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BRICS: Sovereignty power and weakness

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Abstract

The BRICS’ impact can be evaluated based on the degree of political coherence among them, as well as their capacity to influence the international system. This article will from the outset assume that the BRICS form a heterogeneous coalition of often competing powers that share a common fundamental political objective: to erode Western hegemonic claims by protecting the principle which these claims are deemed to most threaten, namely the political sovereignty of states. The BRICS form a coalition of sovereign state defenders. While they do not seek to form an anti-Western political coalition based on a counter-proposal or radically different vision of the world, they are concerned with maintaining their independence of judgment and national action in a world that is increasingly economically and socially interdependent. They consider that state sovereignty trumps all, including, of course, the political nature of its underpinning regimes. Thus, the BRICS – even the democratic ones – fundamentally diverge from the liberal vision of Western countries.

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Notes

  1. This point is cogently noticed by John Ikenberry in the conclusion of his last book (Ikenberry, 2011).

  2. They can nonetheless assert with some justification that the United States, for example, remains fundamentally sovereignist despite its liberal orientation, as evidenced by its action in multilateral institutions and negotiations. For example, the United States is largely responsible for the current deadlock in WTO negotiations, or for the Security Council's total lack of condemnation of Israel on the settlement issue.

  3. For more details on this issue, see the revelations made by Wikileaks (2011).

  4. Interview, Itamaraty May 2011. Brasilia.

  5. Clinton and Amorim's joint press conference in Brasilia (2010).

  6. 6 ‘All three of these countries, besides being developing, are plural, multicultural, multiethnic, multilingual, multi-religious, and share elements of a common economic and political history’, according to Indian ambassador Singh (Carpenter, 2009).

  7. 7 ‘Countries like Brazil, China, India, South Africa and a few others are the ‘new kids on the block’ among global players that shape international relations. They legitimately aspire to greater participation in international institutions, which still suffer from a ‘democratic deficit.’ Global decisions can no longer be made without listening to their voices’ (Amorim, 2010).

  8. 8 Celso Amorim underscores the role of the Cancun conference in the political process of building the BRICS in (2010).

  9. 9 For more details on this case, see Laïdi (2003).

  10. 10 ‘The United States’ main concessions in this round relate to agriculture. This is of interest to Brazil. However, China and India will only consider it politically optimal to further cut their tariffs if their exporters are offered tariffs conducive to their supporting an agreement’ Baldwin, (2011).

  11. 11 Jim O’Neill (2011), who coined the term BRIC, told the BBC it was a mystery as to why South Africa had been invited to participate in their meeting: ‘South Africa is small compared to these countries. South Africa is about half a percent of global GDP. And there are other economies which have much more justification if they were to really look at similar potential to the Brics. Turkey, Indonesia, Mexico, Korea, even Saudi Arabia, Poland. I don’t really understand why the Chinese and the others agreed to it’. While this observation is economically pertinent, it is politically naïve in the sense that the thought process of the BRICS is fundamentally political. South Africa's accession allows the BRICS to include Africa and thus strengthen their international legitimacy.

  12. 12 ‘There is no reason to doubt that the economic potential of the new centres of global economic growth will inevitably be converted into political influence and will strengthen multipolarity’ Putin (2007).

  13. 13 Celso Amorim deliberately overlooks this point when he says: ‘The arrival of the BRICS is revolutionizing the global balance of power by making it more multipolar and more democratic’ Amorim, (2011). Cf. my answer to him: Laïdi (2011).

  14. 14 O Estado de Sao Paulo, 17 July 2011.

  15. 15 In 2001, Chinese exports to India, Russia and Brazil did not exceed 3 billion dollars each. In 2009, Chinese exports to these three countries respectively reached 30, 17 and 14 billion dollars. In less than 10 years, Chinese exports to India have thus increased 10-fold. Source: World Bank.

  16. 16 Interview in l’Estado de Sao Paulo, 17 July 2011.

