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Comparing the ties that bind criminal networks: Is blood thicker than water?

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Abstract

Structural analysis of illicit markets suggests that criminal enterprise is to some degree linked with legitimate enterprise, and that, networks generally comprise groups and clusters of individuals with varying subgroup structural characteristics. Rather than investigating networks formed exclusively through formal organizational ties, this study compares the structure of criminal networks formed by different types of ties (co-offending, kinship, formal organization membership and legitimate business or other non-criminal connections) using p*(exponential random graph) models. The results indicate that kinship and formal organization networks are highly cohesive and have low fragmentation probabilities. Therefore, the results show that blood, both through kinship ties or the metaphoric blood that ties formal criminal organizations is thicker than the ties that bind co-offending groups. Policy implications for policing techniques are also discussed.

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Notes

  1. Organized crime groups may be involved in a wide range of activity that may or may not involve illicit markets. The term criminal enterprise is used here to refer to a subset of activity typically engaged in by organized crime groups that involves business activity aimed at generating profit through producing, distributing, smuggling, retailing, or financing (including money laundering proceeds) commerce of illicit goods or legal commodities in illicit markets.

  2. Traditionally, organized crime operations were described as corporate syndicates (for example Natarajan, 2000). Organizations were depicted as large, hierarchically structured groups that spanned large geographic areas (regional or national) with differentiated roles and entrenched leadership (Brown and Clarke, 2004). These organizations were enduring, stable entities based on loyalty ties. As crime generalists, members of centrally controlled organized crime seek opportunities, and are able to do so because of their ability to tap abundant resources (Brown and Clarke, 2004).

  3. Individuals in the network (or groups of individuals) are referred to as ‘nodes’ and the connections between them are ‘ties’ or links. Characteristics can be assigned to nodes and ties. Collectively, the ties of a network form the social structure.

  4. This is a very simplistic explanation of ERGM. For a more complete mathematical discussion of the technique refer to Robins et al (2007).

  5. This finding appears to contradict notable co-offending research aimed at revealing network characteristics among juvenile delinquents (for example, see Sarnecki, 2001).

  6. The PTA is generated by analysts from the RCMP and Criminal Intelligence Section of British Columbia, with assistance and support from law enforcement agencies located within the Pacific Region.

  7. This annual report consolidates all current strategic information about groups known to be involved in organized crime. The Canadian Criminal Code defines organized crime as a crime committed by any group of at least three people, punishable by more than 5 years in prison, which has a material benefit, meaning the primary motive is profit (C.C.C. Section 467.1). In other words, this includes all activity wherein individuals act cooperatively in a criminal enterprise.

  8. To test the reliability of coding instructions 10 intelligence analysts were provided with two narratives and instructions to extract all individuals (60 people named) while coding all relationships between pairs of people (273 edges or relationships). Reliability tests confirmed consistency on whether links/relationships were found between individuals (0.94 for a tie being coded when a relationship exists between two people) and the nature of the relationship coded (0.97 for formal group link, 0.95 for associate relationships, 0.81 for co-offender links and 0.64 for other relationships including family and legitimate business partners).

  9. Refer to Snijders et al (2004) for a more complete explanation and equations for each parameter used in this study.

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Correspondence to Aili Malm.

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A version of this paper was presented at the International Symposium of Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis held on 17–19 March 2008; Izmir, Turkey. This meeting was hosted by the Turkish National Police. Opinions expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.

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Malm, A., Bichler, G. & Van De Walle, S. Comparing the ties that bind criminal networks: Is blood thicker than water?. Secur J 23, 52–74 (2010). https://doi.org/10.1057/sj.2009.18

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