Introduction

On 29 May 2005, 54.7% of the French electorate voted against the ratification of the European constitutional treaty (ECT). This clear-cut outcome triggered a severe crisis of the constitutional process in Europe. In the aftermath of the referendum, numerous causes have been put forward by scholars to explain this sudden rejection of European integration by the French people: for instance, the willingness to sanction the President and the government, economic and social fears, tactical manoeuvring from different actors, etc. More than 2 years after this event, it does make sense to explore the more profound causes of the French 'non', while analysing the mobilizing actors of the left, including not only political parties but also some unions and civil society organizations. This paper will therefore seek to find out to what extent criticism towards the European Union (EU) by anti-globalization and left-radical actors determined the involvement of some figures of the Socialist Party (PS) against the treaty. Various reasons justify focusing on the PS and its environment on the left of the political spectrum. While some authors have emphasized the role played by extremist parties and their electorates in determining the referendum's outcome (Perrineau, 2006; Ivaldi, 2006), this trend seems to be a general feature among West European party systems. The peculiarity of the French referendum consists rather in the spectacular shift of the socialist electorate resulting from a significant part of the PS campaigning for the 'non'.¹ Two theoretical approaches are usually used to explain the relationship between the electorate and the political parties. In a bottom-up perspective, political parties adjust their stance to positions and discourses already structured in the social sphere (for instance by unions or civil society organizations). In contrast, the core argument of the top-down approach is that some parties instrumentalize the European issue in order to distinguish themselves from their political rivals and gather electoral capital. We formulate the hypothesis that both logics are not mutually exclusive and both of them are observable in the French referendum campaign. The objective of this paper is therefore to assess to what extent the stance of some PS leaders against the ECT is a response to activism by the anti-globalization movement and its radical left allies. Among the PS dissidents, the focus will in particular be on former Prime Minister L. Fabius, since his decision to run against the treaty widely destabilized his own party and hence played a significant part in the campaign.

The general theoretical approach in this paper aims at taking some distance with the notion of Euroscepticism, while looking at what is rather seen as mobilization against the actual process of European integration as it is currently shaped by European and national decision makers and institutions, without labelling the actors as 'anti-European'. Indeed, the term Euroscepticim is very much focused on political parties (although sometimes also used for studies of public opinion) and fails to account for the various and embedded forms of mobilization against European integration. Furthermore, its conceptualization remains problematic and, in spite of an intense academic debate, no convincing typology for instance results from the distinction between hard and soft Euroscepticism (Taggart, 1998, Kopecki and Mudde, 2002, Szczerbiak and Taggart, 2003). Thus, adopting an approach in terms of mobilization and resistance provides three main advantages. First, it allows us to take into account the various actors mobilizing against European integration, as typically illustrated by the 2005 French referendum campaign. Second, while typologies tend to give a static account of 'Euroscepticism', the study of mobilizations against the treaty helps to highlight the dynamics of this process, like for instance the relationship between factionalism and a party's environment. Third, this approach allows us to refer precisely against what exactly actors were mobilizing. Indeed, since the EU is a 'moving target', it should not be referred to outside a particular historical and political context. This approach should thus help provide some 'historical depth' to the analysis. While the term 'Euroscepticism' has only been used in the scholarly debate since the early 1990s, mobilization by political and social actors against European integration has existed since the early years of the Community, as will be demonstrated by a brief historical account of the relationship between French PS and the European unification project.

Although mobilization against the ECT cannot be seen as a protest movement, a combination of classical sociology of political parties, mainly the organizational approach by A. Panebianco, on the one hand, and theory of collective action (or social movements), on the other, is particularly helpful to analyse the interactions at stake in the context of conventional politics like the 2005 French referendum campaign. The political opportunity structure will be used as an overarching concept useful in binding the two approaches together. This very large and multifaceted concept aims at emphasizing the characteristics of the context in which protest movements develop and that constrains them (Kitschelt, 1986, 58; Kriesi, 1991; Koopmans, 1999). It is mostly studied through institutional and/or cultural variables, which are seen as structural in a political and social system. This structural approach will be complemented by an analysis of the interactions between the opponents of the ECT within and outside the PS. For this purpose, four processes that developed in the treaty ratification campaign will be studied: namely those of the activation of the 'relays' (A. Paniebianco), the constitution of a new actor, a change scale in the level of mobilization and a polarization between the two 'sides' of the conflict. For scholars of social movements, these processes aim at 'making variables dynamic' (McAdam et al., 2001, 44). While analysing the patterns of mobilization, it will be assessed to what extent they account for a bottom-up process through the influence of the PS environment on the party dissidents over the ECT. In addition, the theory of political parties' development by A. Panebianco (1988) helps to link typical organizational features of the French PS and its relationships with its environment. In so doing, the focus will be on factionalism as a product of internal and external factors to the party.

The first part of this paper will deal with two dimensions of the political opportunity structure (limiting the analysis to the left side of the political spectrum): the inter-related institutional features of the Fifth Republic and the intra-organizational characteristics of the PS on the one hand; and the cognitive impact of its organizational and ideological environment on the other. The second part of this paper will expand on the interactions between the various actors of the left in the campaign. It will be argued that some important mobilization processes are at stake, but that institutional and organizational factors might have played a stronger role in determining the actors' strategies. At the empirical level, the analysis rests on the study of documents and websites, on newspaper coverage of the campaign (mainly the mainstream daily Le Monde) and, to a wide extent, on some interviews with civil society representatives and PS members.²

The Political Opportunity Structure of the PS Opponents of the ECT: Institutions, Organization and Ideas

Historical institutional and organizational factors: The PS, Europe and factionalism

