Skip to main content
Log in

Strategic voting in a semi-presidential system with a two-ballot electoral system. The 2007 French legislative election

  • Original Article
  • Published:
French Politics Aims and scope

Abstract

The decline of the explanatory power of the Michigan model of party identification led to increased importance being given to models based on short-term factors. Among such models, the strategic voting model occupies a central position, because it allows us both to understand the ways in which voters modify their vote intentions in a specific situation and to measure the consequences for party systems. But if scholars have paid a great deal of attention to strategic voting in plurality systems, they have often neglected strategic voting in majority runoff systems, although this rule is widely used around the world both for presidential and legislative elections. Owing to the two rounds, options for strategic voting in a majority runoff system are more numerous than in a plurality system. But, the usual form of strategic voting is not the only reason that voters can choose to desert their preferred parties. We assume that each election is embedded in an institutional and political context that can also affect voters’ behavior. In France, recently this question of context has become more acute for two reasons. First, legislative elections are both national and local ballots, in which strong parties frequently present candidates who already hold one or more political offices (a widespread practice known as the cumul des mandats). Thus, voters can desert their preferred party for a candidate of another party that they know and already appreciate. Second, legislative elections now take place some weeks after the presidential elections. Voters can change their vote intentions for legislative elections because of what happened in the presidential elections to affect the overall political regime. Drawing on district-level survey data from the 2007 French legislative elections, this article reveals low levels of strategic voting in a narrow sense but strong effects when we define strategic voting more broadly as affected by embedded institutional rules. This latter form of strategic voting helps to shape the party system.

This is a preview of subscription content, log in via an institution to check access.

Access this article

Price excludes VAT (USA)
Tax calculation will be finalised during checkout.

Instant access to the full article PDF.

Institutional subscriptions

Similar content being viewed by others

Notes

  1. Candidates who obtain both an absolute majority of valid votes cast and a vote total equal to at least one quarter of the registered electorate are elected in the first round. Otherwise, a runoff election is held among the top two candidates and those polling a number of votes greater than or equal to one-eight (12.5 per cent) of the electorate.

  2. www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/2007/.

  3. This study was conducted by the CERAPS (Centre d’Etudes et de Recherches Administratives, Politiques et Sociales, University of Lille2) and the CEVIPOF (Sciences-Po, Paris) with the financial support of the Agence Nationale pour la Recherche. The fieldwork was carried out by Opinionway. We thank André Blais (University of Montreal) for his suggestions.

  4. Questions used in this research are indicated in the appendix.

  5. This mark, 5, resulted from the observation that a number of respondents have only rating the candidates that they appreciated the least by giving all of them a very bad mark. We cannot consider, in that case, that a candidate whose score was 1/10, looked like a preferred candidate.

  6. These operations do not bias the sample, which still remains valid. First, we kept the respondents in the all constituencies of the initial sample. Second, we observed small differences in the marginal results of the initial (5920) and final (3825) samples (between 1.0 and 1.4 points for each modality of the socio-demographic characteristics) taken into account in the different sample quotas. Furthermore, there are hardly significant differences in the results of the political questions (vote intentions, preferred parties and so on) between the two samples. Finally, at the end of these extractions we did not find any bias, which could have a significant effect on the dependant variable.

  7. We find the same phenomenon in the United States because incumbent candidates always obtain a higher score than challenger candidate. www.electionstudies.org/nesguide/toptable/tab8a_2.htm.

  8. Panel électoral français (2007). « Cevipof – Ministère de l’Intérieur », www.cevipof.msh-paris.fr/PEF/2007/PEF2007.htm.

  9. 3807 respondents (99.5 per cent) answer this question.

References

  • Alvarez, R.M. and Nagler, J. (2000) A new approach for modeling strategic voting in multiparty elections. British Journal of Political Science 30: 59.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Benoit, K., Giannetti, D. and Laver, M. (2006) Voter strategies with restricted choice menus. British Journal of Political Science 36: 459–485.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Blais, A. (2004) Strategic voting in the 2002 French presidential election. In: M.S. Lewis-Beck (ed.) The French Voter. Before and After the 2002 Election. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 93–109.

