^aDepartment of Political Science, Lund University, Box 52, SE-221 00 Lund, Sweden. E-mail: ole.elgstrom@svet.lu.se

Abstract

Efforts by the European Commission and by leading member states, to normatively frame the debate about trade – and thus rhetorically entrap other actors by references to previous commitments – are ubiquitous; and member states do take account of the potential effects of their actions, in terms of potential praise or shaming, and adapt their behaviour to the institutional setting. However, this holds true only up to a certain limit. If sensitivity to domestic constituencies is high enough and the issue gets politicized, then member states may break ranks regardless of institutionalized normative constraints, especially if the issue-area is linked to proclaimed key self-images of the government. External pressure can also play its part. Indeed, the Commission's reluctant decision to include development sections in the final offer was arguably not only the result of internal member state activity, but also of pressure from the EU's counterpart – Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific – whose main bargaining objective was to include strong and effective development provisions in the final agreement.