Abstract
A conventional technocratic wisdom has begun to form that blames the failure of the US led invasion of Iraq on the small number of American troops deployed and the ideological divisions at the centre of the Bush administration itself. This paper argues that both these accounts are at best simply descriptive. A much more sustained explanation has to be based on a close examination of the ideological assumptions that shaped the drafting of policies and planning for the aftermath of the war. The point of departure for such an analysis is that all agency, whether individual or collective, is socially mediated. The paper deploys Antonio Gramsci's notion of ‘Common Sense’ to examine the Bush administration's policy towards Iraq. It argues that the Common Sense at work in the White House, Defence Department and Green Zone was primarily responsible for America's failure. It examines the relationship between the ‘higher philosophies’ of both Neoconservatism and Neo-Liberalism and Common Sense. It concludes that although Neoconservatism was influential in justifying the invasion itself, it was Neo-Liberalism that shaped the policy agenda for the aftermath of war. It takes as its example the pre-war planning for Iraq, then the disbanding of the Iraqi army and the de-Ba’athification of the Iraqi state. The planning and these two decisions, responsible for driving Iraq into civil war, can only be fully explained by studying the ideology that shaped them. From this perspective, the United States intervention in Iraq was not the product of an outlandish ideology but was instead the high water mark of post-Cold War Liberal interventionism. As such, it highlights the ideological and empirical shortcomings associated with ‘Kinetic Liberalism’.
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Notes
For an indication of what those in the administration might have wanted to do after success see Frum (2003, p. 232).
Different individuals operating within ideological systems have varying levels of autonomy to identify and attempt to transform the discourses that shape their perception. However, no individual has complete autonomy to escape the ideational structures within which they work.
For a similar conclusion albeit arrived at from a very different perspective see the comments of Stella Rimington, the ex-head of MI5 in Norton-Taylor (2008).
Senior Whitehall sources in London were quoted in October 2002 as looking for ‘a political outcome’ an implosion of Iraqi power from within, as opposed to ‘an industrial strength war.’ (Norton-Taylor, 2002). ‘British government sources admitted yesterday that there had been a ‘general expectation’ on both sides of the Atlantic that ‘the Iraqi people would revolt against Saddam as they had in 1991’ or at least that there might be a coup ‘with in the higher echelons’ of the regime.’ (Beeston and Baldwin, 2003). These conclusions were confirmed by a series of interviews I carried out with senior decision makers in Whitehall in November 2002.
‘It is not too late for the Iraq military to act with honour and protect your country’ (Bush, 2003a).
Phillips estimates the General Order No. 1 made 120 000 unemployed out of a total party membership of 2 million. Bremer cites intelligence estimates that it effected 1 per cent of the party membership, 20 000 people. Packer estimates ‘at least thirty-five thousand’. The large variation in estimates indicated the paucity of reliable intelligence on the ramifications of such an important policy decision. (Packer, 2005, p. 191; Phillips, 2005, pp. 145–146; Bremer and McConnell, 2006, p. 40).
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Acknowledgements
Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Centre for International Politics, University of Manchester and the Department of Politics, Goldsmiths College, University of London. I would like to thank those in the audience for their comments. I would also like to thank Clare Day for her comments on the text.
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Dodge, T. Coming face to face with bloody reality: Liberal common sense and the ideological failure of the Bush doctrine in Iraq. Int Polit 46, 253–275 (2009). https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2008.41
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2008.41