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‘Waltz, Mearsheimer and the post-Cold War world: The rise of America and the fall of structural realism’

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Abstract

The explanatory power of structural realism in the post-Cold War world has been hotly debated in the international relations literature. Critics pronounce the death of structural realism in this new world order, whereas proponents maintain that this approach still manages to shed a great deal of light on international affairs, even after the end of the Cold War. In this article, the two main branches of structural realism, Kenneth Waltz’s defensive realism and John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, are challenged on their own terms to assess whether they are still useful in explaining world politics in the post-Cold War era. The results indicate that neither Waltz’s defensive realism nor Mearsheimer’s offensive realism can account for international politics under hegemony or unipolarity, and that their theories have consequently had no explanatory power since the end of the Cold War.

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Notes

  1. Although there has been a debate on whether the post-Cold War world has been unipolar, multipolar or something else, there is widespread agreement that the United States has been the most powerful state in the international system since the fall of the Soviet Union.

  2. Whether or not Waltz should be regarded as a defensive realist has been debated in the literature. For conflicting interpretations, see, for example, (J. Snyder, 1991 p. 12, n. 36; Labs, 1997, p. 8; Kydd, 2005, p. 14, n. 14). With that said, Waltz is usually considered a defensive realist because he refutes Mearsheimer’s offensive realist hypothesis that states seek to maximize relative power, and maintains that states attempt to accumulate ‘an appropriate amount’ of power instead (Waltz, 1988, p. 616). Waltz (1988, p. 625) also writes that ‘[t]he excessive accumulation of power by one state or coalition of states elicits the opposition of others’. Therefore, ‘states can seldom afford to make maximizing power their goal. International politics is too serious a business for that’ (Waltz, 1979, p. 127). Finally, Waltz (1979, p. 126) notes that the ‘first concern of states is not to maximize power, but to maintain their positions in the system’. For these reasons Waltz is regarded as a defensive realist in this article.

  3. For publications on hegemony and unipolarity, see, for example, (Wohlforth, 1999; Brooks and Wohlforth, 2008; Monteiro, 2011; Schweller and Pu, 2011; Layne, 2012). Also, see the special issue in World Politics on unipolarity that includes the following articles: (Finnemore, 2009; Ikenberry et al, 2009; Jervis, 2009; Mastanduno, 2009; J. Snyder et al, 2009; Walt, 2009; Wohlforth, 2009).

  4. As we will see, Mearsheimer’s offensive realism makes a distinction between regional and global hegemony, and it is global hegemony that is especially problematic for offensive realism. Waltz’s defensive realism, however, does not make any distinction between regional and global hegemony and only considers global hegemony.

  5. As will be demonstrated, the enduring features of the international system, such as anarchy, are not sufficient to save either Waltz’s defensive realism or Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, as hegemony and unipolarity pose inherent difficulties for both of these theories that make them defunct irrespective of other structural features of the system.

  6. As we will see, offensive realism does not necessarily lose all of its explanatory power under regional hegemony, but only under the condition of global hegemony or unipolarity.

  7. In this regard, Waltz (2000a, pp. 36–37) writes, ‘the task will exceed America’s economic, military, demographic, and political resources; and the very effort to maintain a hegemonic position is the surest way to undermine. The effort to maintain dominance stimulates some countries to work to overcome it’. Waltz (2000a, p. 38) also notes that ‘[t]he United States cannot prevent a new balance of power from forming. It can hasten its coming as it has been earnestly doing’.

  8. For other offensive realist publications, see, for example, (Labs, 1997; Layne, 2002; Elman, 2004).

  9. For a different conception of anarchy and hierarchy than that offered by Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, see, for example, (Donnelly, 2006; Lake, 2009).

  10. As Mearsheimer (2001, p. 422, n. 60) himself explicitly points out, his offensive realism is designed ‘to explain both the foreign policy of individual states and international outcomes’.

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Acknowledgements

I thank David Blagden, Michael Cox, Adrian Hyde-Price, Bob Jervis, Shiping Tang, Bill Wohlforth and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. A previous version of this article was presented at the 2013 Annual ISA Convention in San Francisco, USA.

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  1. Politics, Languages & International Studies, Office 1WN 2.25, University of Bath, Bath, BA2 7AY, UK

    Arash Heydarian Pashakhanlou

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Pashakhanlou, A. ‘Waltz, Mearsheimer and the post-Cold War world: The rise of America and the fall of structural realism’. Int Polit 51, 295–315 (2014). https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2014.16

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