1. ^aUniversité de Paris 1, CERAPS, France. E-mail: Bdolez@aol.com
2. ^bCNRS-CERAPS, Université de Lille 2, 1 place Déliot, BP 629, 59024 Lille Cedex, France. E-mail: alaurent@univ-lille2.fr

Abstract

After outlining a way of calculating the seat–vote equation for the French majority two-ballot majority electoral system, this article shows that the 2002 legislative elections were consistent with the 'fourth exponent law' and not to the more general cube law, mainly because of the nationalization of electoral behavior since the 1960s. More generally, the 'fourth exponent law' is a good indicator of the transfer of votes into seats in France, as long as the variation in votes between the Left and the Right-wing is not too large. In particular, the 'fourth exponent law' makes it possible to highlight bias caused by the drawing of electoral boundaries (specifically, malapportionment) and the presence in the second round of a third party, here the National Front.