new model of citizenship is based on the idea that the rights enjoyed by citizens should be differentiated without, however, abandoning the idea of a common public altogether. In Young's (1994: 395) view, 'a democratic public should provide a mechanism for the effective representation and recognition of the distinct voices and perspectives of those of its constituent groups that are oppressed or disadvantaged within it'. This, Young believes, may only be attained by virtue of installing a differentiated citizenship, which ultimately relies upon the recognition of group rights.

Will Kymlicka's (1995) proposal of 'multicultural citizenship' may be read as another powerful critique of the idea of universal citizenship. In Kymlicka and Norman's (1995: 302) view, while it is true that citizenship as a formal status renders all members of community being treated as equals, it is also true that citizenship promotes a particular cultural identity, which is imposed on all members of the political community. That is to say, homogenisation is an ordinary ingredient of modern citizenship. In contrast to such inclinations of modern citizenship, Kymlicka suggests that both the theory and politics of citizenship have to recognise the fact that modern societies are multicultural bodies. This, according to Kymlicka, may be attained by means of instituting multicultural citizenship.

However, while taking a critical stance against the homogenisation effect of modern citizenship, Kymlicka takes the critiques raised against Young's proposal of differentiated citizenship seriously. Young's differentiated citizenship has especially been criticised on the ground that it may incite social disintegration. Although Kymlicka and Norman (1995: 304–6) share the concerns expressed in these critiques, they do not agree with the contention that the recognition of any type of group or special representation rights would necessarily have disintegrative consequences. In Kymlicka's (1995: 192) view, not all group rights would have the same negative impacts on the fate of political community. While conceding that the recognition of some of the group rights could have such impacts, the recognition of some others, Kymlicka argues, would reinforce social integration. Classifying group-specific rights as polyethnic rights for immigrants and religious groups, special representation rights for disadvantaged groups and self-government rights for national minorities, Kymlicka (1995: 26–33) advocates that the first two classes of rights would serve the fortification of social integration. This is so, because, Kymlicka (1995: 192) argues, '[t]he demands of immigrants and disadvantaged groups for polyethnic rights and representation rights are primarily demands for inclusion, for full membership in the larger society'.

In the case of self-government rights, however, the picture is considerably different. There, Kymlicka (p. 192) concedes that the recognition of such rights would 'pose a threat to the social unity' of society. Nevertheless, he reminds us, 'the denial of self-government rights is also destabilizing, since it encourages resentment and even recession'. It is for this reason, Kymlicka (p. 192) argues that the 'fundamental challenge facing liberal theorists is to identify the sources of unity in a democratic multination state'.

Proposals made around the recognition of the cultural rights of citizens may be assessed in the same vein. That is to say, instituting 'cultural citizenship' (Pakulski, 1997) may be another way of coping with the tragedy of modern citizenship. Cultural citizenship involves 'the right to be different, to re-value stigmatised identities, to embrace openly and legitimately hitherto marginalised lifestyles and to propagate them without hindrance' (Pakulski, 1997: 83). As implied, the debate around cultural citizenship revolves around the recognition of three sets of rights: 'the right to symbolic presence and visibility (vs. marginalization), the right to dignifying representation (vs. stigmatization) and the right to propagation of identity and maintenance of lifestyles (vs. assimilation)' (Pakulski, 1997: 80). As is evident, the recognition of such rights may also be of some use in easing the homogenisation effect of modern citizenship.

The proposals of 'differentiated citizenship', 'multicultural citizenship' and 'cultural citizenship' have undoubtedly shown some possible ways of coping with the tragedy in question. Nevertheless, while these proposals appear to be introducing solutions to the problems engendered by modern citizenship, they seem to create new problems, some of which touch on the very essence of citizenship. The first serious problem in this vein concerns the idea of group rights. Here the problem is with the definition of the group itself. It is plain that drawing the borders of the groups would be a troublesome issue if group rights were recognised. Likewise, it is rather difficult to answer the question of which human groups are to have the privilege of having special representation rights (Philips, 1993).

