Skip to main content
SpringerLink
Log in

studying policy advocacy through social network analysis

  • Symposium
  • Published:
European Political Science Aims and scope Submit manuscript

Abstract

Social Network Analysis (SNA) conceptualizes a policy-making process as a network of actors. It can assess if an interest group (IGs) occupies a leading central position within this policy network, if it belongs to various ad hoc coalitions or if it plays a brokering role between different stakeholders. Such network variables are crucial to capture how IGs mobilize and gain access to policymakers, and to explain their goal achievements and potential policy influence as well. This article reviews recent studies applying the methodological tools of SNA. It then proposes an innovative research design to investigate how IGs seek to influence the course of a policy-making process across many institutional venues.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Log in via an institution

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. To convincingly show that such exchanges occur for both access and influence, an empirical study should always try to gather empirical data about the (reported or observed) behavior of both sides of the exchange relationships (e.g., IGs and policymakers). This methodological challenge can be very well addressed by SNA tools, which are able to control for a double confirmation (from the sender and the receiver, and vice versa) of existing ties (Ingold et al, 2013).

  2. Homophily is the tendency to associate or create relations to similar others. Typically, and if two nodes or actors share similar attributes (such as being of the same actor type, voting for the same political party, etc.), they also have the tendency to share a tie among each other (see Hanneman and Riddle, 2005).

  3. Two actors are structurally equivalent if they display the same relational profile in the network. For example, two actors share cooperation relations with actors A and B; and conflict relations with actors C and D. They have thus the identical relational cooperation and conflict profile what makes them completely structural equivalent.

  4. The ‘eigenvector’ approach is an effort to find the most central actors (i.e., those with the smallest farness from others) in terms of the ‘global’ or ‘overall’ structure of the network (Hanneman and Riddle, 2005; Bonacich, 1987).

  5. Density, reciprocity and transitivity are three measures grasping the connection and connectivity among actors within the network. Density is the observed number of ties divided by the maximum of possible ties in the network. Reciprocity is given when an existing directed tie from actor A to actor B is also present in the other direction (e.g., when B is replicating the relation back to A). And transitivity is the tendency of two actors to be connected if they share a mutual neighbor or partner in the network (see Wasserman and Faust, 1994).

  6. One may additionally note that IGs coalition participation can also be asked through interviews such as presented by Heaney (2014) or Heaney and Lorenz (2013).

References

  • Baumgartner, F. (2007) ‘EU Lobbying: A view from the US’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(3): 482–488.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, F. and Leech, B. (1998) Basic Interests: The Importance of Groups in Politics and in Political Science, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Baumgartner, F., Berry, J., Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D. and Leech, B. (2009) Lobbying and Policy Change: Who Wins, Who Loses, and Why, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Berkhout, J. (2013) ‘Why interest organizations do what they do: Assessing the explanatory potential of ‘exchange’ approaches’, Interest Groups & Advocacy 2(2): 227–250.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beyers, J. (2008) ‘Policy issues, organisational format and the political strategies of interest organisations’, West European Politics 31(6): 1188–1211.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beyers, J. and Braun, C. (2013) ‘Ties that count. Explaining interest group access to policymakers’, Journal of Public Policy 34(1): 93–121.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Beyers, J. and Kerremans, B. (2012) ‘Domestic embeddedness and the dynamics of multilevel venue shopping in four EU member states’, Governance 25(2): 263–290.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Binderkrantz, A. and Pedersen, H.H. (2016, this issue of European Political Science) ‘What is access? A discussion of the definition and measurement of interest group access’, European Political Science, doi: 10.1057/eps.2016.17.

