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Independent expenditures in congressional primaries after Citizens United: Implications for interest groups, incumbents and political parties

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Abstract

This article examines how Citizens United affected the balance of power among ‘outside’ groups in congressional primaries through 2014. Contrary to predictions of massive independent expenditures (IEs) by large corporations, the article documents: (i) an increase in the number and diversity of IE groups together with a decreased concentration of effort among them; (ii) a relative decrease in the power of factional outsiders; (iii) the emergence of ephemeral ‘in-and-out’ groups; and (iv) among these, the emergence of single-candidate PACs (political action committees), with the most significant growth being among those allied with incumbent office holders. The article also speaks to some of the recent literature on political parties. The Super PACs most closely allied with the congressional party leaders, despite unlimited contributions, continued to choose not to invest in contested primaries, raising doubts about recent arguments to the effect that unlimited contributions to the parties would be likely to make a substantial difference in determining who runs under the party’s label in a general election.

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Notes

  1. We categorize ‘competitive’ challengers here, and throughout the article, as those who received at least 25 per cent of the primary vote.

  2. See Boatright (2013, Chapter 3) for discussion.

  3. While it is difficult to show how the changes we documented above with respect to incumbent primaries would apply to primaries within the opposition party or in open seat primaries, it is plausible to expect that they do. (see Boatright, 2014, pp. 130–134; 157–162 for efforts to identify similar patterns over time for opposition party and open-seat primaries.) IEs, however, can easily be measured across all primary types.

  4. Of the 184 entities spending money in the 2014 primaries, only 49 did so in the 2012 primaries and 79 in the full 2012 cycle.

  5. For a summary of successful primary challenges, see Boatright (2013, p. 196).

  6. Mississippi Conservatives supported Thad Cochran, spending more on his behalf ($1.8 million) than any organization, including the Chamber. Texans for a Conservative Majority supported Sen. John Cornyn. Government Integrity Fund Action Network supported Arkansas Representative Tom Cotton; Cotton had no primary opponent but the group spent in preparation for Cotton’s general election race against Sen. Mark Pryor. Southern Conservatives supported Jack Kingston in his Georgia Senate race. Americans for Common Sense supported George Demos (NY-1) in a primary in which neither candidate was a factional conservative.

  7. This does not include the Kentucky Opportunity Coalition [501(c)4] and Kentuckians for Strong Leadership [Super PAC] – two organizations supporting Sen. Mitch McConnell that reported its $8 million spent during the primary season as being general election expenditures.

  8. In the three highest-spending Senate primary challenges in 2010 and 2012 – the challenges to Blanche Lambert Lincoln (D-AR), Orrin Hatch (R-UT) and Richard Lugar (R-IN), over three-fourth of the IEs were made on behalf of the challengers.

  9. In some of these instances these appear to have been expenditures made during the primary cycle but with the intention of helping the incumbent in the general election. Some of these incumbents faced competitive primary challengers, however, and still others, such as South Carolina’s Lindsey Graham, had reason to expect to face competitive primary challengers but ultimately such challenges did not materialize.

  10. This figure includes four incumbents running in California; three of these incumbents faced primary opponents of the other party. California uses a ‘top-two’ primary system in which the candidates of all parties run against each other in the first round and the top two advance to the general election.

  11. As in footnote 6 above, the 61 per cent figure does not include $8 million in single-candidate IEs favoring Sen. McConnell, if they had been included, the pro-incumbent portion for the Senate would be 75 per cent.

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Court cases:

  • Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 50 (2010).

  • SpeechNow.org v. Federal Election Commission, 599F. 3d (D.C. Cir., Mar. 26, 2010), cert. denied 131S. Ct. 553 (Nov. 1, 2010).

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Correspondence to Robert G Boatright.

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Boatright, R., Malbin, M. & Glavin, B. Independent expenditures in congressional primaries after Citizens United: Implications for interest groups, incumbents and political parties. Int Groups Adv 5, 119–140 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1057/iga.2016.1

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