The organizational theory of political parties by A. Panebianco is particularly well suited to grasp the articulation between internal dynamics and the position over European integration of a party as a whole. According to his analysis, parties account for a process of growing institutionalization, which is determined by the degree of cohesion of the party elites, the existence of factions being the main criterion for institutional weakness. Proceeding with a genetic analytical model, he defines already the SFIO, the PS's predecessor organization, as a weakly institutionalized organization composed of ideologically distinct groups and therefore likely inclined to factionalism (A. Panebianco, 1988, 65). As a consequence of its lack of organizational and ideological cohesion, a party is not able to dominate its own environment and its dominant coalition (i.e. the majoritarian alliance of elites who run the party) can therefore be easily destabilized. This theory explains particularly well the PS's position over European integration. Indeed, it has been typically related to the reluctant factions' capacity to make their objections heard, be it for instance the rebellion led by the left wing against G. Mollet's pro-EDC position in the years 1952–1954, or the latent opposition of leftist faction CERES, led by J. P. Chevènement, under F. Mitterrand's leadership. Because of his 'union of the left' strategy, Mitterrand had to take into account the anti-EC position of both the Communist partner and the left faction of the party (Bergounioux, 1996, 247), thus entertaining major doctrinal contradictions between actual commitment towards European integration and rhetorical blaming of EC course (Delwit, 1995, 91; Bergounioux and Grunberg, 2005, 377–378). The party's internal life under L. Jospin's leadership demonstrates a similar inability to resolve the latent contradiction between the party doctrinal identity and its official pro-European line. After Jospin's defeat in the 2002 Presidential election, the traditional opposition to Europe embodied by J.L. Mélenchon and H. Emmanuelli was strengthened by the establishment of a new faction, Nouveau Parti socialiste, led by a new generation of party figures (V. Peillon, A. Montebourg and J. Dray). For the leftist minority, the acceptance (by F. Mitterand and L. Jospin) of the European liberal policies is to blame for the current discomfiture of the party. Thus, the resistance to European integration is more a constant feature of a strong party minority than an exception in the trajectory of French Socialists since 1945.

The conjunction between the above-depicted genetic factionalism within the PS and the dynamic implied by the institutions of the Fifth Republic has been underlined by all scholars of the French PS as a structural element determining the party's ideological orientation (Cole, 1989; Grahem, 1993; Bell and Criddle, 1994; Clift, 2003). This principle of internal organization is known as 'presidentialized factionalism' and depicts how the old factional organization of the party was both maintained and transformed into a competitive system of leadership production after 1958. The mutation of the PS into a presidentialized catch-all party was guided by F. Mitterrand from the 1970s onward. As his personal authority declined, in particular during his second mandate, personal rivalries inside the party sharpened and prevailed over ideological confrontation between factions, which had allowed the PS to mobilize different sectors of French society in the 1970s (Bell and Criddle, 1994; Sferza, 2002, 171–177). Thus, the institutions of the 1958 constitution created a new opportunity structure (Gaffney, 2003) that F. Mitterrand used to reach the Presidential palace. L. Jospin supported this trend while supporting the 2001 constitutional reform that resulted in the strengthening of the regime's presidential nature. Today's PS very much bears the heritage of personalized factionalism in its actual functioning. The factions (called courants) constitute an organized system of presidential candidate selection, thus reflecting the 'primary goal' (Panebianco, 1988, 16) of the party. The courants are actually political networks allowing national leaders to gather support from local leaders by means of controlling the 'selective incentives' (Panebianco, 1988, 10), that is, individual remuneration (either material or status related) distributed to intermediary party elite. In exchange, local leaders are in charge of convincing party members to vote for the programmatic manifesto (motion) put forward by the head of the courant at party congresses. Local figures' own promotion inside the party depends on their ability to organize support for the courant, since the number of delegates sent to the federal and national council is proportional to the number of voices gathered by each motion.³ This 'actual contract between local, federal and national leaders' therefore ensures a 'pyramidal' functioning of the party based on networks that guarantees an efficient voting discipline over motions (Desmeuliers, 2005, 293). After the catastrophic Rennes party Congress in 1990, where the dissent over courants chiefs reached a climax, some institutional reforms were implemented in order to 'curb' the courants. Hence, L. Jospin's accession to power in 1997 was accompanied by a decrease of factional rivalries with only limited success, though (Clift, 2003, 95–102). And since 2002, the role of courants has constantly been at the core of debates over the PS renovation.

This operational modus of the PS doubtlessly constitutes a further incentive for feeding contention over Europe for faction leaders willing to portray themselves as presidential candidates, as was the case with the issue of the ECT. Among the most visible PS treaty opponents in the campaign (J.L. Mélenchon, H. Emmanuelli and L. Fabius) it makes sense, though, to focus more particularly on L. Fabius because he does not belong to the minority left wing of the PS and because, as former Prime Minister and mainstream politician, he was the most prominent figure of the 'no' camp. L. Fabius was a long-time leader of a well-grounded faction and his decision to speak against the ECT can only be analysed with respect to the PS' typical personalized factionalism. From the time when he was appointed Prime Minister under F. Mitterrand in 1984, he had been nurturing the ambition to be elected President. In this respect, L. Jospin's defeat in 2002 opened a 'political boulevard'.⁴ After the Dijon party congress in 2003, where European issues had once again been eluded, L. Fabius was the most credible Presidential wannabe (Bergounioux and Grunberg, 2005, 476–477). But the introduction of a primary election of the party's candidate for the Presidential election in 1995 was rather an obstacle for him. The new procedure constrains candidates by forcing them to woo leaders of the left, party activists and voters (Dolez and Laurent, 2007) and gives the advantage to the most popular personality. While L. Fabius had been cultivating a reliable network for many years inside the party, he suffered an important lack of leadership and popularity beyond a limited circle of faithful allies.⁵ In the summer of 2004, while L. Fabius believed that his statute as party candidate was ensured by a tacit agreement with the Party's first secretary, F. Hollande, the latter portrayed himself as a rival.⁶ Whereas Europe was already a bone of contention within the PS, L. Fabius confirmed at the party's 'summer school' in La Rochelle his position against the treaty,⁷ of which he had already given a hint as the treaty was signed by Head of states and governments in June 2004.⁸ F. Hollande announced in the same month that the official line of the party would be decided in an internal referendum held in December 2004. In spite of a strong majority of party members speaking out in favour of the treaty, L. Fabius and other party figures decided to play a role in the campaign. It is in particular the resulting transgression of the members' vote that exacerbated party dissent. The decision to openly oppose the treaty must also be assessed with respect to the overlapping of the balance of power between courants and the position over the ECT. Indeed, Nouveau Monde(H. Emmanuelli and J. L. Mélenchon), NPS (B. Hamon, V. Peillon, A. Montebourg) and Forces militantes (M. Dolez) had, respectively, gathered 16.33, 16.88 and 4.38% of the party members' votes at the 2003 Dijon congress. Therefore, leaving F. Hollande's majority and joining the opponents of the treaty offered L. Fabius a chance to alter the power equilibrium in his favour and establish a new dominant coalition against F. Hollande.