  • Binderkrantz, A., Christiansen, P.M. and Pedersen, H.H. (2015) ‘Interest group access to the bureaucracy, parliament, and the media’, Governance 28(1): 95–112.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bolleyer, N. and Börzel, T. (2010) ‘Non-hierarchical policy coordination in multilevel systems’, European Political Science Review 2(2): 57–185.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bonacich, P. (1987) ‘Power and centrality: A family of measures’, American Journal of Sociology 92(5): 1170–1182.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bouwen, P. (2002) ‘Corporate lobbying in the European Union: The logic of access’, Journal of European Public Policy 9(3): 365–390.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Box-Steffensmeier, J. and Christenson, D. (2014) ‘The evolution and formation of amicus curiae networks’, Social Networks 36(0): 82–96.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Box-Steffensmeier, J., Christenson, D. and Hitt, M. (2013) ‘Quality over quantity: Amici influence and judicial decision making’, American Political Science Review 107(3): 446–460.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Calanni, J.C., Siddiki, S., Weible, C. and Leach, M. (2015) ‘Explaining coordination in collaborative partnerships and clarifying the scope of the belief homophily hypothesis’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 25(3): 901–927.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Carpenter, D., Esterling, K. and Lazer, D. (1998) ‘The strength of weak ties in lobbying networks’, Journal of Theoretical Politics 10(4): 417–444.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Culpepper, P. (2011) Quiet Politics and Business Power: Corporate Control in Europe and Japan, Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Eising, R. (2007) ‘The access of business interests to EU institutions: Towards elite pluralism’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(3): 384–403.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Eising, R. (2016, this issue of European Political Science) ‘Studying interest groups: Methodological challenges and tools’, European Political Science, doi: 10.1057/eps.2016.14.

  • Fischer, M. (2014) ‘Coalition structures and policy change in a consensus democracy’, Policy Studies Journal 42(3): 344–366.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Gray, V. and Lowery, D. (1998) ‘To lobby alone or in a flock: Foraging behavior among interest groups’, American Politics Quarterly 26(1): 5–34.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Halpin, D. and Binderkrantz, A. (2011) ‘Explaining breadth of policy engagement: Patterns of interest group mobilization in public policy’, Journal of European Public Policy 18(2): 201–219.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Hanneman, R. and Riddle, M. (2005) ‘Introduction to social network methods’, available at: http://faculty.ucr.edu/~hanneman/, accessed 29 June 2015.

  • Hansen, J. (1991) Gaining Access: Congress and the Farm Lobby, 1919–1981, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Henning, C.H. (2009) ‘Networks of power in the CAP system of the EU-15 and EU-27’, Journal of Public Policy 29(02): 153–177.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heaney, M. (2006) ‘Brokering health policy: Coalitions, parties, and interest group influence’, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law 31(5): 887–944.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heaney, M. (2014) ‘Multiplex networks and interest group influence reputation: An exponential random graph model’, Social Networks 36(1): 66–81.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Heaney, M. and Rojas, F. (2008) ‘Coalition dissolution, mobilization, and network dynamics in the American antiwar movement’, in G. Patrick and Coy (ed.) Research in Social Movements, Conflicts, and Change, Bingley: Emerald group publishing Volume 28, pp. 39–82.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heaney, M. and Rojas, F. (2011) ‘The partisan dynamics of contention: Demobilization of the antiwar movement in the United States, 2007–2009’, Mobilization 16(1): 45–64.

    Google Scholar 

  • Heaney, M. and Lorenz, G. (2013) ‘Coalitions portfolios and interest group influence over the policy process’, Interest Groups and Advocacy 2(3): 251–277.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henry, A. (2011) ‘Ideology, power, and the structure of policy networks’, Policy Studies Journal 39(3): 361–383.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Henry, A.D., Lubell, M. and McCoy, M. (2011) ‘Belief systems and social capital as drivers of policy network structure: The case of California regional planning’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 39(3): 361–383.

    Google Scholar 

  • Hojnacki, M., Kimball, D., Baumgartner, F., Berry, J. and Leech, B. (2012) ‘Studying organizational advocacy and influence: Reexamining interest group research’, Annual Review of Political Science 15(9): 1–12.

    Google Scholar 

  • Holyoke, T. (2003) ‘Choosing battlegrounds: Interest groups Lobbying across multiple venues’, Political Research Quarterly 56(3): 325–336.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ibarra, H. (1993) ‘Network centrality, power, and innovation involvement: Determinants of technical and administrative roles’, The Academy of Management Journal 36(3): 471–501.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ingold, K. (2011) ‘Network structures within policy processes: Coalitions, power, and brokerage in Swiss climate policy’, Policy Studies Journal 39(3): 435–459.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ingold, K. and Varone, F. (2012) ‘Treating policy brokers seriously: Evidence from the climate policy’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 22(2): 319–342.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ingold, K., Varone, F. and Stokman, F. (2013) ‘A social network-based approach to assess de facto independence of regulatory agencies’, Journal of European Public Policy 20(10): 1464–1481.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kenis, P. and Schneider, V. (1991) ‘Policy Networks and Policy Analysis: Scrutinizing A New Analytical toolbox’, in B. Marin and R. Mayntz (eds.) Policy networks: Empirical Evidence and Theoretical Considerations, Boulder, CO: Westview, pp. 25–59.

