Abstract
The security environment of the Soviet state during the Gorbachev period was distinctly different from earlier periods. The increased number of non-aggressive states in the Soviet Union's international environment further enhanced the security of the regime in historically unprecedented ways. Nuclear weapons freed the Soviet Union from fears of territorial aggression, while making its own expansion too costly. The achievement of military parity with the West gave the Soviets a further enhanced sense of security. Nuclear weapons also created significant common threats from nuclear war, providing strong incentives for accommodation and cooperation. Looking from the post-Cold War era, both Reagan and Gorbachev finally turned out to be anomalies. The particular circumstances that had created the opportunities for extraordinary breakthroughs by the diplomacy of these two men disappeared almost as quickly as they had arisen.
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Notes
It was a widely held view among foreign policy elites in the West that the East—West conflict would be a semi-permanent feature of world politics. As late as 1986, Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that ‘the American-Soviet rivalry is not some temporary aberration but a historical rivalry that will long endure (Brzezinski, 1986, p. xiii). Colin Gray argued that ‘the East-West conflict is (for all relevant policy-related purposes) a permanent feature of international relations’ (Gray, 1977).
This new policy direction was particularly unexpected by influential analysts in the United States, who expected Soviet decline to trigger Soviet expansion and repression. In the early 1980s, for example, Edward Luttwak argued that ‘regime pessimism’, exacerbated by economic failure, would produce Soviet aggression against neighboring states, particularly in Asia (Luttwak, 1982): ‘For Russian governments, foreign glory is not merely an escape from transient crises, but a feature of the very constitutional order, permanent conquests serve to justify the permanent subservience of Russian society … . For this reason, international tension and the spectre of war in the form of an “imperialist” attack on the Soviet Union , are vital to the interest of the Communist elite’ (Pipes, 1984, pp. 41–42).
Of particular note for its extensive reliance on Soviet sources, and its scope, is Zubok (2007).
Among these accounts are Beschloss and Talbott (1993), Barrass (2009), Gaddis (1991, 1997), Hunter (1998), Hutchings (1997), Garthoff (1994), Hogan (1992), Remnick (1993), Oberdorfer (1991), Matlock (1995), Lebow and Risse-Kappen (1995), and Strayer (1998).
One of the few systematic attempts to schematize the adaptation process is from James N. Rosenau, who distinguishes four types of adaptation (acquiescent, intransigent, promotive and preservative). In Rosenau's framework, the Soviet Union has moved from intransigent to acquiescent (Rosenau, 1981). On the application to the Soviet Union, see Rosenau (1987).
This article extends and updates earlier formulations of this argument (Deudney and Ikenberry, 1991/1992, 1992).
(Zubok, 2007, p. 334). This key insight was also earlier made by Jacques Levesque: ‘Rarely in history have we witnessed the policy of a great power continue, through so many difficulties and reversals, to be guided by such an idealistic view of the world, based on universal reconciliation, and in which the image of the enemy was constantly blurring, to the point of making it practically disappear’ (Levesque, 1997, p. 252). See also English (2000).
For accounts of the Soviet economic situation, see Goldman (1983) and Aslund (1990).
For this argument, see Deudney and Ikenberry (1991). For a review of the related academic literature from the 1950s and 1960s, see Meyer (1970).
For discussion of possible grand strategic responses to decline, see Gilpin (1981) and Kennedy (1991). For a consideration of the range of Soviet options, see Campbell (1988).
Autocratic states are marked by single-party and autocratic political rule, repression of human rights, extensive confiscatory extraction, and domination of civil society. Liberal democratic states are marked by political democracy and pluralism, extensive reliance on markets and private property, openness, and the accountability of the state to civil society.
Among the Soviet documents available in English, see Gorbachev (1987) and Nikitin (1988). For early discussion, see Kubalkova and Cruickshank (1989).
The classic formulation of this argument is made by Otto Hintze: ‘the form and spirit of the state's organization will not be determined solely by economic and social relations and the clashes of interests, but primarily by the necessities of defense and offense, that is, by the organization of the army and of warfare’ (Hintze, 1906, 1975, p. 111).
International theories concerned with system-level phenomena tend to downplay foreign policy patterns based on domestic regime type. But one strand of realist theory, developed by Raymond Aron and Stanley Hoffman, argues that the character of the international system is powerfully influenced by the domestic regimes of the states that make it up (Hoffmann, 1965; Aron, 1966). Somewhat confusingly, this unit-centric approach has recently come to be referred to as ‘neo-classical realism’, as well as ‘liberalism’.
For the composition of power and nuclear applications, see Deudney (2000a, 2000b).
For strong accounts of geography and international setting as formative influences, see Pipes (1974) and Gray (1988).
For accounts of the unit-level origins of imperial tendencies, see Kehr (1977) and Smith (1986).
For description of this reconstruction, see Duignan and Gann (1992).
For the role of the Western alliance, see Kugler (1994).
For the origins, features and evolution of this system, see Ikenberry (2011).
There is a large historical literature depicting the building of this Western order. For an overview of the early postwar efforts of the United States and Europe, see Patrick (2009). For an important study of patterns of Western political and security cooperation, see Risse (1997).
The best synoptic account remains Gaddis (1982).
For a lively critical overview, see Scoblic (2008).
A key figure in articulating the right-wing critique of the insufficiencies of containment is James Burnham. For the initial statement, see Burnham (1953). For a collection of Burnham's editorials and articles from the period when he was editor of the influential conservative magazine National Review, published by William F. Buckley, see Burnham (1967). Burnham's biography argues for his influence on Reagan (Kelly, 2002). More recent statements include Wildavsky (1983) and Podhoretz (1980). For an overview of rollback and other options, see Walt (1989).
