Debate
European Political Science (2008) 7, 194–198. doi:10.1057/palgrave.eps.2210188
Deliberative Lies
Robert E Goodina
aPhilosophy Program, Research School of Social Sciences, Australian National University, Canberra, ACT 0200, Australia. E-mail: goodinb@coombs.anu.edu.au
Abstract
Deliberative democrats enjoin participants in ideal speech situations never to lie. But game theorists show that people can have purely truth-based motives for strategically misrepresenting information they hold privately when they are deliberating with others. If deliberative democrats want to ensure that every participant in the deliberation fully and truthfully reveals to one another all private information that they hold, that sets some stringent requirements for the nature of the group that deliberates together.
Keywords:
deliberative democracy, strategic misrepresentation