    Google Scholar 

  • Klijn, E. and Koppenjan, J.F.M. (2000) ‘Public management and policy networks: Foundations of a network approach to governance’, Public Management 2(2): 135–158.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Knoke, D., Pappi, F.U., Broadbent, J. and Tsujinaka, Y. (1996) Comparing Policy Networks. Labor Politics in the U.S., Germany, and Japan, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Koger, G., Masket, S. and Noel, H. (2009) ‘Partisan webs: Information exchange and party networks’, British Journal of Political Science 39(3): 633–653.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Koger, G., Masket, S. and Noel, H. (2010) ‘Cooperative party factions in American politics’, American Politics Research 38(1): 33–53.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Leifeld, P.H. and Schneider, V. (2012) ‘Information Exchange in Policy Networks’, American Journal of Political Science 53(3): 731–744.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lowery, D. and Gray, V. (2004) ‘A neopluralist perspective on research on organized interests’, Political Research Quarterly 57(1): 163–175.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Lubell, M. and Fulton, A. (2007) ‘Local policy networks and agricultural watershed management’, Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 18(4): 673–696.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mahoney, C. (2007) ‘Networking vs. allying: The decision of interest groups to join coalitions in the US and the EU’, Journal of European Public Policy 14(3): 366–383.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Mahoney, C. (2008) Brussels versus the Beltway: Advocacy in the United States and the European Union, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pappi, F. and Henning, C. (1998) ‘Policy networks: More than a metaphor?’ Journal of Theoretical Politics 10(4): 553–575.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pappi, F. and Henning, C. (1999) ‘The organization of influence on the EC’s common agricultural policy: A network approach’, European Journal of Political Research 36(2): 257–281.

    Google Scholar 

  • Pedersen, H.H., Binderkrantz, A.S. and Christiansen, P.M. (2014) ‘Lobbying across arena: Interest group involvement in the legislative process in Denmark’, Legislative Studies Quarterly 9(2): 199–225.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Pralle, S. (2006) Branching Out, Digging in: Environmental Advocacy and Agenda Setting, Washington DC: Georgetown University Press.

    Google Scholar 

  • Sabatier, P.A. and Jenkins-Smith, H. (1993) Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach, Boulder, CO: Westview.

    Google Scholar 

  • Stokman, F. and van den Bos, J. (1992) ‘A Two-Stage Model of Policy Analysis with an Empirical Test in the U.S. Energy Policy Domain’, in G. Moore and J.A. Whitt (eds.) The Political Consequences of Social Networks. Research in Politics and Society, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 219–253.

    Google Scholar 

  • Vannoni, M. (2016, this issue of European Political Science) ‘Studying preference attainment using spatial models’, European Political Science, doi: 10.1057/eps.2016.13.

  • Varone, F., Ingold, K. and Jourdain, C. (2016) ‘Defending the status quo across venues and coalitions: Evidence from California Interest Groups’, forthcoming.

  • Wasserman, S. and Faust, K. (1994) Social Network Analysis: Method and Applications, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Wright, J. (1996) Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence, Boston, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

The authors acknowledge the financial support of the Swiss National Science Foundation (funding of project 100017_149689). A previous version of this article was presented at the ECPR Joint Session of Workshop in Salamanca (April 2014). The authors thank Helene Pedersen, Matia Vannoni, Rainer Eising and the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments.

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Political Science and International Relations, University of Geneva, Unimail – 40 Bvd du Pont d’Arve, Genève, CH-1211, Switzerland

    frédéric varone & charlotte jourdain

  2. Institute of Political Science, University of Bern, Fabrikstrasse 8, Bern, CH-3012, Switzerland

    karin ingold

  3. Chair of Empirical Theory of the State, University of Konstanz, Fach D 81, Konstanz D-78457, Germany

    volker schneider

Authors
  1. frédéric varone
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  2. karin ingold
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  3. charlotte jourdain
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

  4. volker schneider
    View author publications

    You can also search for this author in PubMed Google Scholar

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Check for updates. Verify currency and authenticity via CrossMark

Cite this article

varone, f., ingold, k., jourdain, c. et al. studying policy advocacy through social network analysis. Eur Polit Sci 16, 322–336 (2017). https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2016.16

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/eps.2016.16

Keywords

Search

Navigation