^aUniversität Bonn, Rechts- und Staatswissenschaftliche Fakultät, Adenauerallee 24-42, 53113 Bonn, Germany. E-mail: g.wagner@uni-bonn.de

This paper grew out of research conducted for the European Centre of Tort and Insurance Law (Vienna) with support by Munich Re. The full reports of contributors from Austria, England and Wales, Germany, Italy, Sweden, Switzerland and the U.S. are published in the volume titled "Tort Law and Liability Insurance", edited by G. Wagner.

Abstract

The interaction between tort law and liability insurance is a complex problem that is difficult to deal with. This article provides a broad overview by distinguishing two approaches or models of the tort/insurance interface. One is the Deterrence Model in which tort law takes the leading role, whereas insurance is an auxiliary, and at times problematic, device. The alternative approach is the Compensation Model in which tort and insurance switch roles in order to provide optimal compensation to those in need. From there on, it is only a small step to no-fault schemes currently considered in some European countries as a substitute for traditional medical malpractice law.