The elements highlighted so far seem to feed the top-down analysis, assuming that position over Europe is mainly imposed by political parties upon the electorate and driven institutional and organizational factors. Nevertheless, this can be counter-balanced by an analysis of the powerful bottom-up impact of the PS environment, namely the other and more radical actors of the left on the party dissidents.

A climate of ideological 'counter-attack'⁹

The notion of 'arena' put forward by A. Panebianco provides a useful tool to grasp the relationships between the PS and its environment. He identifies, for instance, a parliamentary and an electoral arena in which parties have to operate (A. Panebianco, 1988, 207–208). With respect to the context of the 2005 referendum, it will be referred here to a mobilization arena, since no electoral mandate is at stake, but the constitutional issue is raised, which allows mobilization by a wide variety of actors. According to Panebianco, the more the degree of complexity (mainly determined by the number of actors) in the arena is high, the more likely is the party to be destabilized by its environment. Depending on its own degree of institutionalization, a party can dominate its environment or adapt to it through conflictual or cooperative relationships (A. Panebianco, 1988, 11–13). There are at least three elements allowing us to see the PS in 2005 as a weak institutionalized organization destabilized by a complex mobilization arena. First, small radical parties at the left of the PS are more numerous than in most other Western European countries. Second, France has no unitary union federation but numerous organizations that are rather weak with respect to affiliation, but retain a rather strong protest and mobilization capacity. Third, protest culture has been revivified in the last 10 years by the anti-globalization movement, which had a great impact on perceptions of the EU, while dragging to a certain extent unions and small left parties in its wake. The main argument here is that the influence of the PS environment on the latter should be understood in cognitive terms. This dimension is related to a cultural framing theoretical approach of the structure of political opportunities. This sector of academic research, which has witnessed a great development since the 1990s, explores the importance '[of the] struggle over the production of mobilizing and counter-mobilizing ideas and meanings' (Benford and Snow, 2000, 613). The alter-globalization utopia laid new common frames for understanding political and social reality which can be used by mobilizing actors while largely tackling the strong ideological deficit after Marxism had lost most of its mobilizing potential.¹⁰ The 'cognitive new deal' implied by the acceptance of anti-globalization thesis in the public sphere paved the way for a legitimate critical discourse over European integration. Indeed, it popularized the idea of a strong relationship between globalization, neo-liberalism and the EU, with the EU being seen as the 'Trojan horse' of neo-liberal globalization.¹¹

In many ways, the 1995 social movement against the reform of the pension system by A. Juppé's government is a milestone in the recent history of the French left. The strikes that started in December 1995 are usually seen as the foundational moment for the anti- or alter-globalization movement (also called the global justice movement) in France. Actually, studies of the movement's genealogy brought some evidence that criticism of the 'neo-liberal financial globalization' did already exist since the beginning of the 1990s: the 1995 movement offered a 'reconversion' space for marginal parties and unions of the radical and Marxist left under the banner of anti-globalization (Agrikoliansky et al., 2005; Contamin, 2005). Interestingly, the criticisms put forward by the activists were directed in the first place against the 'Europe of Maastricht', that is, against the constraining so-called convergence criteria implied by the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) (Contamin, 2005, 245–246; 252–253; Gordon and Meunier, 2002, 125, 130). In a petition supporting the strikes, numerous recognized left-oriented intellectuals interpreted the movement as a struggle for the defence of the 'universal principles of the Republic' and 'a radical reflection over the future (French) society' as well as over the alternative between a 'liberal Europe' and 'a Europe of citizens and social and economic rights'.¹² This interpretation eventually generated an anti-globalization 'framing' by the intelligentsia as statements by, for instance, E. Izraelewicz (Vice-director of the daily economics newspaper Les échos) or Z. Laïdi (Professor at the Paris Institut d'Etudes Politiques and P. Lamy's advisor) account for (Andelovici, 2002; Contamin, 2005). Thus, the creation of Attac¹³ out of the existing mobilization networks at the initiative of the journalists of Le Monde diplomatique (I. Ramonet and B. Cassen) in 1998 was doubtlessly the outcome of this network-building process. As European integration became a matter of importance to Attac, its President at the time, B. Cassen, chose deliberately to emphasize the economic aspects of the issue. Attac's arguments hence focused on blaming the EU 'neo-liberal' policies while overlooking political and institutional issues like the nature of the EU polity. It has proved to be a clever and efficient strategy since Attac members were divided among proponents and opponents of a federal approach (Wintrebert, 2007, 134–143). The success of Attac and the nebulous organizations revivified older left radical traditions and marginal parties like Lutte ouvrière or the Ligue communiste révolutionnaire. A conjunction between claims by the global justice movement and those made by trade unions has clearly taken place,¹⁴ although it is often a partial and ad hoc cooperation (Béroud and Ubbiali, 2005). The organizations that constitute the environment of the PS on its left can be regarded as significant vectors of protest with a renewal of involvement in associations in France, while political parties barely play any longer their genuine function as agents of mobilization and socialization (Haegel, 2005, 27–28). On the one hand, these organizations often attract disappointed former party members; on the other, they have a penetration capacity into parties with quite common double-membership.

The PS did not remain impermeable to these developments within its own mobilization arena. Nevertheless, the cognitive impacts related to the coming of age of anti-globalization have been rather latent in the first place, at the time where L. Jospin tried to profile the PS as a modernized pro-European governing party. It is only the Socialist debacle on 21 April 2002 that provoked a backlash of resistance forces to this course and accelerated the penetration of growing criticism towards globalization and Europeanization into the party. Interestingly, the first conjunction of social concerns and Europeanization operated by the 1995 movement converged with controversy about the effects of EMU and the Eastern enlargement within the PS. Many party figures — not only representatives of the party's left wing — then started to protest against the 'ultra-liberal turn of the (European) Commission'¹⁵ and to criticize the 'overthrowing of the balance between deepening and enlarging'.¹⁶ But protest could be contained by L. Jospin's leadership. As he took the lead of the party, L. Jospin undertook an ideological modernization of the party while putting forward a doctrine depicted as 'réalisme de gauche' (Clift, 2003). It was an attempt to formulate a specifically French-styled social-democratic doctrine relying on the notion of volontarisme, that is, the capacity of the state to enforce a neo-Keynesian macro-economic policy in order to regulate capitalism and cope with the negative impact of globalization, especially with regard to employment and services publics (Clift, 2003, 127–133). Thus, L. Jospin engaged in an ideological confrontation with Blair's third way and Schröder's 'neue Mitte, as accounted for by the speeches delivered at the Malmo Congress of the Party of European Socialists. They were widely seen in France as theorizations of social-liberal 'renunciation'. In so doing, though, he adopted a pro-European stance and a claim for deepening a 'social Europe', a core element of the PS's identity.