  17. 17 The New chief of Brazilian diplomacy, Antonio Patriota (2011), provides insights into the new directions of Brazilian diplomacy under the new presidency, in a subtle speech.

  18. 18 With regard to the Teheran Agreement of 17 May 2010, the former chief of Brazilian diplomacy writes that: ‘The insistence on sanctions against Iran – effectively ignoring the Declaration of Tehran, and without even giving Iran time to respond to the comments of the “Vienna Group” (the US, France and Russia) – confirmed the opinions of many analysts who claimed that the traditional centers of power will not share gladly their privileged status’. This interpretation is not false in itself. However, the chief of Brazilian diplomacy is careful not to explain why China and Russia ended up voting for sanctions against Iran. See Amorim (2010).

  19. 19 Interview with Strobe Talbott (2011).

  20. 20 Interviews in Itamaraty, May 2011, Brasilia.

  21. 21 Quite significantly, the Non alignment 2.0 report makes little mention of the BRICS, and when it does the BRICS are considered a strategic option among others: ‘India has also benefited from its engagement with new institutions and groupings like IBSA, BRICS. These ought to be made more robust, while simultaneously newer avenues of strategic engagement should be added: such as the Indian Ocean region (going beyond the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium), Turkey, Indonesia, Iran, GCC, “dialogue of civilisations”, among others. This is part of a strategy of broadening our options and arenas in which we can exercise influence for different purposes’ (Khilnani et al, 2012b).

  22. 22 International Monetary Fund, Fact Sheet: IMF Quotas. http://www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/pdf/quotas.pdf.

  23. 23 ‘This requires abandoning the obsolete unwritten convention that requires that the head of the IMF be necessarily from Europe. We are concerned with public statements made recently by high-level European officials to the effect that the position of Managing Director should continue to be occupied by a European’. In: Statement by the IMF Executive Directors Representing Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa on the Selection Process for Appointing an IMF Managing Director (2011) Press Release No. 11/195, 24 May. http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11195.htmm.

  24. 24 For more on Beijing's support for Lagarde's candidacy (2011).

  25. 25 Brazilians are among the most hostile to the Fed's monetary policy, which is conducive to speculative capital flows to them. However, the situation was more complex with regard to the DSK succession case. The Brazilian representative to the IMF and the Brazilian Central Bank Governor seemed to favor Brazilian support for the Mexican candidacy. The Minister of Finance apparently made the decision to support Mrs Lagarde, since the president did not get involved in the matter at all. According to Valor Economico, 30 June 2011.

  26. 26 According to the Indian Minister of Finance: ‘We are working together with the BRICS countries. It is difficult to say at right this moment because there is a divergence of views in respect of different candidates’. Cited in Indian Ministry of Finance (2011) Also see: The Economist (2011).

  27. 27 For a sober assessment of the performances of the BRICS made by these countries’ representatives, see BRICS.

  28. 28 The head of Brazilian diplomacy recently affirmed that his country's abstention on resolution 1973 was akin to a ‘caution’ signal. The big question is what this signal meant: caution to the Libyan regime, or caution to the West, which might be tempted to move too swiftly and too strongly. He probably meant a combination of the two. See his interview in O Estado de Sao Paulo, 17 July 2011.

  29. 29 ‘Brazil will not accept a document that is identical to the one that was passed against Libya and that led to airstrikes’, Declaration from the Brazilian Minister of Foreign Affairs, cited in: Folha de Sao Paulo, 10 June 2011.

  30. 30 Folha de Sao Paulo, 16 June 2011.

  31. 31 Cited in O Estado de Sao Paulo, 17 July 2010.

  32. 32 O Estado de Sao Paulo, 21 June 2011.

  33. 33 See the interview with the Brazilian Foreign Minister, O Globo, 7 August 2011.

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Laïdi, Z. BRICS: Sovereignty power and weakness. Int Polit 49, 614–632 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2012.17

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