1. ^aDepartment of Political Science, University of California, Santa Barbara, Santa Barbara, CA 93106-9420, USA. E-mail: adams@polsci.ucsb.edu
2. ^bDepartment of Mathematics and Computer Science, Wilkes University, Wilkes-Barre, PA 18766, USA
3. ^cSchool of Social Sciences, University of California, Irvine, 3151 Social Science Plaza, Irvine, CA 92697-5100, USA

Abstract

With rare exceptions, spatial models of candidate strategies under plurality rule have analyzed single-stage plurality elections. In this paper, we explore whether the two-stage French presidential election system plausibly changes the major candidates' policy incentives, compared to what their incentives would be in a single-stage plurality contest. We report the results of counterfactual simulations on survey data from the 1988 presidential election, which suggest that the office-seeking candidates' strategies would be similar under two-stage and single-stage plurality rules.