However, two points must be stressed here in order to understand why the ideological and cognitive context had so dramatically changed in 2005. First, L. Jospin's réalisme de gauche was no radical break-up aimed at delegitimizing the old leftist tradition, but rather a synthesis allowing its advocators (the courant Gauche socialiste led by H. Emmanuelli and J.L. Mélenchon) to merge and retain some influence on the party's programmatic profile, including the incorporation of some new leftist demands. L. Jospin had for instance included the creation of a kind of Tobin tax in his presidential programme of 1995,¹⁷ that is, 3 years before the foundation of Attac. Second, and more importantly, L. Jospin failed to bring about an effective and enduring ideological renovation because of its blatant failure to be enforced at the European level. Indeed, the outcomes of supranational policies in the years of the Jospin's government, and not least the Treaty of Amsterdam, have been seen by many as a capitulation and the failure of the specific French synthesis at the European level (Clift, 2003, 154–157).

Therefore, the leftist discourse carried by the environment of the PS progressively gained ground while exerting an irresistible cognitive influence on it. This is clearly reflected in the way the issues of globalization and European integration are addressed in the motions presented at the successive party congresses between 1997 and 2003. The majoritarian motion¹⁸ supported by all major figures of the party (new First Secretary F. Hollande, L. Fabius, M. Rocard and D. Strauss-Kahn) at the Brest congress in 1997 accounts for the approach promoted by L. Jospin following the 1996 national convention 'Mondialisation-Europe-France': globalization is seen as a challenge rather than a threat¹⁹ and the stress lies very much on Europe as the only chance to cope with it.²⁰ Significantly, the French word for globalization (mondialisation) appears only twice in the whole motion. On the contrary, the motion supported by the party left-wing (Gauche socialiste) severely criticizes globalization and the EU, which is blamed for domestic social problems: here, the term globalization is systematically associated with the adjective 'liberal' (mondialisation libérale).²¹ By the Grenoble Congress in 2000, the motion supported by F. Hollande addressed the globalization theme much more than previously. The need for Europe to enforce regulation of globalization, which was now seen as a threat and commonly depicted as 'mondialisation libérale',²² was stressed. Nevertheless, globalization and Europe were only addressed in a rather short section in the second place after the section on domestic issues. As for the minority motion presented by H. Emmanuelli, it pursued the criticism of post-Maastricht integration and, more significantly, called on the PS to be the party political voice of the anti-globalization movement.²³ The cognitive turn came to a climax at the Dijon Congress in 2003, where the motion supported by F. Hollande almost explicitly undertook the anti-globalization criticism of globalization,²⁴ which was addressed in the very first section meaningfully entitled 'Dominer la mondialisation par un nouvel internationalisme'. Furthermore, F. Hollande called for representation of and cooperation with the anti-globalization movement,²⁵ a claim that had been made only by the party left wing in the previous years. This Congress also saw the creation of a new courant at the left wing of the party endorsing harsh criticism of globalization and of the EU, named the 'Trojan horse' of global neo-liberal policies.²⁶ Today, the alter-globalization discourse has deeply penetrated into the PS. Some party figures have taken over Attac-styled mottos like 'another world is possible'²⁷ or 'another future is possible'.²⁸

Furthermore, although the cognitive aspect seems to be more important, ties between Attac and the PS are not only limited to ideas. Attac coordination groups of PS-elected representatives have for instance been created in the French Assemblée nationale and Senate as well as the European Parliament (EP). The Attac-EP-intergroup has been headed for several years by the current vice-president of the Party of European Socialists (PES)-EP-group H. Désir, who started his public career in the association SOS-Racisme. The ties between civil society and the PS are even more important at the local level, where the party networks (associations and unions) play a genuine operational role (Sawicki, 1997, 21–24). As a consequence, some party members object to what they see as a radicalization of the party.²⁹ Indeed, when compared to other European social democratic parties, PS members often adopt rather radical positions in the EP.

When considering for instance protest against Commission proposal for the 'services directive', there has been a large mobilization of the left at the European level (and more generally of almost all French parties in the pre-referendum context). However, the French Socialists (together with the Belgian ones) were the only Social Democrats who voted against the final text, that is, against the compromise set up by the PES and the European People's Party groups, just as the Greens and the GUE.³⁰ In a nutshell, the PS has been progressively affected by the cognitive change in its environment from the mid-1990s on. The failure of the moderate ideological renovation carried out by L. Jospin left space for even more criticism towards globalization and the EU imported by the party left wing into the party. The debacle of 21 April 2002 accelerated this process and opened a phase of radicalization of the party, which characterizes the specific opportunity structure of the 2005 referendum.

Hence, the analysis of the political opportunity structure allowed us to highlight the importance of both the historically inherited intra-party organization and the influence of the climate characterizing the PS mobilization arena. It will now be completed by an analysis of interactions between actors. These will show to what extent the various elements of the opportunity structure have actually been used by the Socialists advocating the 'non' in the campaign and whether response to anti-globalization or intra-party tactics most determined the 'no' campaign.

