1. ¹Department of Management, School of Business Administration, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA
2. ²Department of Management, Fisher College of Business, The Ohio State University, Columbus, USA

Correspondence: Y Luo, Department of Management, School of Business Administration, University of Miami, 417 Jenkins Building, Coral Gables, FL 33124-9145, USA. Tel: +1 305 284 4003; Fax: +1 305 284 3655; E-mail: yadong@miami.edu

Received 19 April 2005; Revised 1 September 2006; Accepted 23 August 2007; Published online 14 February 2008.

Abstract

This article applies the dialectical logic of loose coupling to interpartner exchanges in order to analyze the dynamics of global strategic alliances. We develop a typology of control and cooperation that defines alliance states or situations according to their level of cooperation under private and collective control. In the private control–cooperation interplay, contending, honeymoon, and coopetition situations arise, depending on the levels of private control and cooperation. In the collective control–cooperation interplay, the loosely connected, the equity hostage, the tightly integrated, and the trusting states emerge according to the levels of collective control and cooperation. We illustrate how an individual partner strategically responds to the control–cooperation interplay under each situation or state, and develop hypotheses explicating how these strategic responses are influenced by relational characteristics such as goal congruity, resource complementarity, and bargaining asymmetry between foreign and local partners.