¹College of the Holy Cross

^*The author thanks Donald R. Brand, James Garand, Ric Hula, Robert Kerstein, Daniel P. Klinghard, Arthur Melzer, Michael Mintrom, David Schaefer, John C. Weicher, Jerry Weinberger, and Richard Zinman along with the anonymous reviewers for Polity for helpful comments. Thanks also to John Engler, Bill Schuette, and Patricia Birkholz for allowing access to the legislative process for this case study. This research was partially funded by a fellowship from the H.B. Earhart Foundation.

Abstract

This article considers the relationship between policy design and the pattern of interests attracted to the political arena. It examines legislation crafted by a large coalition of diverse interests that designed policy favorable to problem solving. This is the kind of policymaking that regime theorists identify with social production—but also one considered a rare circumstance. Previous attempts at passing similar legislation failed because the problem was defined narrowly and the political arena contained only two stakeholders, offering no opportunity to introduce a change that benefited one without harming the other. Success required redefining the problem and changing the nature of the political arena in a manner similar to that described by Schattschneider. By doing so, diverse interests discovered a way to benefit collectively. The present case therefore demonstrates the advantage of coupling the strategic insight of Schattschneider with the normative goals of regime theorists.