For this view, see Welch (1988), Clemens (1978) and Clemens (1990).
For an explanation of the episodic pattern of Western public nuclear alarm, see Deudney (1996).
For description and critical assessment, see Posen and van Evera (1983).
(Lapidus and Dallin, 1989, p. 15). This incoherence is also discussed in Bell (1989).
For Soviet—European relations, see Sodaro (1990) and Stent (1981).
For discussion, see Paarlberg (1985) and Jentleson (1986).
For discussions of the peace movement and its impacts, see Meyer (1990), Risse-Kappen (1991) and Knopf (1998).
As Paul Warnke observed, the Soviet abandonment of Eastern Europe ‘would not have been possible at the time when the Soviet Union feared that the elimination of its buffer zone of satellite states would be taken advantage of by the West and thus present a serious threat to Soviet security’ (Warnke, 1991, p. 64).
For accounts and assessments, see Sarotte (2009) and Engel (2009).
Exactly what Gorbachev and Reagan meant by nuclear ‘abolition’ is not fully clear. At least three different images have been advanced. First is the verified elimination of all nuclear weapons, developed in Steinberger et al (1993). Second is the elimination of nuclear weapons along with most other major weapons, known as ‘General and Complete Disarmament’, analyzed in Wolfers et al (1966). Third is the dismantling of all nuclear weapons accompanied by careful preparations for re-nuclearization combined with some form of strategic defense, developed in Schell (1984). For a balanced but skeptical overall assessment, see Miller (1988). For a recent treatment and conditional advocacy, see Perkovitch and Acton (2008). Despite its continued currency and influence, there exists no analysis of this topic in the IR and strategic studies literature comparable to treatments of war-fighting and deterrence. The relationship between these alternative situations and deterrence is also confused, with some advanced as alternatives to deterrence and some as extensions and modifications of it.
Gorbachev's anti-nuclearism was part of a much broader aversion to the use of violence in politics, a startling preference for the heir of Lenin and Stalin. For description and discussion of Gorbachev's near-pacificism, see Zubok (2007, p. 444).
In an early assessment of nuclear weapons, William Borden observed that ‘from a strictly military viewpoint Russia's vast “security zone” has rapidly diminishing utility’ (Borden, 1946, p. 162).
For descriptions and assessments, see Holloway (1983), Leebaert (1981) and Gartoff (1990).
See also Shakhazarov (1988, 1991).
These theories are described and discussed in Shenfield (1987a, 1987b).
For the central role accorded science and technology in Soviet ideology, see Bailes (1978) and Parrott (1983).
For a detailed account and assessment, see Evangelista (1999).
For the rhetorical recklessness on nuclear weapons of the early Reagan administration, see Scheer (1982) and Center for Defense Information (1983).
For this hawkish strata and their views, see (Mann, 2004) and (Sanders, 1983).
For accounts of the ‘war scare’, see Andrews and Gordievsky (1990, pp. 593, 599–600), Prados (2006), Mann (2009, pp. 73–81) and Hoffman (2009, pp. 73–100).
For example, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger accused Reagan of ‘casual utopianism’ (Schlesinger, 1987). For the more general hard realist view of against arms control, see Gray (1992).
For the extent of mass public concern over nuclear vulnerability in the early Cold War period, see Boyer (1985) and Wittner (1997). For the influence on the young Ronald Reagan, see Lettow (2005).
For recent detailed accounts of Reagan's anti-nuclearism, see Lettow (2005), Mann (2009) and Hoffman (2009).
For the logic of settlements and their role in constituting post-war orders, see Ikenberry (2001).
For a concise account of the reductions in nuclear forces at the end of the Cold War, see Cirincione (2007) and Vogele (1994).
Key statements of this view are provided by Wohlforth (2003) and Brooks and Wohlforth (2000/2001).
For strong statements of this view, see Schweizer (1994, 2002) and Dolan (1990). For critical assessments, see Schrecker (2004).
Making a strong case for the impact of Reagan's ideological assertiveness and the relationship between ideas and Western economic strength and renewal is Henry Nau's essay in this volume (Nau, 1990).
For this view of arms control at the end of the Cold War, see Glynn (1992).
For the overall Cold War balance and the difficulties in measuring it, see Wohlforth (1993).
For expensive weapons of marginal strategic utility supported by the electoral base, see Brown (1992). Much of the increase in expenditures was allocated in the procurement of expanded major naval surface combatants, which were tasked to a strategically marginal mission (Mearsheimer, 1985; Posen and van Evera, 1983).
For a history of ballistic missile defense efforts in the United States, see Baucom (1992). For overviews of issues surrounding SDI and critical Western assessments, see Carter and Schwartz (1983), Miller and van Evera (1986) and Fitzgerald (2000).
For Soviet views of space weapons and SDI, see Velikov et al (1986), Westwick (2008) and Shenfield (1987a, 1987b).
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Acknowledgements
This article benefited from comments during the Princeton Workshop in March 2010, a Workshop at the German Marshall Fund in Washington DC in March 2011, and a panel at the International Studies Association in Montreal in March 2011. Particular thanks for comments from Mick Cox, James Goldgeier, Jakub Grygiel, Henry Nau and William Wohlforth. Thomas M. Williams provided exceptionally able research assistance.
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Deudney, D., Ikenberry, G. Pushing and pulling: The Western system, nuclear weapons and Soviet change. Int Polit 48, 496–544 (2011). https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2011.23
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2011.23