Interactions Between the Protagonists of the 'no' Campaign on the Left: Important but Deficient Processes

Three processes at stake for protest movements

The French referendum campaign saw the constitution of a new actor, which reminds one of the typical interaction processes identified by D. McAdam, S. Tarrow and C. Tilly in relationship with protest movements. The Collectif national pour un 'non' de gauche was created with the launch of the 'Call of the 200' on 19 October 2004 at the initiative of the Fondation Copernic, a radical-left think tank then headed by Y. Salesse.³¹ The Call is a petition against a 'pseudo-Europe that holds the market as an idol and secret negotiation as liturgy'³² and was signed by 200 personalities of the left: political party members (LCR, PC, Verts, ultra-left of the PS, etc.), figures of the non-profit sector, union members, university professors, etc. From the beginning, the strategic aim shared by most actors involved was to establish a new political force able to support a unitary candidate at the 2007 Presidential. This implies destabilizing the PS in order to 're-found an alternative at the left of the PS (with the) conviction that there will be no alternative on the left without a significant faction of Social-democrac'.³³ Indeed, the commitment of the Fondation Copernic aimed at overcoming two major obstacles impeding the success of its claims. First, the endemic and typical fragmentation in numerous (sometimes very small) organizations, which has for long characterized the French radical left, had to give way to a wider unified actor to be able to gain weight. Second, the criticism of the EU must be taken out of the left radical ideological 'ghetto' in order to be perceived as more legitimate and thus gather some wider support. These aims were to a certain extent achieved as the Collectif's campaign succeeded in attracting national figures of the PS. As mentioned above, the 1995 strike movement is widely seen as the foundational moment imposing new anti-liberal cognitive frames as well as operating the junction between anti-globalization and union mobilization. The traumatizing defeat of L. Jospin on 21 April 2002 triggered a new unitary dynamic on the left of the PS. But actually, most activists involved in the Collectif had been used to campaigning and mobilizing together for many years.³⁴ Against this background, the referendum on the ECT offered a formidable opportunity to exploit this mobilization potential and launch a unitary dynamic while campaigning against the PS establishment.³⁵ Hence, as the referendum was decided, the long inter-connected networks could quite easily be re-activated and people could be brought together. Two previous initiatives in particular constituted a prelude to the 2005 campaign. Following the 2002 Presidential election, the Ramulaud Call 'for an alternative of the left' was launched in 2003, and in the same year, a book entitled Europe: une alternative was published by 'a group which was foreshadowing the composition of the Collectif'.³⁶ The Fondation Copernic, and in particular C. Debons (the Fondation's vice-director)³⁷, played a crucial coordinating role: because it was composed of people coming from various organizations³⁸ and because it had developed a reflection on European issues since its establishment in 1997, it had sufficient legitimacy to take on and supervise the initiative in an open and pluralist perspective, without being suspected of seeking benefits for a particular party.³⁹ Attac was not sharing exactly the same strategic line. In 2005, the alter-globalization association was experiencing the greatest internal turmoil since its foundation. Precisely this year, the conflict between the President J. Nikonoff and the founder members, which had been smouldering since 2002, broke out. Nikonoff advocated a more significant and autonomous role of Attac on the political stage. The relationships between the association and political parties were thus precisely the bone of contention within Attac.⁴⁰ This had two consequences for the campaign on the ECT. First, the direction needed sufficient legitimacy to take action: this is why an internal consultation was organized in December 2004 where 78% of the members spoke themselves out for the association to take part in the campaign.⁴¹ After failing as the rally organization for civil society in the campaign, Attac deliberately led a separate campaign and did not participate in common activities with the Collectif apart from three bigger unitary meetings from April on (in Toulouse, Marseille and Paris).⁴² But rather than through the 'alliances' between national figures, it is at the local level that the Collectif played a crucial role in the campaign.

The campaign on the ground by the participants of the Collectif du non swept along the mainstream actors and led to a change scale of mobilization, that is, 'a change in the number and level of coordinated contentious action' (McAdam et al., 2001, 45). Whereas the campaign seemed to confer an advantage to proponents of the treaty in the first months, the media started to grant more interest to their adversaries in March, that is, as the 'yes' and 'no' curves inverted in the polls. While blaming a boycott of the 'non' campaign by the mainstream media, treaty opponents had been campaigning on the ground and efficiently on the internet, where networks of 'non' activists have been best inter-connected.⁴³ The Collectif's strategy consisted in 'starting early and leading a long-term struggle on the ground'.⁴⁴ The main goal was to generate the creation of local committees everywhere on the domestic territory. This is why existing mobilization networks had been reactivated in the summer 2004 so that about 50 local Collectifs du non already existed, as the Call was launched in October. Mobilization underwent an important acceleration in the last months: 200 Collectifs du non were active in December, 500 in March and about 900 at the end of May. In March, the Collectif national had organized around 1,500 public meetings which were much more crowded than the meetings in favour of the treaty.⁴⁵ The organizational modus based on unitary collectifs promoted by the Fondation Copernic takes root in the understanding of the current modalities of political participation. Given the citizens' disaffection towards party politics, the collectif formula reflects the unwillingness to be associated with a particular party, in particular with the PC, which is seen as a declining organization.⁴⁶ This unitary dynamic generated an efficient multiplying effect. The Collectif national was composed of about 30 people who met about two or three times a month. Their role was to convey a consistent point of view on the campaign to the local collectifs.⁴⁷ As for Attac, in spite of its internal crisis, it was able to campaign actively, thanks to its 215 local committees, and to organize between 300 and 500 public meetings.⁴⁸ Here again, A. Panebianco's theory helps to account for the articulation between the PS dissident personalities and the dynamic launched by the Collectif du non. According to him, there are inside political party 'relays' or 'boundary personnel', ie actors with privileged relations with the different parts of the environment. The more numerous the boundary personnel, the more pronounced are the tensions within the organization' (A. Panebianco, 1988, 205). As a matter of fact, H. Emmanuelli and J.L. Mélenchon (and their 'circles') have had contacts with the radical left since 2003, for instance with the Fondation Copernic, and this intensified in 2004.⁴⁹ The campaign therefore accounts for the — very instrumental — activation of the 'relays' between the party and its environment. In March, as the 'yes' and 'no' curve in the polls inverted for the first time, the success of the 'no' activists was an incentive for H. Emmanuelli and L. Fabius to commit themselves more actively in the campaign. H. Emmanuelli launched the collectifs socialistes pour un non de gauche, which aimed at overriding the lack of financial means affecting the PS dissidents.⁵⁰ The convergence of mobilization initiatives reached a climax with the unitary meeting on 27 May since all the actors committed against the treaty were represented. Obviously, the involvement of the PS figures was about capitalizing on the successful mobilization of the radical left with regard to the 're-composition' of the left for the presidential election. L. Fabius, since he could not be seen as a 'relay', was particularly instrumental in order to appear as the rallying leader of the 'no'.⁵¹ Whereas he wanted to stay a step behind at the beginning of the campaign, he seems to have been dragged by the mobilization dynamic on the left, because he 'had to be in the movement'.⁵²

