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Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad

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Abstract

This article seeks to substantiate theoretically Marc Sageman's claims of a ‘leaderless jihad’ through the application of the conceptual framework offered by the novel scientific paradigm of complexity theory. It is argued that jihadist networks, such as those behind the September 11 attacks and the bombings in London and Madrid, can be profitably understood in terms of complex adaptive systems, emergent organisations that coalesce and self-organise in a decentralised fashion. Complexity sheds new light on the jihadist movement by providing an account of the bottom-up self-organisation of its networks and the systems of distributed intelligence which allow those networks to operate and pursue successful attacks on the basis of partial and localised information, and this despite the strenuous efforts at counter-terrorism deployed by states.

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Notes

  1. A range of texts can be referred to for a non-technical introduction to complexity theory and non-linear science, among which are Prigogine and Stengers (1985), Prigogine (1996), Lewin (1992), Waldrop (1992), Capra (1996), Stewart (2002) and Gleick (1987). Taylor (2001) provides a stimulating reflection on the wider social and cultural ‘moment of complexity’.

  2. See Bousquet and Curtis (2011) for a more detailed argument for the value of complexity theory as a social ontology for the reinvigoration of systems thinking in the study of global politics. The early pioneering attempts to apply complexity to International Relations include such seminal works as those of Rosenau (1990) and Jervis (1997). For the computational approach of agent-based modelling, see Marchi and Page (2008) and Geller (2011).

  3. For further accounts of the growing influence of complexity theory in the theories and practices of war, and notably within the US military, see Bousquet (2008, 2009).

  4. This is in contrast with the fundamental assumption underpinning the tradition of Western science, according to which ‘you don’t have to take into account the falling of a leaf on some planet in another galaxy when you’re trying to account for the motion of a billiard ball on a pool table on earth. Very small influences can be neglected. There's a convergence in the way things work, and arbitrarily small influences don’t blow up to have arbitrarily large effects’ (Gleick 1987: 15).

  5. In contrast, negative feedback counters perturbations and preserves the stability of a system through recursive loops. Negative feedback was at the heart of cybernetics, an early precursor of complexity theory that studied the stabilising homeostatic mechanisms common to living beings and machines (as embodied in thermostats, self-guided missiles, or animal metabolism). While shifting their focus to the productive effects of positive feedback (until then essentially viewed as entirely destructive), complexity scientists do still see negative feedback as complementary in moderating run-away processes of change. In practice, most if not all living systems will display both types of feedback. The seminal formulation of cybernetics remains Norbert Wiener's Cybernetics or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine (1949).

  6. Peter Hedström (2005: 25) likewise argues against covering laws and in favour of a mechanism-based approach within which a social mechanism describes ‘a constellation of entities and activities that are organised such that they regularly bring about a particular type of outcome’. I do not however share his commitment to methodological individualism, nor do I believe it to be a logical correlate of a mechanistic approach.

  7. The notion of a coherent organisation called al-Qaeda first emerged during the FBI-led investigation into the bombing of the African embassies in 1998. For legal reasons, it was convenient to claim that suspected individuals were members of an organisation in order to facilitate their prosecution. This was due to reliance on a legal framework originally set up to deal with mafia-like criminal enterprises.

  8. Stadler (2006: 170−5) convincingly argues for the direct influence that complexity theorists such as Fritjof Capra had on Castells during his time at Berkeley.

  9. A similar story can be told regarding the Algerian network dismantled in Spain in 2004, which had formed from the remnants of previous GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé) networks (Jordan and Horsburgh 2005: 183).

  10. Al-Qaeda has at different times called for the removal of US troops from Saudi Arabia, the retreat of Western influence in the Middle East, and the resolution of the Israel–Palestine conflict, but these appear either essentially opportunistic or just facets of the broader jihadist aspiration to a global Islamic revival rather than substantive demands that might prompt a cessation of the call to jihad upon being acceded to. It is particularly noteworthy that Hamas, a violent Islamist group with clear political and territorial demands, has consistently shunned al-Qaeda.

  11. For complexity theorists, the key characteristic of life and its unique capacity for creativity and adaptability is that it lies in between highly ordered structures, which are resilient but unable to alter their internal organisation or their external behaviour (minerals, for example), and chaotic systems, whether non-linearly determined or stochastic, which are too fluid and transient to generate any enduring forms (such as particles within a gas).

  12. This does not however mean that Western states have no past experience of dealing with such decentralised modes of operation or that there is anything specifically non-Western about them. As noted by one of the anonymous reviewers, similarly decentralised operational practices were implemented from 1977 by the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) to minimise the risk of police and military disruption of individual cells. Nevertheless, in comparison with al-Qaeda, the IRA arguably maintained a clearer command structure above the cell level along with an association with a political party legitimately contesting elections.

  13. See ‘Madrid Bombing Probe Finds No al-Qaeda Link’, MSNBC.com, 9 March, 2006, available at http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/11753547/from/RL.1/ (accessed 15 March, 2010); and ‘Leak Reveals Official Story of London Bombings’, The Guardian, 9 April, 2006, available at http://politics.guardian.co.uk/labour/story/0,,1750264,00.html (accessed 15 March, 2010). Reports of a known terrorist mastermind entering and leaving the UK just before the 7/7 bombings or of any tangible connection to senior al-Qaeda figures have proven so far unfounded. For one police source, ‘All the talk about “Mr Bigs” and al-Qaeda masterminds looks like something from a film script at the moment. Of course, things could change if new intelligence comes through, but it looks increasingly as if these people were largely working on their own. It is not something we expected’ (Phythian 2005: 370). However, contact with jihadist figures and some form of operational training may have occurred when two of the bombers (Siddeque Khan and Shazad Tanweer) went to Pakistan between November 2004 and February 2005 (Intelligence and Security Committee 2006).

  14. One anonymous reviewer correctly points out the need also to consider the role that state agencies may play in supporting certain militant groups for their own ends, in the way the CIA did with the mujahedin during the Soviet War in Afghanistan, or how parts of the Pakistan ISI probably do to this day. This does not fundamentally alter the analysis, however, but suggests the need for further detail in the examination of the multifarious relationships jihadists entertain with their environment and the other actors within it.

  15. Edgar Morin (1977: 80) uses the term ‘dialogic’ to encapsulate the simultaneous competition, antagonism and complementarity of distinct logics, here those of hierarchy and network. A close parallel can be drawn to Deleuze and Guattari's understanding of their concepts of ‘tree’ and ‘rhizome’ and the relation between them (1987). There is not the space here to develop this argument in greater depth, but it is worth noting the influence of precursor sciences to complexity on the thought of Deleuze and Guattari, the interface of which has been subsequently developed by DeLanda (2004, 2006) and Bonta and Protevi (2006).

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Acknowledgements

I would like to thank Simon Curtis and the anonymous reviewers for their thoughtful comments and helpful suggestions in response to earlier versions of this article, along with the editorial team of the Journal of International Relations and Development for their diligence and valuable guidance throughout the review process.

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Bousquet, A. Complexity theory and the War on Terror: understanding the self-organising dynamics of leaderless jihad. J Int Relat Dev 15, 345–369 (2012). https://doi.org/10.1057/jird.2011.24

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