    Google Scholar 

  • Blais, A., Massicotte, L. and Dobrzynska, A. (1997) Direct presidential elections: A world summary. Electoral Studies 16 (4): 441–455.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Bowler, S. and Grofman, B. (eds.) (2000) Introduction: STV as an embedded institution. Elections in Australia, Ireland and Malta Under the Single Transferable Vote: Reflections on an Embedded Institution. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, pp. 1–40.

    Chapter  Google Scholar 

  • Burden, B.C. (2009) Candidate-driven ticket splitting in the 2000 Japanese elections. Electoral Studies 28 (1): 33–40.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Capdevielle, J., Dupoirier, E. and Ysmal, C. (eds.) (1981) « Tableau des électorats en mars 1978 ». France de gauche, Vote à droite. Paris, Presses de la Fondation nationale des Sciences politiques, collection Références, pp. 19–90.

    Google Scholar 

  • Cox, G.W. (1997) Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems. New York: Cambridge University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Dolez, B. (2004) « A la recherche de l’abstentionnisme électoral. Actualité d’une vieille question ». Revue française de Science politique 54: 669–680.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Dolez, B. and Laurent, A. (2000) Les reports de voix aux législatives de 1997, une analyse des résidus. In: P. Bréchon, A. Laurent and P. Perrineau (eds.) Les cultures politiques des Français. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 401–415.

    Google Scholar 

  • Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy. New York: Harper and Row.

    Google Scholar 

  • Dupoirier, E. and Sauger, N. (2009) Four rounds in a row: Interactive effects among legislative and presidential election outcomes in France. French Politics 8 (1): 21–41.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Duverger, M. (1954) Political Parties. London: Methuen.

    Google Scholar 

  • Fiorina, M.P. (1996) Divided Government. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn and Bacon.

    Google Scholar 

  • Foucault, M. (2006) How useful is the « Cumul des Mandats » for being re-elected? Empirical evidence from the 1997 legislative election. French Politics 4 (3): 292–311.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Goguel, F. (ed.) (1983) « Les élections législatives des 14–21 juin 1981 ». Chroniques électorales. Tome III: La Cinquième République après de Gaulle. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, pp. 177–198.

    Google Scholar 

  • Grofman, B. (2008) Taxinomie of runoff methods. Electoral studies 27: 395–399.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Grunberg, G. and Haegel, F. (2007) La France vers le Bipartisme ? La présidentialisation du PS et de l’UMP. Paris: Presses de Sciences Po, Collection Nouveaux Débats.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gschwend, T. (2003) Comparative politics of strategic voting: A hierarchy of electoral systems. Paper presented at the 2003 annual meeting of the APSA.

  • Gschwend, T. and Leuffen, D. (2004) Stuck between rock and a hard place: Electoral dilemmas and turnout in the 2002 French legislative elections. In: M.S. Lewis-Beck (ed.) The French Voter. Before and after the 2002 Election. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 155–177.

    Google Scholar 

  • Gschwend, T. and Leuffen, D. (2005) Divided we stand – Unified we govern? Cohabitation and regime voting in the 2002 French elections. British Journal of Political Science 35: 691–712.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Kedar, O. (2005) When moderate voters prefer extreme parties: Policy balancing in parliamentary elections. American Political Science Review 99 (2): 185–199.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • King, A. (ed.) (2002) In: Leadership, Personalities and the Outcomes of Democratic Elections. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

    Book  Google Scholar 

  • Marsh, M. (2007) Candidates or parties? Objects of electoral choice in Ireland. Party Politics 13 (4): 500–527.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Muxel, A. (2007) « Les trajectoires de vote de la présidentielle aux législatives: constance et mobilité, participation et abstention ». « Panel électoral français 2007 », http://www.cevipof.msh-paris.fr/PEF/2007/V4/PEFP4-AM.pdf.

