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The Great Financial Crisis: Setting priorities for new statistics

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Abstract

Every financial crisis brings in its wake demands for more information; the latest one is no exception. Because, in deceptively tranquil times, it is well-nigh impossible to foster the consensus necessary to improve data availability, such a window of opportunity must not be missed. To be sure, the main reason why crises occur is not lack of statistics but the failure to interpret them correctly and to take remedial action. But better statistics can no doubt be a big help. Priorities for new data collections include better property prices and, above all, comprehensive financial information for banks on a consolidated and global basis, covering their balance sheets but also their income statements. This could be usefully complemented with corresponding information on the international geography of these banks’ operations and, for crisis management purposes, with much more timely and granular data on their bilateral exposures. The collection of information should be based on sound governance arrangements, flexible and cost-efficient. The BIS can play and is playing a very active role.

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Acknowledgements

I thank Wayne Byers, Dietrich Domanski, Ingo Fender, Jacob Gyntelberg, Bob McCauley, Pat McGuire, Denis Pêtre, Pradhan Swapan-Kumar, Kostas Tsatsaronis, Paul van den Bergh and Philip Wooldridge for helpful comments and suggestions. The views expressed are my own and do not necessarily reflect those of the BIS.

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This essay was prepared for a keynote presentation at the conference ‘The future of regulatory data and analytics’, Bank of England, Centre for Central Banking Studies, London, 17–18 January 2013.

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Borio, C. The Great Financial Crisis: Setting priorities for new statistics. J Bank Regul 14, 306–317 (2013). https://doi.org/10.1057/jbr.2013.9

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