The likelihood of the repression of the intra-group differences is another possible problem. As is evident, it is reasonable to doubt whether the recognition of group rights would not open the door for the colonisation of the differences within the group in question. Moreover, as Chantal Mouffe (1992b) correctly argues, there is also the likelihood of having frozen, closed group identities in the case of differentiated citizenship. Group representation may easily pave the way for a particular group identity being posed as if it were a universal identity. Differentiated citizenship may prompt an entirely opposite result too. Groups may also become indifferent to one another if their identities are reinforced through differentiated citizenship. In other words, pursuing differentiated citizenship may inflame group fetishism.

However, a much more serious problem concerns the central principle of citizenship, that is, equality. It looks quite legitimate to question whether citizens would still remain equal in a political community wherein group rights were recognised. Or, is it more likely that the recognition of such rights would disrupt the equality of citizens? If this happens, that is, if equality gets damaged, there remains no room for universality either. This is because, the principle of universality means, in the case of national citizenship, the equality of all the members of the nation-state.

All of these are serious problems and they all seem to arise automatically once the notion of universality (i.e., the idea that all members of the community should enjoy the same rights), is

'...the debate over contemporary citizenship is now stuck between national citizenship on the one hand and group fetishism on the other: between the options of assimilation or absolute alterity.'

abandoned. Yet this may also be taken to mean that the debate over contemporary citizenship is now stuck between national citizenship on the one hand and group fetishism on the other: between the options of assimilation or absolute alterity. In other words, it is as if there is no choice but giving up either equality or difference. It is as if there is no alternative but to opt for either national citizenship or the end of citizenship.

No matter how paradoxical things appear, citizenship today is not as helpless as it looks. Some recent interventions into the debate on citizenship are likely to render contemporary citizenship more potent in coping with the paradox described above. Central to such interventions has been rethinking the categories of equality and universality.

RETHINKING EQUALITY AND UNIVERSALITY

At the heart of rethinking equality is disapproving of the identification of equality with sameness. Once the idea of equality is divorced from the idea of sameness, the attainment of the former would no longer require social homogenisation. Instead, it may be understood as a social state wherein social and cultural differences survive.

Rethinking equality along these lines has crucial implications concerning the paradox discussed above. To begin with, once equality is perceived as irreducible to sameness, the demands for public recognition of social and cultural groups may, instead of being seen as conflicting with the idea of equality, be considered a plea for equality. Likewise, once it is acknowledged that equality may be attained only if differences survive, the recent revival of the politics of difference may be read as another wave of the demand for equality of modern times.

A very respectable example of rethinking equality along such lines is found in Jacque Derrida's (1997a, 2000) reflections on friendship. Thinking on the politics of friendship, Derrida (1993: 213) proposes 'to think out an equality that would not be homogenous, that would take heterogeneity, infinite singularity, infinite alterity into account'.⁵ Similarly, perceiving equality and difference as interdependent, let alone being contradictory, Alan Touraine (1998: 174) argues that equality of being different is essential to social equality. In Touraine's (p. 170) words, 'we are equal only because we all want to be different'.

Rethinking the notion of universality has also helped us to cope with the paradox outlined above. Being a central dictum of modern politics, the notion of universality presumes the likelihood of a heavenly view of the earth. Understood this way, the idea of universality assumes that out of countless particularities of the earth, a blessed one – say intellectual, bureaucracy, state, proletariat, party, nation or chief – is endowed with the talent of having a heavenly, universal view of the world. However, the idea of universality as understood this way has been defied in the recent debates on citizenship. As a feminist critique has argued rather convincingly (Yuval-Davis and Werbner, 1999), the universality of modern (-national) citizenship has been a

'...once equality is perceived as irreducible to sameness, the demands for public recognition of social and cultural groups may, instead of being seen as conflicting with the idea of equality, be considered a plea for equality.'

false universality. Feminist critique has illustrated successfully that the abstract, disembodied individual-citizen imagined by both the liberal and the republican citizenship has actually been a masculine being. Meaning, the disembodied citizen imagined by universalism-inspired modern (-national) citizenship has in reality been a masculine citizen.⁶ In other words, as has been shown by the feminist critique, modern citizenship has always had a particular content and hence it has always failed to be disembodied and universal.

