Abstract
This article relates the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq to fundamental aspects of Anglo-American political economy, including the increasing integration of the British and US economies, and the largely Anglo-American-led project of global economic restructuring currently taking place. Part I discusses the political economy of UK–US relations and the evolution of an Anglo-American military–industrial conglomerate. Part II links the Anglo-American relations and interests detailed in the first part of the article to an on-going project of global reconstruction. With this as a context, Part III reviews the history of British and US foreign policies towards Iraq and the culmination of these policies in the invasion of the country. The conclusions draw implications for the overall nature and direction of current trends of change.
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Notes
British historian Mark Curtis has argued that British politicians, media and the academic community help to keep the public ignorant about Britain's role in the world. ‘Activists on the left’, he argues, ‘know far more about, and write far more about the US than Britain’; and the academic community ‘place more emphasis on critiquing US rather than UK foreign policy’: whereas ‘in the US there is a large body of very good critical analysis of US foreign policy’, in the UK academics tend to focus on US foreign policy and the EU's role in the world, rather than on British foreign policy. He argues that declassified files on British foreign policy, which illuminate aspects of Britain's role in the world that are missing from much discussion of contemporary events, have been largely ignored by British academics, though they have been available to the public for over a decade. As a result,
We have significantly been kept in the dark as to this country's real role in the world .… We the public do not know a fraction of what this country has been up to in the last 50 years, even though the evidence … is actually sitting there ready to be documented by interested academics or journalists.
According to Curtis, these files show that, with respect to Britain's role in world affairs over the past century, ‘not much has changed’ (Cochrane, 2005).
It was French demands, to which Britain agreed, that resulted in the carving out of a separate state of Lebanon from the former Ottoman province of Syria, and the preservation of Lebanon and Syria as a sphere of French influence.
The hejaz is in modern day Saudi Arabia. King Faisal was neither from any of the lands that were cobbled together to form Iraq, nor was he associated with the religious sect of the majority of the population of the new state, and therefore his rule was, from the start, dependent on British domination of the area.
And with payment to Iraq set at 4 shillings per ton of oil produced (Research Unit for Political Economy, 2002).
As has been frequently observed, many of the arguments offered by President Bush to support a United States invasion of Iraq – fostering freedom, democracy and development – are identical to those used by Britain almost 90 years ago when it created Iraq.
This it did repeatedly. The IPC owned fields elsewhere in the world and were in no hurry to develop the Iraqi fields or build larger refining capacity there. In fact, its existing installations in 1958 covered only 0.5 per cent of its concession area.
Beginning in the 1970s, the United Kingdom and United States supplied Saudi Arabia and allied Persian Gulf states with massive amounts of highly sophisticated armaments. BAE's most important client is the Saudi royal family. The largest business deal in UK history, the Al-Yamamah deal with the Saudis, has involved over the last two and a half decades, the sale of 96 Tornado Fighters and more than 100 Hawk jets and other training aircraft totaling at least £20 billion (Lilley, 2003).
It took army, national guard and police units 2 weeks to defeat insurgents barricaded in the mosque. Hundreds of people were killed.
This would have included discussion of the continued illegal occupation by Israel of the West Bank, Gaza and the Golan Heights, the subject of the unenforced UN Security Council Resolution 242, as well as Israel's occupation at the time of south Lebanon.
Gowans (2006). James Paul points out that on numerous occasions the United States and United Kingdom ‘declared their goal to oust Saddam and their intelligence services made many efforts to assassinate him or to overthrow his government by military coup’ (Paul, 2003).
The text of these Resolutions can be accessed at www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0687.htm, and www.fas.org/news/un/iraq/sres/sres0688.htm.
The ‘no-fly-zones’ were never sanctioned by the Security Council.
Paul (2003). After the withdrawal of UN weapons inspectors in 1998, the United States and United Kingdom dramatically increased the average monthly release of bombs – ‘from 0.025 tons to 5 tons’. Without consulting the Security Council, they launched ‘Operation Desert Fox’ – ‘torrential bombing throughout southern and central Iraq’ from 16 to 19 December 1998 (Research Unit for Political Economy, 2003).
West Qurna (Russia's Lukoil), Majnoun (France's Total) and North Rumaila (China's national). The Wall Street Journal (19 September 2002) used oil industry sources to compile the following information: Companies that initiated deals with Iraq in the 1990s, and reserves of the fields in which they would drill if sanctions are lifted: illustrationReproduced in Research Unit for Political Economy (2003). France's TotalFinaElf won $4 billion in contracts; the Russian oil firms, Lukoil and Zarubneft, won agreements worth tens of billions of dollars (Renner, 2003).
