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The effects of the 2001 French law on multi-holding of electoral mandates

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Abstract

The article assesses the consequences of the 2001 change in French regulation regarding the cumul des mandats, or multi-holding mandates, which restricted the opportunity to simultaneously hold several elective mandates. Comparing before and after the implementation of the new Law, empirical descriptions show that (i) candidates in legislative elections adapted to the new rules by reducing the local mandates held; (ii) candidates also showed a tendency to change the nature of the mandates held. These results can give some insight into the future consequences of the law currently being debated.

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Notes

  1. Half of the subsidies received by political parties depends on the votes obtained by their candidate in the legislative elections that incites parties to multiple the number of candidates.

  2. It should be noted that all the local mandates were renewed between 1997 and 2002; in 2001 for City Councils, in 1998 and 2001 for General Council and in 1998 for Regional Councils.

References

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Acknowledgements

The authors would thank Elizabeth Sheppard for her comments and Emiliano Grossman and Nicolas Sauger who fostered this project.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. EM Strasbourg Business School, University of Strasbourg (LaRGE), and Telecom ParisTech, (Dep. SES), 47 avenue de la Forêt Noire, Strasbourg, Cedex 67082, France

    Abel François

  2. 1030 avenue Centrale, 384000 Saint-Martin-d’Hères, Sciences Po Grenoble, Grenoble University (Pacte), Grenoble, France

    Raul Magni-Berton

Authors
  1. Abel François
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  2. Raul Magni-Berton
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Correspondence to Abel François.

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François, A., Magni-Berton, R. The effects of the 2001 French law on multi-holding of electoral mandates. Fr Polit 12, 69–76 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1057/fp.2014.4

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  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/fp.2014.4

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