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Framing identity in Iran: Culture, conflict and the West

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Abstract

Foreign policy scholars do not often approach understanding the conflict between Iran and the West over the nuclear issue in terms of identity politics. Many observers would argue that strategic issues take center stage and drive the positions of the leaders on both sides. However, such a position assumes that leaders in Iran and in the West have a unified approach to the conflict. While a strategic approach might suggest that the trial agreement signed in the fall of 2013 resulted from Iran’s economic desperation brought on by tightened sanctions, there remain hardliners within Iran who did not want to see cooperation with the West despite the potential for Iran’s economic gains. We continue to see mixed reactions to the April 2015 framework agreement. Looking to the past (2005–2010) using a systematic, empirical approach to mapping these views offers greater understanding of the ways in which Iranian leaders viewed the nuclear negotiations with the West. In turn, what we learn from this period informs our effort to understand the negotiations as they continue today. Key findings are differentiation across the various leaders in terms of which strategies they use, as well as differentiation within each leader over time in the strategies they use. While observers largely agree that the nuclear issue has been elevated in Iranian politics, this analysis shows that there is actually much debate about what it means in terms of steps forward and orientation toward the West and demonstrates that we can create better tools to map these debates.

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Notes

  1. This agreement exchanged ‘limited, temporary, targeted, and reversible’ sanctions relief for Iran with the freezing of many aspects of Iran’s nuclear program. See Katzman and Kerr (2015).

  2. According to Nader (2013), Rouhani falls within this group.

  3. The author wishes to thank Michael Young at Social Science Automation, Inc. for his generous assistance. See http://www.socialscienceautomation.com/ for more information about SSA.

  4. I have not reported all the data here, which includes information about the subjects and targets of the strategies.

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Appendix

Appendix

Identity strategy coding

For the Identity strategy, the coding program discerns the groups to which the leader refers and if they are employed as ‘self’ or ‘other.’ The author then, based on a list of labels compiled by the author from a different set of documents than those coded for this study, categorized the ingroup (‘self’) names as ‘direct’ (which is more exclusive, see above) or ‘regional/global level’ (which is more inclusive). For example, if a leader referred to the ingroup as Iran, Iranian nation, Iranians and so on, it was coded as ‘direct.’ If instead the leader used labels such as ‘developing nations’, ‘Islamic peoples’, or ‘states of the Middle East’, it was coded as ‘regional/global level.’ The more direct ingroup labels a leader uses compared with regional/global labels, the more exclusive that leader is in his depiction of ingroup boundaries. In order to simplify the look at the data, an exclusivity index was created. It is simply the ratio of the number of direct ingroup references to the number of ingroup references at the regional and global level.

Justice and governance strategy coding

The coding program also recorded, by sentence, when/if a leader used the Justice (negative or positive) and/or Governance (negative or positive) strategies. Key indicators for either the negative or positive Justice strategy include discussion of the situation of the group being described. The negative variant of the Justice strategy (or Injustice) is present when the leader dwells on the fact that the group ‘deserves more than we have’. Here the group as a group (not just individuals) is subject to unfairness, is making unreasonable sacrifices, or is not being adequately rewarded for its efforts. A leader using this strategy describes the struggle of the group and/or the poor situation in which a group finds itself. Phrases such as ‘the right to self-determination’ and the ‘right to struggle against foreign oppression’ also indicate this strategy. For the positive variant, a leader focuses on the group being treated fairly or more fairly than in the past, and/or on the recent gains that have been or are being made. Leaders using the positive spin have a theme of achieving success and overcoming particular obstacles that had held the group back.

Both the positive and negative variants of the Governance strategy are indicated by discussions of institutions, laws, alliances with other states, elites, or parties, proposals for change, taking part in talks. A leader employs the negative variant when the emphasis is on the harm that has been done, is being done, or will be done to a group by these factors. Also, a leader is using this strategy if he is describing talks that failed. A leader focusing on the benefits and/or need for particular laws, alliances, or talks is using the positive variant.

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Grove, A. Framing identity in Iran: Culture, conflict and the West. Int Polit 52, 549–566 (2015). https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2015.25

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