Information Exchange as Collusive Behaviour: Evidence from an Antitrust Intervention in the Italian Insurance Market

doi:doi:10.1111/j.1468-0440.2004.00283.x

The Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance (2004) 29, 219–233. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0440.2004.00283.x

Information Exchange as Collusive Behaviour: Evidence from an Antitrust Intervention in the Italian Insurance Market

Donatella Porrini^1,*

¹Institute di Scienze Economische e Statistiche, University of Milan, Italy

^*I would like to thank L.M. Bakker and B.Will for their very helpful discussions respectively at the Tenth Joint Seminar of The Geneva Association for the Study of Insurance Economics and the European Association of Law and Economics (EALE), Rotterdam, and at the 20th Conference of the European Association of Law and Economics, Nancy.