Abstract
This essay presents the argument that analysts, crystal ball readers and general future-tellers generally should to a much higher extent rely on claimed interests of great powers than on resources alone in predictions of future behaviour of great powers. Analysts should analyse what states want to do given what they could do, as much as analyse what states could do based on their resources, or analysts should analyse state policy intentions as much as state policy resources.
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Notes
For neo-classical thinking, see Lobell et al (2009).
Stratfor annually issues predictions about the next quarter, as well as the next year, as well as assessments of earlier predictions. Thus, in 2011, Stratfor predicted that Russia would be more conciliatory as its previous assertiveness had played in the hands of those opposed to Russian influence in Europe. Russia's relations with Germany would be strengthened even more, leaving the East European states, including the Baltics, in a more isolated situation than before. Third, China was predicted to meet several problems with Asian developments, with unclear effects on Russia. Finally, in Russia's own backyard, the situation would not be stable, beginning with continued unrest in Central Asia and the Caucasus and potential small powder kegs exploding even in Moldova, in addition to the many more Caucasus kegs (Stratfor, 2011).
Another rationale works for small powers where bandwagoning with great powers is the most common behaviour.
Both Soviet foreign policy ideology documents, as well as more recent documents of similar value, are less useful to predict short-term or current diplomatic foreign policy activities. They tend to be inherently tied to what is presently possible and what the interlocutor is doing. There is a certain reactive element in short-term behaviour. Second, in everyday politics, whatever ideational basis there is, a large degree of pragmatism is necessary and even the ideology-based Soviet Union were known for its deviations when an immediate gain was visible or a distant goal seemed not achievable.
They may be renamed also in terms of power, like Pavel Baev (2008) has done in his development of two themes, that of military security and energy security, which together ‘constitute two key elements of Russia's power that is typically conceptualized as “greatness” ’. The Russian intention is aimed to ‘re-establish and re-constitute Russia's “greatness” ’, which is Putin's third key theme (Baev, 2008, p. 2).
Russian economic life is restricted by ‘climatic and geographical factors, short growing seasons, poor soil, extreme temperatures, a landlocked location, and the lack of easily accessible stone for building’ (Rieber, 2007, p. 206).
With regard to the international system, Rieber refers to the three times, 1917–1920, 1941–1943, 1989–1991, when ‘the very existence of the Russian state’ was at stake (Rieber, 2007, p. 212). As for leadership, 1917 and 1991 were the two significant years (Rieber, 2007, p. 213). Both the international system as such and the domestic system work against whatever is ‘normal’ situation for a strong state.
For the notion of foreign policy ideology, see Carlsnaes (1987).
In practice, many authors who deal with the present tend to conclude also with predictions about the future, both explicitly and at least implicitly. For such predictions, see, for example, Nygren (2008), Baev (2008), Braun (2008), Goldman (2008), Legvold (2008), Lucas (2008).
See Wagnsson et al (2009). For differences with respect to the notion of security, see Wagnsson (2008). For a much more general and rather comprehensive volume on differences between Russia and Europe, see Engelbrekt and Nygren (2010).
To an increasing extent, the organisation has become an economically oriented one, but this should fool no one. It was created as a political organisation and will survive as one as well.
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Nygren, B. Using the neo-classical realism paradigm to predict Russian foreign policy behaviour as a complement to using resources. Int Polit 49, 517–529 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2012.14
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2012.14