Article
Polity (2007) 39, 479–501. doi:10.1057/palgrave.polity.2300086
Constitutionalism, Judiciary, and Democracy in Islamic Societies*
Güne
Murat Tezcür1
1Loyola University Chicago
*I express my gratitude to Said Arjomand, Claudio Katz, Robert Mayer, Arlene Saxonhouse, the editor of Polity, Andrew Polsky, and three anonymous reviewers for Polity for their valuable comments.
Abstract
This article reconsiders the relationship between secularism, liberalism, and democracy in non-secularized societies by focusing on judicial activism. The goal is to identify the forms of constitutionalism and judicial review that are necessary for the sustainability of democracy in societies where exclusive and holistic interpretations of religion remain pervasive. How is it possible to prevent majority rule from decaying into the tyranny of the majority in such societies? Neither the guardianship regimes embodied by the Iranian and Turkish republics nor Islamic democracy provide viable models that overcome the tension between constitutionalism and democracy. However, a conflict between these two principles in Islamic societies is avoidable. Judicial review, sanctioned by democratically written liberal constitutions and not guarded by non-elected institutions such as military, would be a guardian of individual and minority rights in Islamic societies.
Keywords:
democracy, secularism, constitution, judiciary, Islam, Iran, Turkey