  • Parodi, J.-L. (2007) « L’ancrage d’une curiosité française : l’élection « exécutive » à quatre tours ». Revue française de Science politique 57 (3–4): 285–291.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Shugart, M. (1995) The electoral cycle and institutional sources of divided presidential government. American Political Science Review 89 (2): 327–343.

    Article  Google Scholar 

  • Ysmal, C. (1998) « Le second tour, le prix de l’isolement de la droite modérée ». In: P. Perrineau and C. Ysmal (eds.) Le vote surprise. Les élections législatives des 25 mai et 1er juin 1997. Paris: Presses de Science po, pp. 285–301.

    Google Scholar 

Download references

Acknowledgements

We thank Bernard Grofman, André Blais and the reviewers of this article for constructive suggestions. The authors gratefully acknowledge the financial support of the Agence Nationale pour la Recherche (ANR)

Author information

Authors and Affiliations

Authors

Corresponding author

Correspondence to Annie Laurent.

Appendix

Appendix

List of the questions used for this research

  • Pour quel candidat y a-t-il le plus de chances que vous votiez ? (liste de tous les candidats présents par circonscription)

Dans l’hypothèse d’une intention de vote pour un candidat du FN

  • Supposons que dans votre circonscription le second tour oppose

    • nom du candidat de gauche

    • nom du candidat de droite

    • nom du candidat FN

Pour quel candidat voteriez–vous?

Dans l’hypothèse d’une intention de vote pour un candidat du MoDem

  • Supposons que dans votre circonscription le second tour oppose

    • nom du candidat de gauche

    • nom du candidat de droite

    • nom du candidat du MoDem

    • Pour quel candidat voteriez–vous?

  • Voici une liste de parties ou de mouvements politiques. Pouvez-vous le dire duquel vous vous sentez le plus proche ou disons le moins éloigné ? (Liste de 14 partis).

  • Vous savez que dimanche prochain se déroule le premier tour des élections législatives. Dans votre circonscription un certain nombre de partis présentent des candidats. Pour chacun d’entre eux pouvez-vous me dire quelle appréciation vous portez sur eux, en leur attribuant une note de 0 à 10. 10 veut dire que vous appréciez beaucoup ce candidat, 0 que vous ne l’appréciez pas du tout. Les répondants pouvaient aussi cocher la case « Je ne connais pas assez ce candidat pour le noter »

  • A votre avis dans votre circonscription

    • un candidat sera élu dès le premier tour

    • un second tour sera nécessaire

    • je n’en ai aucune idée

Pour ceux qui pensent qu’un candidat sera élu dès le premier tour

  • Selon vous, quel candidat a le plus de chances d’être élu au premier tour? (liste de tous les candidats en course dans la circonscription

Pour ceux qui pensent qu’un second tour sera nécessaire

  • En cas de second tour, quels sont les candidats qui ont le plus de chances d’être présents?

  • A votre avis, quelles sont les chances de chacun de ces candidats d’être présent au second tour, sur une échelle de 0 à 10, où 10 signifie « certain d’être présent au second tour » et 0 « aucune chance d’être présent au second tour »

  • A votre avis, quelles sont les chances de chacun de ces candidats d’être élu au second tour, sur une échelle de 0 à 10, où 10 signifie « certain d’être élu au second tour » et 0 « aucune chance d’être élu au second tour »

  • A votre avis, est-il préférable que, après les élections législatives, il y ait une majorité de députés:

    • Favorables à Nicolas Sarkozy pour qu’il ait les moyens d’appliquer son programme

    • Opposés à Nicolas Sarkozy pour qu’il soit obligé de partager le pouvoir

Rights and permissions

Reprints and permissions

About this article

Cite this article

Dolez, B., Laurent, A. Strategic voting in a semi-presidential system with a two-ballot electoral system. The 2007 French legislative election. Fr Polit 8, 1–20 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/fp.2009.42

Download citation

  • Published:

  • Issue Date:

  • DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/fp.2009.42

Keywords

Navigation