The intensity of the campaign brought about a strong polarization between supporters of the 'yes' and those of the 'no'. Against the background of collective action, 'polarization is the widening of political and social space between claimants in a contentious episode and the gravitation of previously uncommitted or moderate actors toward one, the other, or both extremes. It is an important process which vacates the moderate center, impedes the recomposition of previous coalitions, produces new channels for future ones' (McAdam et al., 2001, 45). The impact of polarization affected in particular the PS, where each member had to take a stance. Most former ministers under F. Mitterrand or L. Jospin joined the camp in favour of the treaty ratification. In August, E. Guigou and B. Kouchner for instance initiated a Comité de la gauche pour le 'oui'. On the contrary, 53 of the 131 MPs, 10 of the 30 French MEPs, 10 of the 40 Heads of départements, eight of the 21 Heads of regions and 37 of the 72 members of the PS's Bureau national (the leading organ of the party) spoke out against the ECT (Duseigneur, 2005, 84). Interestingly, divergence also appeared among PS members close to Attac supporters. Whereas the Head of the region Provence-Alpes-Côte d'Azur Michel Vauzelle committed himself actively in the campaign against the treaty, H. Désir, who was at the time in charge of coordinating the Attac grouping of MEPs, broke off with the association over the issue of the ECT.⁵³ The struggle over the treaty also implied dissent among L. Fabius' allies. Some close friends like G. Savary or J. Lang refused to reject the treaty. In contrast, the MEP P. Bérès, who was a member of the European Convention, mentioned the changes made at the ICG in 2004 and spoke herself for a 'renegotiation' of the ECT.⁵⁴ From December to March, rumours about sanctions from the party's leadership against the dissidents overhung the campaign. F. Hollande eventually abandoned this possibility and the Bureau national issued a 'solennel condamnation'. The polarization in the party destabilized F. Hollande's authority and conferred L. Fabius some electoral legitimacy since a massive majority of the left electorate voted against the ratification of the ECT. However, it should not be inferred that this stems from a 'union of left' kind of strategy that would have been meticulously calculated and carried out by L. Fabius and his supporters from the beginning of the campaign. Actually, the image of a 'unified front' of the left against the treaty conveyed in the media is to a certain extent misleading and conceals deep deficits in the interactions between the various actors of the 'no', particularly as far as figures of the PS are concerned.

Deficient interactions: The limits of the PS environment's role

Although L. Fabius and H. Emmanuelli wanted to profile themselves as rallying leaders of the left, they did not (unlike J.L. Mélenchon) commit themselves fully in the campaign. They avoided in the first place campaigning together with the 'anti-liberal' left in spite of a close assessment of the treaty's content. L. Fabius, who had belonged historically to the 'social-liberal' right wing of the PS, could not legitimately join the camp of the radical left.⁵⁵ Hence, his line of action consisted in conveying his ideas in the media rather than organizing meetings⁵⁶ in order to influence public opinion without campaigning officially against his own party.⁵⁷ Like H. Emmanuelli, L. Fabius proved less reluctant to join the 'unitary' campaign once the 'no' camp was bound to prevail, as accounted for by the participation of his closest ally C. Bartolone at the meeting on 27 May. Actually, PS dissidents were most concerned by the internal struggle within the party. Contacts between members of the NPS or L. Fabius' ally H. Weber and representatives of the Fondation Copernic actually aimed at gathering resources — in terms of ideas and arguments — for the internal referendum campaign.⁵⁸ Even then, cooperation between the various advocators of the 'no' was weak because each leader preferred pursuing his/her own strategy.⁵⁹ After the victory of the 'yes' at the internal referendum, L. Fabius gathered between 300 and 500 of his supporters among party officials on 20 January in order to explain his stance on the treaty, rather than seeking to rally the other party figures of the 'no'. Consequent to this 'half-commitment' by the PS dissidents, the polarization inside the party between the minority left wing and the mainstream camp led by F. Hollande was not strong enough to bring about a consistent 'no' camp and reverse the balance of power between the courants. The following party congress in Le Mans in November 2005 illustrates this matter of fact since realignments have not been consistent with the cleavage over the ECT: whereas J.L. Mélenchon rallied L. Fabius, H. Emmanuelli joined the NPS that imploded during the congress. Eventually, L. Fabius signed the final manifesto, together with the majority led by F. Hollande. This closed, once again, the bracket of contention over Europe. L. Fabius' supporters actually faced a strategic dilemma between 'legitimacy of the party and legitimacy of the voters'.⁶⁰ But this 'in-between' stance did not allow him to profile himself as a leader of the whole left. He appeared in September 2005 for the first time in his career on the stage at the Fête de l'Humanité, a traditional event organized by the PC, where he was booed by the crowd,⁶¹ because he had 'not been recognized a legitimate advocator of the 'non'.⁶²

