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Two-level games and trade cooperation: What do we now know?

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Abstract

A large body of literature in international relations has attempted to explain the interaction between domestic politics and International Relations in the field of trade policy. This article provides new critical insight into the literature on two-level games published during the last 25 years and their contribution to the study of international trade cooperation. I will outline the relevant two-level games literature to establish what we already know about international bargaining and domestic sources of multilateral trade cooperation. I first examine two major perspectives, the domestic political approach and the systemic (international) perspective by presenting a critical review of the literature. I then identify new avenues for theoretical and empirical research in the field. I suggest that to bridge the present rigid division between Comparative Politics and International Relations we need two-level games studies in the following areas: cross-country comparisons on domestic political processes; actor interactions at different levels; comparison of international bargaining processes; and middle-range theory-building.

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Notes

  1. Individual level or first-image theories explain IR in terms of the personal characteristics of individual statesmen. Domestic-level explanations (the second image) focus on the internal organization of states. Finally, international-level explanations (the third image) look at a nation-state's position in the international system and argue that outcomes are determined by international structures (Waltz, 1959).

  2. Gourevitch (2002) distinguishes between systemic, society-centred and state-centred approaches. In an earlier study, he even outlined five different approaches: production profile, intermediate associations, state structure, economic ideology and international system (Gourevitch, 1986). Moravcsik (1993) in turn distinguishes between society-centred, state-centred approaches and theories of society relations. This differentiation is somewhat redundant as society-centred approaches and theories of society relations refer to the same aspects.

  3. The term comes from Mosley (2005).

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Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Stefano Bartolini, Riccardo Crescenzi, Michael E. Cox, Klaus Goetz, Adrienne Héritier, Ellen M. Immergut, André Kaiser and the anonymous referees for their comments on earlier versions of this article. A previous version of this article was presented at the Robert Schuman Center at the European University Institute. Thanks are also due to Mark William Jones, Helen Morris and Rhodes Barrett for their English-language editing support that greatly improved the text. This article forms part of a broad research project on Negotiating Trade Liberalization at the WTO, which was recently published in the International Political Economy Series of Palgrave Macmillan.

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    Eugénia da Conceição-Heldt

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da Conceição-Heldt, E. Two-level games and trade cooperation: What do we now know?. Int Polit 50, 579–599 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1057/ip.2013.15

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