Proven Iraqi oil reserves are around 112 billion barrels, but total reserves are estimated at well over 200 billion barrels and may even be as much as 400 billion. What makes these reserves so attractive is the low cost of their extraction, and the enormous profits that makes possible. According to the US Department of Energy ‘Iraq's oil production costs are among the lowest in the world, making it a highly attractive oil prospect’. It is estimated that a barrel of Iraqi oil can be produced for less than $1.50 and possibly even as little as $1. This compares to $5 in other low-cost areas such as Malaysia and Oman, and between $6 and $8 a barrel in Mexico and Russia. Production costs in the North Sea run between $12 and $16 a barrel, whereas in the US fields they can reach as much as $20 (Beams, 2003). In the summer of 2001, a National Energy Policy Development Group chaired by Vice President Cheney produced a document (made public after a long court case) that includes a map of Iraq's major oil fields and a two-page list of ‘Foreign Suitors for Iraqi Oilfield Contracts’: 40 companies from 30 countries with projects agreed or under discussion including, in addition to the well-known French, Russian and Chinese deals, companies from Germany, India, Italy, Canada, Indonesia, Japan and other countries. There was not a single US or UK deal on this list (Paul, 2003).
‘Had Dr Blix and the UN inspectors been allowed to complete their “pre-war” inspection process for an estimated 6 more months in 2003, they could have ultimately determined Iraq was indeed free of WMD’ (Clark, 2003).
Newsweek (2003). Iran, the second largest OPEC producer was, at the time, actively discussing a switch to euros for its oil exports. During 2002, the majority of reserve funds in Iran's central bank were shifted to euros, and concern mounted as to whether they intend to switch oil payments to euros. ‘Economics Drive Iran Euro Oil Plan, Politics Also Key’ (IranExpert, 2002).
US dominance in direct investment is three times that of Germany and four times that of France. British investment in Asia (including China) represents only 5 per cent of its US investment (and 3 per cent of its European investment) (Foster).
BAE Systems’ North American branch is treated by the Pentagon as a domestic arms company. According to Ian Prichard of the British Campaign Against Arms Trade (CAAT), ‘BAE System North America appears to be virtually a separate company – even top UK executives are not privy to the more sensitive work carried out by “their” company in the US’ (Lilley, 2003).
The Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary at times assumed the role of arms broker. Prime Minister Blair used the opportunity of his visit to India during the Kashmir crisis of 2002 to promote BAE's efforts conclude a deal to sell 66 Hawk jets to India for £1 billion, as did the Foreign Secretary later that year (Lilley, 2003).
According to The Observer, BAE chairman Sir Richard Evans was ‘one of the few businessmen who can see Blair on request’; quoted in Lilley (2003).
Writing of the close friendship between Prime Minister Tony Blair and BP CEO John Browne (Lord Browne of Maddingley), members of the press have referred to BP as ‘Blair Petroleum’. James Paul notes, however, that it would be ‘more accurate to say that Blair was the BP Prime Minister’ (Paul, 2003).
‘It was not until the end of the 1960s that production for international trade absorbed an increasing proportion of labor within the advanced countries’ (Marglin and Schor, 1990, p. 51).
A decline in the US share of world manufactured exports, and an intensification of import competition in the US home market began in the 1960s (see, for a discussion Coates, 2000, pp. 28–32).
Changes in direction took place in France (1982–1983), Australia (1983), Canada (1984) and New Zealand (1984). Among the developing countries, the first major program of reform was launched by Chile's Pinochet government in the mid-1970s. China's new departure began in 1978.
Most notably, the recent mega-mergers that have created the oil ‘super-majors’, and the trend toward military ‘mega-firms’.
Prime Minister Blair indicated as much in his speech to US government officials and dignitaries at the George Bush Sr. Presidential Library in Texas in April 2002: ‘Who develops oil and gas, what the new potential sources of supply are, is a vital strategic question’ (Hyland, 2003).
Duss et al (2010). This figure do not include long-term veteran's disability and medical costs, social costs and macro-economic costs. Joseph Stiglitz and Linda Bilmes (2008) estimate the direct budgetary cost of the war to the US government in the range of $1.7 trillion to $2.7 trillion. This includes all past, present and future budgetary costs associated with the war through 2017.
This figure comes from the National Priorities Project is a 501(c)(3) research organization that focuses on the impact of federal spending and other policies at the national, state, congressional district and local levels. See their ‘Cost of the War in Iraq’ website, www.costofwar.com/.
In the nineteenth century, Britain devoted a substantially smaller proportion of her national output and savings to home investment than did any of her major competitors (Floud, 1981, pp. 12–17).
Verkaik (2006). Aegis has earned more than £246 million from contracts with the Pentagon and the CPA. Erinys International, which was formed in 2003 with a contract from the CPA to guard oil sites and pipelines in Iraq, has made more than £86 million. Armourgroup's turnover has increased from $71 million in 2001 to $233 million in 2005; Control Risk Group saw its turnover rise from £47 million in 2003 to £80 million in 2004 with contracts in Iraq from the Pentagon, the CPA, the Office of Reconstruction and Development and USAID (Almond, 2005; Sengupta, 2006).
Tim Bell, another favorite of the Thatcher government now involved in Iraq, ran the Tories’ election campaigns in 1979, 1983 and 1987.
Testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee; quoted in USA Today (2006).
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Halperin, S. The political economy of Anglo-American War: The case of Iraq. Int Polit 48, 207–228 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2011.4
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2011.4