As far as the new actor, the Collectif pour un non de gauche is concerned, mobilization also suffered a deficit that was linked to the involved political parties' strategic interests. Firstly, the course of events was not in favour of a large gathering. Since the Call of the 200 was launched in October, figures of the PS were not able to participate before the end of the internal debate with the party referendum.⁶³ Secondly, the radical anti-liberal, and for some anti-capitalist,⁶⁴ tune of the Call obviously could not be approved either by leaders of the PS like H. Emmanuelli or L. Fabius, or by the leader of the Republican-souverainiste leader J.P. Chevènement. Among trade unions, commitment has been very uneven. As far as the CGT is concerned, the Comité confédéral national had called to vote 'non' in spite of its General Secretary's (B. Thibault) position in favour of the treaty. However, mobilization on the ground was rather weak in order to avoid an open conflict within the union.⁶⁵ Most significantly, strategic party interests have prevailed immediately after the victory of the 'no' on 29 May in opposition to the unitary cooperation culture and organizational method of the collectif promoted by the Fondation Copernic. This gave some evidence that party leaders were not really pursuing a collective strategy. J.L. Mélenchon for instance invited the supporters of the 'no' at his movement's 'summer school' a couple of months after the referendum, but he invited only party representatives and excluded civil society organizations. He thus gave a signal to the other actors that his priority was to 'change the majority in the PS thanks to the new balance of power after the victory of the "non" camp'.⁶⁶ M.G. Buffet (PC) and O. Besancenot (LCR) claimed being able to bring together around their party all the forces of the anti-liberal left and each wanted to be 'the rallying organization for the others'.⁶⁷ Beyond the referendum, the actual goal for all involved actors was the 2007 Presidential election. In this respect, the project to agree on a single candidate at the left of the PS ended up in a flop and the political capital accumulated with mobilization during the campaign dissipated into numerous 'small' candidates. Thus, the processes of actor constitution and scale change of mobilization proved to be relatively ephemeral. The modus operandi based on the collectif unitaire that had been very efficient in the mobilization arena could not be transposed into the electoral arena because the political leaders involved gave priority to the visibility of their own organization. Besides, some tried to convince L. Fabius to leave the PS and to found a new more radical party, because according to C. Debons, 'thinking that there can be a refounding without a faction of social-democracy is totally illusory'. But L. Fabius maintained his cautious action line and got ready for the next important dates in the PS internal life, namely the party congress in Le Mans in November 2005, and then the Presidential primary election. L. Fabius therefore demonstrated that he was more interested in controlling his party apparatus than becoming the rallying leader of the radical left like Oskar Lafontaine did in Germany.

Conclusion

The structure of political opportunities for PS treaty opponents in 2005 comprised two main elements: first, a cognitive climate characterized by the strength of alter-globalization thesis critical of European integration and hence to the mobilization by various organizations (political parties, trade unions, civil society) over these issues, and second, the exacerbated factionalism shaped by the centrality of the presidential election in the French regime constituted an additional incentive for using the ECT as a means to gather political support. Interactions between the various actors involved demonstrate that the unitary dynamic generated by the radical left had a decisive impact on the PS figures' involvement in the 'no' campaign. However, the interactions processes conceal the more significant internal strategies of political party leaders who focused more on their organization than on the collective dynamic. This is in particular true for L. Fabius, whose strategy aimed at gaining control over the PS apparatus. Hence, he sought to gain political support while pretending to formulate a political response to criticism towards the EU put forward by the anti-globalization movement and now widely spread out in French society. At the theoretical level, the study of mobilization of the left in the 2005 French referendum campaign validates an alternative approach to Euroscepticism studies. While clear-cut categories for political parties help little to understand the success of the 'no' campaign, the concepts elaborated by scholars of protest movements proved to be of relevant use for this contentious episode of conventional politics. Finally, the paper brought to light the structural factors determining contention over Europe within the PS beyond the ECT referendum. Since the early years of the integration project, the French PS has displayed controversy over the compatibility between the liberal nature of the single market's implications and the Socialist ideology. This has deeply reached into French political culture until today. This may be a hint of the need to study earlier resistance to European integration beyond the 'wave' of Euroscepticism in the 1990s that has been most studied by scholars.

Notes

¹ Indeed, the share of the Front National electorate who rejected the Constitutional Treaty (93%) remained very stable in comparison with the referendum on the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992 (92%). Moreover, many traditional eurosceptic actors (the 'left-Souverainist' J. P. Chevènement, the Gaullist-Souverainist C. Pasqua) were weakened in 2005 or decided to adopt a low-profile campaign (the Trotskist A. Laguiller, J. Le Pen). On the left, the share of the electorate rejecting the European treaty, which was already very strong in 1992, increased up to 81% for the Communist Party (PC) and 98% for the Ligue communiste révolutionnaire (LCR). It is unarguably the rocking of the Socialist and Green electorates that made the difference, with a spectacular increase of the 'non' from, respectively, 22 to 56% and 42.9 to 60%. Les sondages sortis des urnes (SSU) — Comparatif 29 mai 2005/20 septembre 1992 http://www.ipsos.fr/CanalIpsos/poll/8074.ap.

² Five interviews have been conducted with Claude Debons from the Fondation Copernic, Eric Le Gall from Attac France, Gilles Savary, Henri Weber and Pervenche Bérès, three French PS MePs who are close to the main figure of the Socialist 'non' Laurent Fabius (or who were close to him before the campaign in the case of Gilles Savary).

³ Articles 4.5 and 6.6 of the PS statutes http://fonctionnement.parti-socialiste.fr/category/les-statuts/.

⁴ Interview with G. Savary, June 2007, Brussels.

⁵ Idem.

⁶ 'Derrière la bataille sur l'Europe, le duel Fabius-Hollande', Le Monde, 31 August 2004.

⁷ Interview with G. Savary, June 2007, Brussels.

⁸ 'Constitution européenne: Fabius réticent', Le Monde, 23 June 2004.

⁹ Interview with C. Debons, March 2007, Paris.

¹⁰ Idem.

¹¹ See Erik Izraelewicz, Le Monde, 7 December 1995; also P. Lamy, 'Le modèle français vu d'Europe. Entretien avec Pascal Lamy', Le Débat, No. 134, mars–avril 2005.

¹² Le mouvement de décembre 1995, appel de soutien aux grévistes, le 4 décembre 1995, Collectif, Le Monde, 5 December 1995.

¹³ Association pour la taxation des transactions et l'aide aux citoyens.

¹⁴ Interview with C. Debons.

¹⁵ Interview with G. Savary, June 2007, Brussels.

¹⁶ Phone interview with P. Bérès, June 2007.

¹⁷ L. Jospin, 1995–2000: propositions pour la France, Stock, Paris, 2001.

¹⁸ It gathered about 84.07% of the votes.

¹⁹ 'L'acceptation de la mondialisation, ça n'est pas la renonciation à l'identité nationale'. Speech by L. Jospin at the Brest Party Congress, 1997.

²⁰ 'La voie de la coopération entre les nations est la seule qui vaille pour maîtriser un système économique libéral qui n'a pas conscience de sa responsabilité sociale. L'Europe trouve là son sens. Elle est un projet historique et un impératif stratégique. Elle ne peut se réduire à un marché sans discipline. L'Europe, aujourd'hui, est l'autre nom de la volonté politique'. Motion A 'Réussir ensemble' présentée par François Hollande, soutenue par Laurent Fabius, Michel Rocard et Dominique Strauss-Kahn.