If it is true that (the) universality (of citizenship) has always been the universality of a particular, it looks quite plausible to suggest that contemporary citizenship needs to abandon the notion of universality. If what happens under the name of universality is actually the imposition of the image of one particularity over the rest, then it sounds quite fair to suggest that the democratic politics today has no alternative other than forgetting the notion of universality once and for all. While it looks attractive, this option is no less disturbing than the option of sticking to the principle of universality. This is because liberating modern politics from the idea of universality would leave the stage to the politics of indifference and fetishism of difference. This, on the other hand, would be an invitation for the end of citizenship, because such a politics may proceed only at the expense of the idea of equality, a sine qua non of citizenship. Hence, it is manifest that a total denial of the notion of universality is of no help in coping with the paradox of equality versus difference, of universality versus particularity. Rather, only a rethinking of the idea of universality would seem to be of some use in such an endeavour.

A good example of such a rethinking has been provided by feminist theory again. Suggesting we pursue a 'differentiated universality', Ruth Lister (1998: 82–4) argues that although there is an inerasable tension between universality and difference, these two are not unbridgeable. Rather, Lister argues, this tension may be rendered productive by means of following a 'differentiated universality', an idea of universality that recognises the contingent nature of what is universal. Pursuing such an idea of universality in the domain of citizenship is expected to endow citizenship with the ability to cope with the challenge of difference without, of course, sacrificing the idea of equality. To achieve this aim, citizenship has to be a domain wherein universality and particularity concur. Such a concurrence, on the other hand, may be attained by virtue of elevating difference, dialogue and solidarity altogether. Lister (77–9) has no doubt that an unconditional loyalty to the politics of difference is in conflict with a citizenship inspired by the principle of 'differentiated universality'. Instead, following Mouffe, she argues that loyalty to the idea of dialogue and solidarity are essential to such an understanding of citizenship. To this view (p. 77), if we are to avoid a politics of group essentialism, the politics of citizenship has to involve some kind of 'framework agreement' of political values or 'grammar of political conduct', together with a 'commitment to valuing difference and to dialogue'.

'Being a central dictum of modern politics, the notion of universality presumes the likelihood of a heavenly view of the earth.'

A more constitutive contribution to the rethinking of the idea of universality has been laid down by Ernesto Laclau (1996, 2000). To begin with, Laclau (2000: 208) argues that 'there is no universality which operates as pure universality, there is only the relative universalisation created by expanding a chain of equivalence around a central particularistic core'. However, Laclau's view is not that universality may be reduced to particularity without any surplus. Instead, essential to Laclau's approach to the paradox of universality versus particularity is, first, to deny renouncing either universality or particularity, and second, to admit that both are impossible (1996: 27–8; 2000: 207–11). In other words, Laclau argues that both particularity and universality are necessary, yet impossible. This approach to the paradox in question stems from Laclau's reflections on the constitution of identity. Opposing essentialism in explaining the formation of identities, Laclau argues that an identity occurs at the moment it is prevented. This is to suggest that identities occur through antagonism, through the existence of a constitutive 'outside'. The occurrence of identity, or, say, the emergence of a particularity at the moment it is prevented, implies that a fully achieved identity or particularity is actually an impossibility. On the other hand, this moment of impossibility, Laclau (1996: 28) argues, is where 'the universal enters into the scene'. In Laclau's (p. 28) words, 'universal is part of [an] identity as far as [it is] penetrated by a constitutive lack, that is as far as [it] has failed in its process of constitution'. This means that the universal emerges out of the particular. Yet, Laclau (p. 28) stresses, 'the universal emerges out of the particular not as some principle underlying and explaining the particular, but as an incomplete horizon suturing a dislocated particular identity'. The universal, in other words, is 'the symbol of missing fullness', of a fullness, which for a moment appears as if it is achievable by the particular. Although the universal emerges out of the particular, it 'does not have a concrete content of its own (which would close in on itself), but is an always receding horizon' (Laclau, 1996: 34). Eventually, the emergence of particularity at the moment of its prevention entails that 'the universality is incommensurable with any particularity, but cannot, however, exist apart from the particular' (p. 34). This, as Laclau notices, 'leaves us with an apparent paradox'. Neither universality nor particularity may be dumped without dumping the other too. In other words, the paradox of universality versus particularity (i.e., the paradox disturbing contemporary citizenship) seems irresolvable. As a matter of fact, this is what Laclau maintains. 'This paradox cannot be solved', he argues (p. 35). But, Laclau (p. 35) continues, this non-solution is the very condition of democracy. The solution of the paradox would imply that that a particular body had been found, which would be the true body of the universal. But in that case, the universal would have found its necessary location, and democracy would be impossible. If democracy is possible, it is because the universal has no necessary body and no necessary content; different groups, instead, compete between themselves to temporarily give to their particularisms a function of universal representation.

