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Expert advice and political choice in constructing European banking union

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Abstract

International actors promoted the transfer of regulatory authority and financial resources from national governments to the European Union (EU) in the context of establishing the prerequisites for financial stability in Europe through banking union. It was supplied, however, by a political process that kept significant resources in resolution and deposit insurance largely in national hands. This article examines the politics behind those decisions, and how the hybrid of European and national competences affects bank regulation and financial stability in the EU. It concludes that the tension between strong EU supervisory powers and weak capacity to deal with insolvent institutions will persist.

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Acknowledgements

The author gratefully acknowledges helpful comments by Rachel Epstein, Randall Germain, Martin Rhodes, Huw Macartney, Mark Cassell and Zdenek Kudrna.

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Authors and Affiliations

  1. Department of Public Administration, University of Twente, RA 4250, P.O. Box 217, 7500 AE Enschede, Netherlands

    Shawn Donnelly

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  1. Shawn Donnelly
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Correspondence to Shawn Donnelly.

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Donnelly, S. Expert advice and political choice in constructing European banking union. J Bank Regul 17, 104–118 (2016). https://doi.org/10.1057/jbr.2015.13

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