²¹ 'Peut-on à la fois répondre à l'urgence sociale et accepter le carcan de l'Europe monétariste ? Peut-on s'attaquer au chômage de masse et accepter le dogme de la baisse du coût du travail et de la flexibilité ? Car la mondialisation libérale conduit une guerre sans relâche contre les salariés, leurs acquis sociaux et contre l'autorité des États-Nations qui régulent aujourd'hui les rapports sociaux. Trop de responsables de la social-démocratie européenne conçoivent leur action comme un accompagnement social de la mondialisation libérale'.

²² 'Cette configuration de la globalisation est lourde de menaces (...)Dans cette nouvelle période, l'action doit se situer au niveau approprié: les institutions internationales comme l'Europe doivent être mises au service de cette impérieuse régulation. C'est l'une des raisons majeures de notre engagement européen. Il s'agit de maîtriser la mondialisation par la mise en uvre d'un projet démocratique à l'échelle du continent'. Motion Hollande: 'Ensemble, réussir aujourd'hui pour convaincre demain' at the Grenoble Party Congress, 2000.

²³ 'Les mouvements dits "anti-mondialisation" doivent trouver un débouché en politique'. Motion H. Emmanuelli, Grenoble Party Congress, 2000.

²⁴ 'Il nous faut répondre au désarroi des catégories populaires, frappées par la mondialisation libérale et qui doutent de la capacité du politique à résoudre leurs problèmes quotidiens. À la mondialisation économique, qui crée de fortes inégalités ...'. Motion Hollande at the Dijon Party Congress, 2003.

²⁵ 'Le Parti socialiste doit être pleinement partie prenante du mouvement pour une 'autre mondialisation' (...) Le Parti socialiste est un acteur à part entière de la lutte contre la mondialisation libérale. Le Parti socialiste prendra l'initiative d'une rencontre avec l'ensemble des partenaires du combat pour une autre mondialisation dans l'année qui vient pour débattre de nos objectifs communs'. Motion Hollande at the Dijon Party Congress, 2003.

²⁶ 'Nous n'avons jamais su prendre une position claire: proposer une stratégie de résistance à l'égard de la mondialisation de l'économie (...) Cette mondialisation fabrique de plus en plus de chômeurs et de précaires dans les pays riches, de plus en plus d'esclaves dans les pays pauvres (...) Face à la mondialisation libérale, l'Europe devrait être vécue comme une protection. Mais l'Union est ressentie, au contraire, comme un cheval de Troie de la mondialisation au sein des nations, imposant la libéralisation et accentuant les inégalités sociales.' Motion pour un Nouveau Parti Socialiste, Dijon Party Congress, 2003.

²⁷ H. Emmanuelli and J. L. Mélenchon in Le Monde, 13 August 2002.

²⁸ L. Fabius' blog http://www.laurent-fabius.net/.

²⁹ Interview with G. Savary.

³⁰ Except for M. Rocard who voted for the final text, and G. Savary who abstained.

³¹ Y. Salesse has been member of the Conseil d'Etat, the highest French court, which is also the government's advisory body. He is close to the Parti communiste.

³² http://www.appeldes200.net/.

³³ Idem.

³⁴ Idem: 'There is in France a long tradition of unitary collectifs and social movementswhich arise when facing a particular political issue. Therefore networks are operational, common working habits are functioning, people know each other. On this particular issue, we have worked with people, who have known each other for twenty years. We have met each other in the networks...So it was easy.'

³⁵ Idem.

³⁶ Idem.

³⁷ C. Debons has long been an official of the moderate left union CFDT. As the organization approved the reform of the pensions system by Prime Minister F. Fillon in 2003, he left the CFDT and joined the more radical CGT, where he was in charge of European issues.

³⁸ Inter alia Yves Salesse, then President of the Foundation, member of the Conseil d'Etat, close to the PC and former collaborator of the Communist Minister J. C. Gayssot; C. Autain, local politician in Paris, close to the PC and to Paris Mayor B. Delanoë, R. Martelli, member of the PC, F. Bavay, Green Vice-President of the Region Ile-de-France, C. Debons, CFDT and then official, etc.

³⁹ Interview with C. Debons.

⁴⁰ Some representatives of the founder members constituted a camp around P. Khalfa (representative of the union G10-Solidaires) to object Nikonoff's 'presidentialized' direction style. The crisis led to an electoral fraud engineered by Nikonnoff at the election of the new direction in June 2006 and to the departure of thousands of members. After evidence of the fraud was established, a new collegial direction led by P. Khalfa was elected in December 2006 (R. Wintrebert, 2007, 232–291).

⁴¹ Lignes d'Attac, January 2005.

⁴² Interview with Eric Le Gall from Attac.

⁴³ 'Les opposants au traité européen ont mieux utilisé Internet', Le Monde, 9 July 2005.

⁴⁴ Interview with C. Debons.

⁴⁵ Idem.

⁴⁶ Idem.

⁴⁷ Idem.

⁴⁸ Interview with E. Le Gall.

⁴⁹ Interview with C. Debons.

⁵⁰ L'humanité, 23 March 2005.

⁵¹ Interview with P. Bérès.

⁵² Interview with G. Savary.

⁵³ 'L'adieu à Attac', par Harlem Désir, Nouvel Observateur, Semaine du jeudi 2 juin 2005 — n°2117.

⁵⁴ 'Une Constitution pour la grande Europe', par P. Bérès, Notes de la Fondation Jean Jaurès, n° 36 October 2003. P. Bérès provides a mitigated assessment of the Convention's work.

⁵⁵ Interviews with C. Debons and G. Savary.

⁵⁶ Interview with H. Weber.

⁵⁷ C. Bartolone cité dans 'M. Fabius reste sur le "non" sans faire campagne', Le Monde, 12 January 2005.

⁵⁸ Interview with C. Debons.

⁵⁹ Interview with P. Bérès.

⁶⁰ Interview with H. Weber.

⁶¹ 'Laurent Fabius est fragilisé au sein du PS après son accueil chahuté à la Fête de "L'Humanité"', Le Monde, 13 September 2005.

⁶² Interview with G. Savary.

⁶³ Interview with C. Debons.

⁶⁴ For H. Weber for instance.

⁶⁵ Interview with C. Debons.

⁶⁶ Idem.

⁶⁷ Idem.

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