'following Laclau, I tend to suggest that equality in the domain of citizenship may be attained only if we uphold a contingent universality, i.e. a universality which is understood as an impossible yet a necessary horizon.'

I believe that rethinking the categories of equality and universality along the above lines may be of some use in coping with the tragedy of citizenship. Following Derrida I tend to argue that the central promise of citizenship, that is, equality, may be attained only if equality is understood as the equality of differences. Likewise, following Laclau, I tend to suggest that equality in the domain of citizenship may be attained only if we uphold a contingent universality, that is, a universality that is understood as an impossible yet a necessary horizon. Rethinking the notions of equality and universality in this way suggests nothing but the following: the best way of coping with the paradox put above is to live with the paradox in question and not to try to overcome it. This, on the other hand, necessarily means that a democratic citizenship has to bear with the tragic nature of modern citizenship. After all, it appears that a democratic citizenship, that is, a citizenship opening some space for particularities without, of course, abandoning the notion of equality, is possible only if we recognise the fact that a pure and full equality is impossible and that this impossibility is the very of condition of a democratic citizenship.

Notes

¹ Participation in communal affairs was an inalienable aspect of citizenship in Athens. Citizens were particularly expected to join politics and war. The ideal citizen, 'a citizen pure and simple' was, in Aristotle's (1998: 175) terms, 'defined by nothing else so much as by the right to participate in judicial functions and in office'.

² In Christian Joppke's (1998: 25) view, however, Soysal's argument 'elevates the fringe into the core experience'. Immigration, Joppke argues, 'touches only the margins of society', and as such 'it does not stir up the national order of things'. Moreover, Soysal is wrong, Joppke (1999: 271) maintains, in assuming that national belonging constitutes the source of rights. This, according to Joppke (p. 271), 'is a fiction, building upon T. H. Marshall's flawed identification of individual rights with citizen rights. Contrary to Marshall's assumption that civil, political and social rights in modern states are all citizen rights, civil and social rights have never been dependent on citizenship. Instead, modern constitutions [...] have conceived of civil and social rights as rights of the person residing in the territory of the state, irrespective of her citizenship status'.

³ An early pioneer of this view, which identifies citizenship with full membership of nation-state-society, was Raymond Aron ([1974] 1994: 279) who ruled out the term multinational citizenship as 'a contradiction in terms' a long time ago.

⁴ The last of these three proposals is put by Rainer Bauböck (1994a, 1994b). In Bauböck's (1994b: 205–6) view, 'the basic standard for inclusion in liberal democratic polity is based on a specific notion of society – the outlines of which can be determined by applying the norm of democratic legitimacy to the social instead of the political sphere. From the perspective of individuals, a society in this sense comprises all whose social position durably relates them to a certain state so that they depend on this state for their protection and rights. Seen from the perspective of a state, a society is the basic ensemble of populations permanently affected by its collectively binding decisions'. Such a community would include (p. 206) 'foreign residents in the territory as well as citizens, and even some foreigners living abroad'. To be brief, what Bauböck (p. 219) proposes is 'an enrichment of liberal democratic citizenship with transnational elements'.

⁵ Derrida's reflections upon hospitality are of import for the politics of citizenship. Suggesting pursuing a politics of hospitality, Derrida (1997b) maintains that 'hospitality should be neither assimilation, acculturation, nor simply the occupation of my space by the Other. That's why it has to be negotiated at every instant'.

⁶ See for instance, Lister (1998).

References

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About the Author

Mesut Yeen is an associate professor of Sociology at the Middle East Technical University (METU), Ankara, Turkey. His research has focussed on Turkish nationalism, the Kurdish question and citizenship in Turkey. He is the author of Devlet Söyleminde Kurt Sorunu (The Kurdish Question in State Discourse) (Istanbul: Iletisim, 1999) and Müstakbel-Türkten 'Sözde Yurttaa': Cumhuriyet ve Kürtler (From Prospective-Turks to Pseudo-Citizens: The Turkish Republic and Kurds) (Istanbul: Iletisim, 2006). He has also written articles and book chapters on the ideology of Turkish modernisation, citizenship and Turkish nationalism.